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This thesis demonstrates the strong similarities between the subtle aspects of 
Austen’s complex characterisations and the perceptions and understandings of 
human psychology that are encompassed within twentieth-century models of 
psychotherapy. In this context, I show how the theoretical frameworks and 
principles that underpin different twentieth-century psychotherapeutic 
approaches facilitate the identification and definition of Austen’s frequently 
acknowledged insights into human nature. While the psychotherapeutic terms 
used in this exploration of Austen’s work have emerged in the post-Austen era, 
there is no suggestion in this discussion that Austen had some prescience of 
future models of psychotherapy. My intent is to highlight the resonances 
between Austen’s insights and modern-day psychotherapeutic formulations, 
and to show how these resonances illuminate Austen’s extraordinary 
psychological perspicuity. The analysis of Austen’s novels from this perspective 
leads to interpretations of Austen’s characters that at times differ substantially 
from existing perceptions and at others reinforce or enhance previous readings. 
The question of whether Austen took a didactic moral position in her novels is a 
central issue within this thesis. I explore the differing opinions expressed in 
existing critiques of her novels in this regard, and challenge the view that 
Austen intended to direct her readers towards a fixed moral code. I argue that 
Austen’s attitude to her craft suggests instead an intention on the author’s part 
to bring about enhanced self-awareness and a movement towards greater self-
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“Sir,” he said, “there is nothing too little for so little a creature as man. It is 
by studying the little things that we attain the greatest knowledge of 
having as little misery and as much happiness as possible” (Johnson to 
Boswell)1 
In this thesis, I explore Jane Austen’s novels from a modern-day 
psychotherapeutic perspective. My reading of the novels is informed by my 
knowledge of the theories and techniques that have influenced 
psychotherapeutic approaches since the early twentieth century, and which 
have underpinned my own work as a practising psychotherapist. From this 
background, I have been struck by the extent to which certain features of 
Austen’s portrayal of her characters, and the interactions that take place 
between them, resonate strongly with the views that modern-day Western 
psychotherapists have of the psychology of the individual, and of the ways in 
which the psychological condition of an individual might affect the nature of 
their interactions with other people. 
Austen’s detailed attention to, and keen insight into, human nature and 
psychology is a quality that commentators have frequently noted since the 
earliest days of the publication of her novels. In 1815 Walter Scott commended 
Austen’s movement away from the popular Gothic and thrilling adventure tales 
of the time towards the portrayal of situations and characters that were more 
true to life:  
That young lady had a talent for describing the involvement and feelings 
and characters of ordinary life which is to me the most wonderful I ever 
met with. The big Bow-Wow strain I can do myself like any now going, but 
the exquisite touch which renders ordinary commonplace things and 
                                            
1 James Boswell, The Life of Samuel Johnson, 2 vols (New York: George Dearborn, 1833), 
I, p. 196. 
2 
 
characters interesting from the truth of the description and sentiment is 
denied to me.2 
This view was reinforced and expanded upon by the contemporary writer and 
reviewer, Richard Whately. In an 1821 article introduced by Brian Southam in 
his Critical Heritage as ‘the most important early nineteenth-century statement 
on Jane Austen’, Whately reflected appreciatively upon fiction which 
by leaving out those accidental irregularities, and exceptions to the rules, 
which constitute the many improbabilities of real narrative, present us 
with a clear and abstracted view of the general rules themselves; and thus 
concentrate, as it were, into a small compass, the net result of wide 
experience.3 (Whately’s italics) 
Whately continued of Austen in particular, ‘Among the authors of this school 
there is no one superior, if equal, to the lady whose last production is now 
before us’, and concluded that readers of Austen’s novels ‘who delight in the 
study of human nature, may improve in the knowledge of it, and in the 
profitable application of that knowledge’.4 
In retrospect, the views of Scott and Whately on Austen may be seen as 
departure points for later commentaries. Reginald Brimley Johnson reinforces 
Scott’s view of Austen’s attention to the commonplace. Comparing Scott with 
Austen, Brimley Johnson writes: 
While he was doing the “big bow-wow strain” […] she was writing on her 
“little bits of ivory” […] her love of truth, one of the strongest elements of 
her nature, was to be revealed in the careful reality of human nature in 
every character and conversation.5   
                                            
2
 Walter Scott, ‘‘Journal’ 14 March 1826’, in Journal of Walter Scott, 1825-26 ed. by J.G Tait 
(Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1939), p. 135. 
3
 See ‘Whately on Austen’ in Jane Austen: The Critical Heritage: Vol. 1: 1811-1870, ed. by Brian C. 
Southam (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968), pp. 87-105 (pp. 87 and 93).  
4
 See Southam, Jane Austen: The Critical Heritage: Vol. 1: 1811-1870, p. 105. 
5
 R. Brimley Johnson, Jane Austen: Her Life, Her Work, Her Family, and Her Critics (London: J. M. 
Dent & Sons Limited, 1930), p.57. Johnson’s allusion to “her little bits of ivory” is of course a reference 
to Austen’s own description of her writing in her letter to her nephew, James; ‘What should I do with 
your strong, manly, spirited Sketches, full of Variety and Glow? – How could I possibly join them on to 
the little bit (two Inches wide) of Ivory on which I work with so fine a Brush, as produces little effect 
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Mary Waldron concurs with Whately that Austen’s dedication to the inclusion 
only of the probable in her novels enabled the author to distil for her readers 
the essence of her experience of human nature. In Waldron’s view, ‘Because we 
are not aghast at the predicaments of Austen’s central characters (as we must 
be with Clarissa, Cecilia, Camilla, Ellis-Juliet, for instance) we can be more open 
to the intricacies of their minds’.6 This has become a widely held view of Austen 
that is succinctly summarised by Susannah Carson who states in the 
Introduction to her collection of essays, ‘Austen is a humanist who seems to 
understand certain eternal truths of human nature’.7 Thus literary critiques 
from the eighteenth century to the twenty-first have comprehensively 
established Austen’s especially acute awareness and perceptions of ‘human 
nature’. 
Interestingly, more recent explorations of Austen’s understanding of 
human nature and psychology as revealed through the ‘intricacies’ of the minds 
of her characters have looked at the author’s work from the perspectives of 
cognitive science and cognitive neuroscience. Cognitive science is interested in 
the way that the brain as a whole functions to bring about various cognitive 
phenomena such as memory, language, perception, attention and reasoning. 
Branches of cognitive science involve linguistics, psychology, neuroscience and 
philosophy. This field thus encompasses questions of mind-brain and mind-
                                                                                                                                       
after much labour?’ See Jane Austen’s Letters, coll. and ed. by Deirdre Le Faye, 4th edn (Oxford: 




 December 1816, pp. 
336-338 (p. 337). Hereafter in this thesis, quotations from letters in Le Faye’s collection will be cited 
as: Letters, followed by the number of the letter in bold, date and year of writing, page(s), in 
parentheses the page(s) on which the quotation is located.  
6
 Mary Waldron, Jane Austen and The Fiction of Her Time (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999, paperback edition, 2001), p. 14. Austen’s commitment to realism in her portrayal of human 
nature is underscored by her wry comments on Mary Brunton’s Self Control in letters that she wrote to 
Cassandra and to Anna Lefroy. To Cassandra, Austen observes that Self Control is ‘an excellently-
meant, elegantly-written Work, without anything of Nature of Probability in it’. Austen continues, ‘I 
declare I do not know whether Laura’s passage down the American River, is not the most natural, 
possible, every-day thing she does.’ To Anna Lefroy, Austen amusingly suggests that she (Austen) 
might improve on Brunton’s work: ‘my Heroine shall not merely be wafted down an American river in a 
boat by herself, she shall cross the Atlantic in the same way, & never stop till she reaches Gravesent.’ 




 October 1813, pp. 242-246 (p. 244), and to Anna 
Lefroy, 111, 24
th
 November 1814, p. 295. 
7
 Susannah Carson, A Truth Universally Acknowledged: 33 Reasons Why We Can’t Stop Reading 
Jane Austen, (London: Particular Books, 2009), p. xix. This collection of essays includes similar 
reflections in essays by, for example, Lionel Trilling, Janet Todd and Ian Watt. 
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body connections.8 Cognitive neuroscience is concerned with the biology of the 
brain, in particular the activity of neurones and neural connections that are 
involved in cognitive processes such as those listed above: memory, language, 
and so on.9 In relation to Austen, John Wiltshire, for example, has provided a 
detailed cognitive scientific and neuroscientific exposition of the significance of 
psychological functions such as memory and the expression of internal states 
through body language and facial expression in Austen’s characterisations.10 
One of the specific areas of cognitive science to which Wiltshire refers relates to 
the influence of levels of attention and emotion on the encoding and retrieval of 
memories.11 In one section he uses findings within this field of research to 
explain Catherine Moreland’s complete inability to remember having seen John 
Thorpe at all on the morning of his proposal of marriage to her, in contrast with 
her constant recall of meetings and exchanges with Henry Tilney. In this 
Wiltshire perceives that ‘Austen seems to have constructed here an egregious 
instance of the dependence of recollection on previous attention’, which he 
later suggests is the basis upon which readers gather that Catherine has no 
interest in Thorpe and is in love with Tilney.12  
From a different angle, writers Alan Richardson and Lisa Zunshine 
explore Austen’s characters and their interactions in the context of the 
                                            
8
 See, for example, José Luis Bermúdez, Cognitive Science: An Introduction to The Science of The 
Mind, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) and The Cambridge Handbook of 
Cognitive Science, ed. by Keith Frankish and William M. Ramsey (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012). For a philosophical slant see Francisco J. Varela, Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch, 
The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience, revised edn (Cambridge Mass: MIT 
Press, 2016). Cognitive science has reached a popular audience through publications such as Daniel 
Kahneman’s Thinking Fast and Slow (London: Penguin Books, 2011) and Malcolm Gladwell’s Blink: 
The Power of Thinking Without Thinking (London: Penguin Books, 2005) which review cognitive 
scientific studies of the processes of reasoning and decision-making, and Daniel Gilbert’s Stumbling 
on Happiness: Why the Future Won’t Feel the Way You Think It Will (London: Harper Press, 2006) 
which covers research into the relationship between the brain and emotions. 
9
 Most prominent in this field is Michael Gazzaniga whose seminal introductory text is now in its fourth 
edition; Michael S. Gazzaniga, Richard B. Ivry & George R. Mangun, Cognitive Neuroscience: The 
Biology of The Mind (New York and London: W. W. Norton and Company Ltd., 2014). See also Paul 
L. Nunez, The New Science of Consciousness: Exploring the Complexity of Brain, Mind and Self 
(New York: Prometheus Books, 2016). 
10
 John Wiltshire, The Hidden Jane Austen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
11
 Wiltshire draws on work by, for example, Michael Posner, Cognitive Neuroscience of Attention, 2nd 
edn (New York: Guildford Press, 2012), and Elizabeth Styles, The Psychology of Attention, 2nd edn 
(Hove and New York: Psychology Press, 2006). 
12
 Wiltshire, The Hidden Jane Austen, see pp. 12-18, (p. 13). See also, Natalie M. Phillips and others, 
‘Patterns of Attention and Memory in Jane Austen’, in Beth Lau, ed., Jane Austen and the Sciences of 
the Mind (London & New York: Routledge, 2018), pp. 156-179.  
5 
 
cognitive scientific concept of ‘Theory of Mind’. Cognitive scientist, Alvin 
Goldman, defines Theory of Mind as ‘the cognitive capacity to attribute mental 
states to self and others’.13 In other words, a person’s theory of mind 
constitutes their ability to recognise that they themselves have mental states 
such as beliefs, desires, knowledge and opinions, and that other people may 
have different such mental states from themselves. In order to glean the mental 
or emotional states of others, people pay attention to non-verbal signs such as 
direction of gaze, facial expression, physical gestures and tone of voice. 
Richardson applies the notion of Theory of Mind to his analysis of Emma: 
in Emma […] Austen represents a repertoire of interpersonal behaviours 
that can best be described and understood in relation to theories of 
Theory of the Mind. Placing her characters in situations that force them to 
guess and guess again at one another’s intentions, beliefs, and emotional 
states, Austen shows how pervasively they rely on social-cognitive 
strategies closely analogous to those that cognitive neuroscientists 
currently study under the rubric of “theory of mind”.14 
The ‘social-cognitive strategies’ that Richardson identifies in his analysis are 
indeed those that, according to cognitive neuroscientists, inform an individual’s 
theory of mind, including even ‘the movements of blood under the skin’. 
Richardson concludes: 
The narrative attention and descriptive clarity that Austen brings to these 
intersubjective transactions and the sense of conscious purpose that her 
characters sometimes bring to the effort of “mind reading” invite us to 
consider Austen herself as an early theorist of what is now called “Theory 
of Mind.” (p. 81) 
                                            
13
 See Alvin I. Goldman, ‘Theory of Mind’, in The Oxford Handbook of The Philosophy of Cognitive 
Science, ed. by Eric Margolis, Richard Ian Samuels and Stephen P. Stich (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012), p. 402. For Richardson and Zunshine on Austen and Theory of Mind, see Alan 
Richardson, The Neural Sublime: Cognitive Theories and Romantic Texts (Baltimore: The John 
Hopkins University Press, 2010), especially Chapter 5, ‘Reading Minds — and Bodies — in Emma’, 
pp. 79-97, and Lisa Zunshine, ‘Why Jane Austen was different, and why we may need cognitive 
science to see it’, in Yearbook of Research in English and American Literature (2008), 24, 141-161. 
14
 See Alan Richardson, The Neural Sublime, p. 81. Further quotations from this publication are cited 
in brackets following a quote or series of quotes from the same page of the publication. 
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Zunshine concurs with Richardson’s summation, and observes that it is the 
degree of attentiveness to the minds and emotional states of others which 
Austen attributes to her characters that is indicative of their degree of 
sensitivity, rather than their outward expressions of emotionality and ‘greedy 
self-consciousness’.15 This perspective from Theory of Mind offers an 
interesting standpoint from which we might perceive Austen’s departure from 
the contemporary fashion for the sentimental novel. As John Mullan succinctly 
explains of David Hume, Samuel Richardson and Lawrence Sterne, these were 
all writers for whom the development of social bonds and harmonious social 
interaction depended upon the outward ‘communication of passions and 
sentiments’.16 For Zunshine, the most sophisticated and skilled social 
communicators in Austen’s novels are not those who feel and express their 
emotions most effusively. Rather they are those who have a highly developed 
theory of mind, and who mediate their behaviour and expressions of thought 
and emotions accordingly.17  
Immaterial Anachronism or Illuminating ‘Interdisciplinarity’ 
Reflection upon Austen’s work in twentieth- and twenty-first century cognitive 
neuroscientific terms such as ‘theory of mind’ is not unproblematic. In his 
Introduction to The Neural Sublime, Alan Richardson acknowledges concerns 
held by some literary critics that modern cognitive scientific readings of the 
literature of past eras are immaterial and unenlightening because they do not 
take into account the historical, cultural and linguistic contexts within which 
these works were produced.18 From this perspective, to describe Austen’s 
depiction of the communicative interplay between her characters in terms of 
Theory of Mind theory is unedifying. The concept of Theory of Mind did not 
                                            
15
 Zunshine, ‘Why Jane Austen was different’, p. 146.  
16
 John Mullan, Sentiment and Sociability: The Language of Feeling in the Eighteenth Century 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), p. 2. I discuss Eighteenth-Century sentimentalism and its influence 
on Austen further during the course of this thesis, in particular in Chapter Two to follow.  
17
 See also Beth Lau’s chapter, ‘Catherine Moreland’s Education in Mindreading in Northanger 
Abbey’, in Lau, ed., Jane Austen and the Sciences of the Mind, pp. 37-57. 
18
 See also Richardson’s attention to Professor of History of Science, Anne Harrington, who cautioned 
that ‘Historians are creatures of their time no less than the people they study’ and warned against the 
use of history as ‘a vehicle to hunt for the present in an earlier age’. See Anne Harrington, Medicine, 
Mind and the Double Brain: A Study in Nineteenth Century Thought (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 5, and cited in Alan Richardson, British Romanticism and the 
Science of the Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 3. 
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exist in Austen’s time, therefore it would hardly be possible for Austen to have 
conceived of patterns of communication in ways that conform to Theory of 
Mind. Equally, from this viewpoint, Austen could not have illustrated ‘the 
dependence of recollection on previous attention’, as Wiltshire proposes, 
because the scientific research into the aspect of cognition which revealed that 
dependence had not yet been carried out.19 I am aware that this thesis may be 
subject to a challenge on similar grounds since all of the psychotherapeutic 
terms that I use in my discussion of Austen’s work have emerged in the post-
Austen era, including the words ‘psychotherapy’, ‘psychotherapist’ and 
‘psychotherapeutic’ themselves.20  
In response to such reservations, I would refer to Richardson’s 
acknowledgement of N. Katherine Hayles’ notion of ‘constrained 
constructivism’.21 Constrained constructivism recognises the historical and 
cultural constraints on current perceptions and interpretations, and yet 
‘attempts to excavate from an abstracted shorthand the complexities that unite 
subject and object in a dynamic, interactive, on-going process of perception and 
social construction’.22 As Hayles notes, this dynamic process cannot construct a 
perfect match between past and present understandings and representations, 
yet it does not indicate resemblances arbitrarily. Rather it ‘engages in a rhetoric 
of “good enough”’, where ‘enough consistencies obtain in the processing and in 
the flux to make recognition reliably and relatively stable’.23 So, when 
Richardson and Zunshine refer to Theory of Mind, and Wiltshire to the 
processes involved in the encoding and retrieval of memories in their analyses 
of Austen’s work, I assume that they neither seek to assert an exact 
correspondence between Austen’s understanding of human psychology and 
                                            
19
 Analogous to this is the view held by some reviewers that it is unhelpful and inappropriate to use 
the term ‘feminist’ in relation to Austen and her work since the word ‘feminist’ was not in use until 
the1880s. See Devoney Looser, ed. Jane Austen and The Discourses of Feminism (London: 
Macmillan, 1995), p. 3.  
20
 The OED records the first use of the words ‘psychotherapy’, ‘psychotherapist’ and 
‘psychotherapeutic’ as occurring from the mid- to late nineteenth century. 
21
 See N. Katherine Hayles, ‘Constrained Constructivism: Locating Scientific Inquiry in the Theatre of 
Representation’, in Realism and Representation: Essays on the Problem of Realism in Relation to 
Science, Literature and Culture, ed. by George Levine (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1993), 27-43. 
22
 Hayles, p. 32. 
23
 Hayles, p. 32. In this light, see Mary Crane, Shakespeare’s Brain: Reading with Cognitive Theory 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). 
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that of twentieth- and the twenty-first century cognitive scientists, nor to 
propose that she was somehow prescient of future discoveries in the cognitive 
scientific schools. What these writers do demonstrate is that it is possible to 
identify similarities between the behaviours and interactions of Austen’s 
characters and the psychological processes identified by cognitive scientific 
research, sufficient to elucidate Austen’s psychological insights more 
specifically, and to show how this can enhance our comprehension and 
appreciation of her characters.24 As Richardson explains in relation to his 
exploration of scientists of the brain in the Romantic era, ‘It is less a matter of 
insisting on resemblance than of listening for resonance, and allowing that 
resonance to help reopen avenues for scholarly investigation’.25 I present 
readings of Austen from a psychotherapeutic perspective in this thesis in the 
same spirit and with the same aims.  
In addition, I follow Richardson’s further recommendation that modern 
psychological analyses of Austen’s work need not, and indeed should not, 
inappropriately resist, minimise or ignore the significance of the historical and 
cultural context within which the author wrote her novels. He advises that to 
note the coincidence of current cognitive scientific models with representations 
of the past portrayed in her literature is ‘the beginning not the end of the 
process of interrogation’. It is a process that he suggests should include the 
following questions: 
What, if anything, in the social, philosophical, and scientific discourses of 
the time made it possible for Austen to observe these behaviours as such 
and to think them worth representing in her fiction? Can one find 
analogous representations in the early psychological thought of the 
                                            
24
 For further and varied twentieth and twenty-first century cognitive scientific perspectives on 
Romantic and Victorian era literature in general and of Austen in particular, see also Lisa Zunshine, 
Why We Read Fiction: Theory of Mind and The Novel (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2006), 
Brian Boyd, On the Origin of Stories: Evolution, Cognition, and Fiction (Cambridge MA and London: 
Harvard University Press, 2009), David Lodge, Consciousness and The Novel (London: Secker and 
Warburg, 2004), Alan Palmer, Fictional Minds (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 
2004), Blakeley Vermeule, Why Do We Care About Literary Characters? (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2010). In addition, Mindful Aesthetics: Literature and Science of Mind, ed. by Chris 
Danta and Helen Groth (London: Bloomsbury, 2013) presents a wide ranging collection of essays on 
this topic.  
25
 Alan Richardson, British Romanticism and the Science of the Mind, p. 3. 
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period, whether or not one can establish conclusively that Austen had 
read such accounts?  
Along with ‘careful scholarship, serious consideration of alternative 
explanations, critical judgement, and the persuasiveness of specific examples’, 
for Richardson, questions such as these take us back into the historical context 
of the text under analysis, and thus legitimise collaboration between the 
scientific and literary academic communities. (p. 15) He describes this 
collaboration as a ‘new interdisciplinarity’ that serves to bridge ‘the notorious 
but increasingly narrow “gap” between the humanities and the sciences’ in way 
that informs and illuminates both of these fields. (p. ix)26  
In the last decade or so since the emergence of this interdisciplinarity, it 
appears thus far largely to have been constituted of contributions to literary 
criticism from the cognitive sciences and cognitive psychology. The 
psychotherapeutic field from which I draw my interpretations of Austen’s work 
has connections with these psychological sciences. However, its focus and 
intentions are very different, as I will clarify with a definition of psychotherapy, 
and explanations of the different schools of psychotherapy in detail in Chapter 
One of this thesis. Insofar as this thesis might itself be viewed as a foray into the 
‘new interdisciplinarity’, I address the questions that Richardson prescribed in 
relation to relevant discourses and representations prevailing in Austen’s time. 
Where relevant, I refer to novels, poetry, political and philosophical 
commentaries, and journals and conduct books that Austen is known to have 
read, and to those to which it is at least believed she would have had access. In 
particular, I will take account of the likely influence on Austen’s writing of 
essayist Samuel Johnson, Enlightenment thinkers and writers such as Adam 
Smith, John Locke and David Hume, of the Sentimentalists such as Sterne and 
Mackenzie, of Rousseau and Mary Wollstonecraft, as well as of the ancient 
Greek philosophers such as Aristotle and Epictetus, and the Roman 
                                            
26
 Alan Richardson envisages a mutual exchange of insights between science and literature in a way 
that informs and enhances both fields. Interesting in this respect is Sally Shuttleworth’s exploration of 
the ways in which literature informed the developing disciplines of child psychology and psychiatry 
between 1840 and 1900. See Sally Shuttleworth, The Mind of the Child: Child Development in 
Literature, Science and Medicine 1840-1900 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
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Emperor/philosopher Marcus Aurelius.27 Furthermore, throughout the thesis I 
will provide specific examples from Austen’s texts to illustrate and support my 
propositions. 
Psychotherapy: theoretical and practical diversity 
First, it is important to define and explicate the psychotherapeutic background 
that informs my reading of Austen’s novels. The OED (2nd rev. edn) defines the 
term ‘Psychotherapy’ as ‘The treatment of disorders of the mind or personality 
by psychological methods’. The dictionary has the term ‘Psychotherapeutics’ to 
refer to ‘The methods or practice of psychotherapy; the branch of medicine or 
science concerned with this’ and Psychotherapeutic’ defined as ‘Relating to, 
based on, or practising psychotherapy; spec. (in early use) relating to the 
treatment of disease by psychic or hypnotic influence.’ So, when I describe my 
approach to Austen’s novels as ‘psychotherapeutic’ I mean that it is related to 
and based on ‘the methods’ and ‘practice’ of psychotherapy. The methods used 
in the practice of psychotherapy are derived from theoretical concepts of the 
ways in which the human mind and personality develop. These give rise to 
formulations regarding the causes of disorders of the mind and personality; 
formulations which, in turn, indicate the form of psychotherapeutics, or 
psychotherapeutic treatment, that is most likely to be effective in any particular 
case. 
                                            
27
 The earliest accounts of the scope of Austen’s reading are given by her brothers, see 
Henry Austen, ‘Biographical Notice of the Author’, 1817, repr. in Persuasion, ed. by Janet 
Todd and Antje Blank (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), Appendix 2, pp. 
326-332, and James Edward Austen-Leigh, A Memoir of Jane Austen (London: The Folio 
Society, 1989 [Text taken from the 2nd edn of the work published 1871, ed. by R. W. 
Chapman, Clarendon Press, 1926]). For comprehensive overviews of Jane Austen’s literary 
background, see William Baker, Critical Companion to Jane Austen: A Literary Reference to 
Her Life and Work (New York: Facts on File Inc., 2008) and David Gilson, A Bibliography of 
Jane Austen, with new intro. and corrections (Winchester: St. Paul’s Bibliographies, 1997). 
See also Jane Stabler, ‘Literary Influences’, in Jane Austen in Context, ed. by Janet Todd 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 41-50, and the Introductions to the 
Cambridge editions Austen’s works (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006). An 
interesting and useful review with commentary is provided also by Katie Halsey in Chapter 
One of her publication, Jane Austen and her Readers, 1786-1945 (London and New York: 
Anthem Press, 2013), pp. 17-35. For further comments on the novels and poetry in 
particular that engaged Austen, see Paula Byrne, The Real Jane Austen: A Life in Small 
Things (London: HarperPress, 2013), pp. 75-91 and for Austen’s education and reading 
more generally, see Claire Tomalin, Jane Austen: A Life (London: Viking, 1997).   
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It is important to be clear that there is not just one theory of the nature 
of human psychology and interrelationships that is shared and agreed upon by 
all psychotherapists. The various forms of practice that constitute the field of 
modern-day psychotherapy have emerged over the last century or so from very 
different and often contradictory ideas about the psychology and behaviour of 
human beings. Chapter One of this thesis traces the development of these ideas 
and the formation of the main schools of psychotherapy: Freudian 
Psychoanalysis, Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy (CBT), and finally the 
Humanistic schools of Gestalt, Transactional Analysis (TA), and the hugely 
influential Client-Centered model of counselling.28 The validity of the 
theoretical foundations of the different schools and the relative efficacy of their 
practical applications is still a matter for debate within the field.29 However, it is 
not my intention to engage with the arguments involved in that debate here, or 
to offer any critique of my own in this regard. Rather, this discussion takes an 
interdisciplinary approach which relates a non-evaluative overview of the key 
features of each of the different psychotherapeutic models mentioned above to 
the ways in which Austen creates her characters and cultivates the interactions 
that take place between them. 
I associate my reference to aspects of a diverse range of therapeutic 
approaches in my analysis of Austen’s novels with a movement that has been 
taking place within the field of psychotherapy for some time. This is a 
movement away from unitary approaches that adopt one of the major 
theoretical models and apply that system to all clients in all circumstances, 
towards those that utilise ideas and strategies from a range of different 
orientations according to the needs of individual clients in specific 
circumstances. This is my own preferred form of therapeutic work, and is 
classified as ‘Integrative Psychotherapy’.  
                                            
28
 There are many books published on the topic of psychotherapy and its different forms. A good 
place to start is with a resource widely used by students and practitioners of psychotherapy, now in its 
sixth edition: The Handbook of Individual Therapy, ed. by Windy Dryden and Andrew Reeves 
(London: Sage, 2014). See also, Richard Nelson-Jones, Theory and Practice of Counselling and 
Psychotherapy, 6
th
 edn (London: Sage, 2015). Specific references to sources related to each of the 
individual models of psychotherapy mentioned here are provided in Chapter One of this thesis. 
29
 See Bruce Wampold & Zac Imel, The Great Psychotherapy Debate: The Evidence for What Makes 
Psychotherapy Work (New York: Routledge, 2015). 
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The Institute for Integrative Psychotherapy defines the practice as:  
a unifying psychotherapy that responds appropriately and effectively to 
the person at the affective, behavioral, cognitive, and physiological levels 
of functioning, and addresses as well the spiritual dimension of life. 
The definition continues: 
Integrative Psychotherapy takes into account many views of human 
functioning. The psychodynamic, client-centered, behaviorist, cognitive, 
family therapy, Gestalt therapy, body-psychotherapies, object relations 
theories, psychoanalytic self psychology, and transactional analysis 
approaches are all considered within a dynamic systems perspective. Each 
provides a partial explanation of behavior and each is enhanced when 
selectively integrated with other aspects of the therapist's approach.30 
The Integrative school thus holds that each of the main models of 
psychotherapy accounts for only part of the whole of the experience of the 
individual, and so provides scope for the use of any or all of these models 
according to the needs of a particular client. Rather than have a single theory 
inform the observation, understanding and treatment of the client, observation 
of the client informs understanding, and this understanding indicates which of 
the many therapeutic approaches may be useful. So it is with my analysis of 
Austen’s novels. I began to read these texts with no notion of applying any 
particular psychotherapeutic model to my understanding or experience of 
them. In fact, I started to read them purely for pleasure. It was my realisation 
that I was able to recognise certain features of the various modern 
psychotherapeutic models in the novels, and that these informed my reading of 
                                            
30
 This is the definition provided on the website for the Institute of Integrative Psychotherapy, 
<http://www.integrativetherapy.com/en/integrative-psychotherapy.php> (accessed 02.12.2016). There 
are many explanatory texts; see for example Kenneth, R. Evans & Maria, C. Gilbert, An Introduction 
to Integrative Psychotherapy (New York and Hants. UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), and most 
recently Linda Finlay, Relational Integrative Psychotherapy: Engaging Process and Theory in Practice 
(West Sussex: Wiley Blackwell, 2016). A more recent development of psychotherapeutic practice, 
termed ‘Pluralistic Psychotherapy’, re-envisions the current Integrative model. For an overview of 
Pluralistic Psychotherapy see Windy Dryden & Andrew Reeves, The Handbook of Individual 
Psychotherapy, pp. 547-573. 
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Austen’s characters and my impressions of the author’s intent, or, at least, her 
interest and focus, that led me to embark upon this project.  
Having made the distinction between my integrative approach and the 
major unitary schools of psychotherapy, it should be said that, until now, critics 
have referred to the theoretical basis of only one of these main schools in any 
great depth or detail in the analysis of Austen’s novels. I refer to readings of her 
work which are based significantly, or even solely on Freudian psychoanalytic 
theory, for example those of Tony Tanner and Julian Wilmot Wynne 
respectively.31 Freud’s work is obviously central to the field of psychotherapy. 
However my view is that, fascinating as Freud’s ideas and Freudian 
interpretations may be, an analysis from a Freudian perspective alone does not 
provide the most illuminating reflections on Austen’s writing. This is in the light 
of substantial and persuasive challenges to the fundamental bases of Freud’s 
research methodology and formulations, especially the comprehensive critique 
of Freud’s work presented by Richard Webster whose critique I discuss in the 
following chapter.32 Furthermore, even if this type of analysis were deemed to 
provide valid explanations for the behaviour and underlying motivations of 
Austen’s characters, it seems to me that these accounts ultimately lead one 
away from a greater understanding and appreciation of the idiosyncratic 
natures of the specific characters themselves, within the particular contexts of 
the novels and stories that they inhabit. This is because Freud intended his 
work to be viewed as a scientific endeavour which would uncover universally 
applicable principles relating to the nature of human psychology as a whole. As 
Freud himself wrote: 
                                            
31
 Tony Tanner, Jane Austen (London: Macmillan, 1986), and Julian Wilmot Wynne, Jane Austen and 
Sigmund Freud an Interpretation (London: Plume, 1998). For more general psychoanalytic 
approaches to literature see also Meredith Anne Skura, Literary Use of the Psychoanalytic Process 
(New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 1981), and more recently Norman N. Holland, Holland’s 
Guide to Psychoanalytic Psychology and Literature-and-Psychology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1990). While the terms ‘psycho-analytic’ and ‘psycho-analysis’ are hyphenated in Freud’s own writing, 
the hyphen has largely been dropped by commentators and by therapists themselves. Both the 
United Kingdom Council for Psychotherapy ((UKCP) and the British Association for Counselling and 
Psychotherapy (BACP) refer to unhyphenated ‘psychoanalytic’ and ‘psychoanalysis’. In this thesis I 
will use these forms unless quoting directly from a text which includes the hyphen. 
32




The concept of the unconscious has long been knocking at the gates of 
psychology and asking to be let in. Philosophy and literature have often 
toyed with it, but science could find no use for it. Psycho-analysis has 
seized upon the concept, has taken it seriously and has given it a fresh 
content. By its researches it has led to a knowledge of the characteristics of 
the unconscious psychical which have hitherto been unsuspected, and it 
has discovered some of the laws which govern it.33 (My italics) 
One can see then that Freud wished to be regarded as having discovered ‘laws’ 
governing ‘the unconscious psychical’, that is the definition of the nature of the 
unconscious element which is part of the psychological make up of all human 
beings, in all places, at all times. Under Freudian psychoanalytic scrutiny, the 
most carefully delineated and unique qualities of each of Austen’s characters 
become subsumed beneath the generality of Freudian interpretations of their 
actions, thoughts, speech and emotions.  
An example of Tanner’s Freudian analysis of a scene in Northanger 
Abbey will serve to illustrate my point. Tanner presents the view that it is 
reasonable to deduce an element of sexual arousal and fear of the loss of 
virginity in Catherine Morland’s frightened excitement as she attempts to 
discover what is locked away in the cabinet in her bedroom at Northanger 
Abbey. He writes:  
Without wishing to deviate into the follies of would-be psychosexual 
criticism, I think it is legitimate to recognise that in an impressionable 
adolescent girl the desire — craving, indeed — for some kind of intense 
excitation may easily be sexual even if it takes another form. To be 
aroused by fear is still to be aroused.34 
                                            
33
 In its entirety Freud’s psycho-analytic theory and its applications to the practice of psycho-analytic 
psychotherapy is a large and complex body of work, translated into English over twenty four volumes; 
The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. by James 
Strachey in collaboration with Anna Freud, jointly published by The Hogarth Press and The Institute of 
Psycho-Analysis. Citations are made by the title of the paper (where appropriate), abbreviation 
Standard Ed. followed by date of publication of papers presented in the edition in brackets, then 
volume and page number(s). For this quotation see ‘Some Elementary Lessons in Psychoanalysis’, in 
Standard Ed. (1937-9), XXIII, 283-286, p. 286.  
34
 Tanner, p. 49. 
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In spite of Tanner’s reluctance to ‘deviate into the follies of would-be 
psychosexual criticism’, Freud’s theory is nevertheless the foundation for his 
comment on Catherine. Both the notion that feelings of excitement in 
adolescent girls ‘may easily be sexual’ and the idea that it might be possible for 
one psychological, emotional or physical experience (sexual desire) to be 
disguised as another that is less threatening to the psyche (fear), especially in 
childhood and adolescence, is rooted in Freudian psychosexual theory.35 
Whether or not this is folly is up for debate. My argument is simply that, even if 
Tanner is correct in his Freudian interpretation of Catherine’s state of mind and 
emotions, this tells us nothing about Catherine as a character that distinguishes 
her from any other adolescent female character in Austen’s novels or indeed 
those of any other writer. Tanner himself is cognisant of this as he continues  
I would draw attention to the phrase used when Catherine is looking into 
the cabinet at all the (empty) drawers: there is ‘in the centre, a small door, 
closed also with a lock and key (which) secured in all probability a cavity 
of importance’. This suggests to me a thinly veiled image of virginity, and 
if that seems far-fetched and perverse just let me suggest that there were 
more mysteries and possible problems and terrors in the transition from 
virginity to marriage — indeed, in that ‘cavity of importance’ — for a 
young girl such as Jane Austen was writing about than in Udolpho or any 
other novel, ‘Gothic’ or not, which Catherine may have read.36  
By this summation, and in accord with Freud’s proposition, Catherine is no 
different in her psychological make-up than any other girl of her age. The same 
may be said of Tanner’s explicitly Freudian reflection that Marianne Dashwood 
suffers from ‘neurosis brought on by repression’, or Wynne’s surmise that 
Elizabeth’s feelings towards her parents ‘correspond well to Freud’s 
description […] from a 1919 essay, on the affections of a little girl that are fixed 
                                            
35
 In one of Freud’s most well-known case histories, The Wolf Man, a young boy’s libidinal feelings 
towards his father are repressed and substituted by fear of wolves. See ‘From the History of an 
Infantile Neurosis (1918)’ in Standard Ed. (1917-19), XVII, 3ff. I do not contend that Tanner is 
necessarily familiar with and influenced directly by the specific case of The Wolf Man, only that, 
whether he wishes to acknowledge it or not, the notions contained within Tanner’s analysis are 
Freudian. I provide further detail of Freud’s theory in Chapter One of this thesis to follow.  
36
 Tanner, p. 49. 
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on her father, “[…] who has probably done all he could to win her love, and in 
this way has sown the seeds of an attitude of hatred and rivalry towards her 
mother”’37 For Freud the phenomena of repression and the direction of a young 
child’s libido towards one parent and rivalry against the other are universal 
psychic processes.38 Thus, when the characters are analysed in this way, for me 
they lose their intrinsic individuality and become instead simply examples or 
illustrations of the ways in which the psychic dynamics postulated by Freud to 
exist in all humans might be manifested. 
I would go further to say that it is difficult to conceive of how this form 
of analysis is able to shed light on the form and degree of the often-
acknowledged extraordinary psychological perceptiveness of the author 
herself. It may be, as Tanner submits, that Austen’s reference to ‘a cavity of 
importance’ is a ‘thinly veiled image of virginity’. It may even be that Mrs 
Bennet ‘stirring the fire’ while Mr. Collins transfers his intentions for marriage 
from Jane to Elizabeth, and the same character’s invitation to Mr. Bingley, 
‘When you have killed all your own birds […] I beg you will come here, and 
shoot as many as you please’ are both laden with ‘erotic innuendo’ as Wynne 
claims.39 However, for Freud, the point of symbolic or metaphorical imagery is 
to shield the conscious mind from any threat to the psyche that may be posed 
by the conscious awareness of potentially dangerous thoughts, desires or 
motivations, especially those of a sexual nature. This would be as true for 
Austen as for any other author. The very theory that leads to the interpretations 
cited above would hold that any sexual content that may be observed in 
Austen’s writing would have emerged unbidden and unconsciously, and could 
be interpreted only under certain conditions of psychoanalysis. Wynne himself 
states this clearly and simply when he writes: ‘Jane Austen’s showing such 
communication in operation has no tendency to entail that she ‘knew’ she had 
                                            
37
 Tanner, p. 99; Wynne, p. 111. 
38
 Freud applied the terms ‘Oedipal complex’ and ‘Electra complex’ to these processes in boys and 
girls respectively. All aspects of the Oedipal and Electra complexes are explained in ‘The Ego and the 
Id’, in Standard Ed. (1923-25), XIX, 31-32. 
39
 Quotations respectively; Tanner, p.49, Wynne, p. 115. The quotations cited from Austen refer 
respectively to the moment at which Mr. Collins ‘had only to change from Jane to Elizabeth—and it 
was soon done—done while Mrs. Bennet was stirring the fire.’ Pride and Prejudice, I:15, 79 and to 
Bingley’s visit to Longbourn to resume his courtship to Jane towards the end of the novel; Pride and 
Prejudice, III:11, 373. 
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done so’.40 The supposition of a lack of conscious awareness on the part of the 
author inherent in a Freudian interpretation of Austen’s work renders 
impossible the identification, or indeed attribution, of any special psychological 
insight on Austen’s part.  
My particular background as an integrative psychotherapist leads me to 
notice and ascribe significance to aspects of Austen’s novels, and of her 
characters, in ways that are quite different from those derived from 
psychoanalysis as described above. The interpretations that I offer in this thesis 
are inspired most particularly by key elements of theory and psychotherapeutic 
practice within the fields of Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy, Transactional 
Analysis and, especially, Rogerian Client-Centered therapy. My reading of 
Austen’s novels has been informed as well by the model of Emotional 
Intelligence which incorporates important elements of Cognitive-Behavioural 
and Rogerian principles. These models rely for their understanding of human 
nature and psychology to a much lesser degree on theories regarding the 
workings of the unconscious mind and to a much greater extent on the 
consciously observable behaviour and characteristics of a person. Their 
formulations regard the particular, observable qualities and mannerisms of 
each individual person as indicative of a state of mind, being or purpose that 
relates specifically to that individual in a certain place and time, and they 
construe the nature of the individual according to their different theoretical 
frameworks. On this basis, I take Austen’s descriptions of her characters and 
the structures of her narratives at face value. I do not attempt to glean from her 
writing any psychosexual or other form of unconscious psychodynamic force 
that she may have been unconsciously concealing from herself and her readers. 
Rather, my interest is to explore ways in which Austen expressed consciously 
and deliberately something that she wanted her readers to see and to 
understand about her characters, and perhaps, through those characters, 
something about themselves.  
                                            
40
 Wynne, p. 98. See also, Norman N. Holland, Holland’s Guide to Psychoanalytic Psychology and 
Literature-and-Psychology. Holland sees an author, like a patient, shaping ‘unconscious material into 
consciously acceptable speech […] one could interpret the dreamer’s account of a dream this way 
[…] if you look for wishes and defences in a piece of language, you will find them’, pp. 63-64. 
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In Chapters Two and Three of this thesis I present detailed readings of 
Austen’s characters from the perspectives of the different major schools of 
psychotherapy that I identify above. Here I provide a brief example of my 
interpretation of Elizabeth Bennet in comparison with Lady Catherine de 
Bourgh to introduce my approach.   
Austen’s insight, characters and intention: a Rogerian view 
It hardly needs to be said that there is already a vast body of non-
psychoanalytic critical analysis of Austen’s work in general, and of her 
characters; the emergence and development of this canon is documented most 
comprehensively in the collections of reviews edited by Brian Southam and Ian 
Littlewood.41 The critiques contained in these publications, as well as in 
individually-authored texts to which I will refer throughout this thesis, present 
observations on Austen’s novels from a range of literary, political, historical and 
cultural viewpoints. In these critiques, terms are sometimes used that have 
significance in my reading of Austen from a psychotherapeutic perspective, but 
which, in the context of that psychotherapeutic perspective, have subtly 
different meanings. A significant example of this is the term, ‘autonomy’, which 
has a specific technical definition in the work of renowned psychotherapist, 
Carl Rogers. Rogers gave primacy in his seminal works to the development of 
an individual’s personal autonomy in the process of psychotherapy. Rogers’ 
theory holds that the possession of a high level of self-aware, self-valuing 
personal autonomy is requisite for a person to maintain a sense of personal 
efficacy and of inner psychological and emotional comfort and ease. His theory 
holds that autonomy involves both self-understanding and self-direction. From 
this viewpoint, autonomy is characterised by the ability to act firmly according 
to one’s own beliefs, values, will and choices, but not solely by this. Crucially it 
is equally characterised by the ability to allow other people to act in the same 
                                            
41
 See B.C. Southam, ed. Critical Essays on Jane Austen (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1968), Jane Austen: The Critical Heritage, Volume 1, 1811-1870 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1968), Jane Austen: The Critical Heritage, Volume 2, 1870-1940 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1987), Jane Austen: Northanger Abbey and Persuasion. A Selection of Critical Essays, and Sense 
and Sensibility, Pride and Prejudice and Mansfield Park. A Selection of Critical Essays (Hants. UK: 
Macmillan, 1976). Ian Littlewood, Critical Assessments, 4 vols. (East Sussex: Helm Information, 
1998). See also Janet Todd, Jane Austen In Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 
for overviews and commentaries on early to more recent critical impressions of Austen’s work.  
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way according to theirs. Thus, an individual is autonomous to the extent that 
they possess a high level of self-awareness and self-worth such that these 
qualities exist independently of the approval, validation, or compliance of 
others.42  
Given the importance of the concept of autonomy within my field of 
psychotherapy, it has been particularly interesting to me to note instances 
where the term has arisen in existing analyses of certain of Austen’s characters, 
along with the words ‘assertive’ and/or ‘aggressive’ to describe a character’s 
expression of their autonomy in communication with others. In the cases of 
these reviews, I recognise how the specific definitions of the terms ‘autonomy’, 
‘assertive’ and ‘aggressive’ that I derive from my psychotherapeutic 
background lead me to very different interpretations of the nature of those 
characters, and thereby to different inferences with regard to Austen’s 
intention for those characters. My response to Deborah Kaplan’s analysis of 
Elizabeth Bennet is illustrative of this difference. Kaplan writes:  
Under the cover of irony she sometimes assumes a dictatorial persona. 
Irony, because it is play, gives her license to dominate, but it does not 
nullify the impact of her assertive, indeed aggressive verbal behaviour […] 
in her playfully domineering role, she refuses the silence and 
subordination marked out for women  
And further: 
Elizabeth, as we have seen, speaks out boldly, but the novel does not 
locate her voice specifically within a community of women. Elizabeth is 
more likely to be verbally aggressive with Mr Darcy, Mr. Bingley, or Lady 
Catherine than with intimate female friends […]. Although her forceful talk 
                                            
42
 See Carl R. Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy, and On Becoming a Person: A Therapist’s View of 
Psychotherapy (London: Constable, 1961). Rogers formulated a model for the relationship between a 
therapist and their client that he considered would enable the client to achieve genuine self-
understanding and self-direction; in other words, greater self-awareness and personal autonomy. I 
explain this model, along with Rogers’ focus and views on the development of personal autonomy in 
detail in Chapter One of this thesis.  
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may betray a striking sense of autonomy, she does not make autonomy a 
topic of conversation with Jane or Charlotte or her aunt.43 
Kaplan’s commentary above concurs in general with a strand of feminist 
criticism that ascribes a complex psychological conflict to Austen and other 
female writers of her time. Such criticism holds that while Austen conceived, 
and wished to express, rebelliousness against the patriarchy within which she 
was confined, nevertheless she had internalised the patriarchal paradigm to 
such a degree that, at the same time, she desired also to be accepted within her 
male-dominated social milieu.44 The proposition from this point of view is that 
Austen invokes female characters in her novels who could behave in ways, or 
occupy positions, contrary to those permitted by society, but that she protects 
herself from censure by ensuring that ‘unrestrained’ or ‘unconventional’ 
behaviour in female characters was negated or at least modified, by ‘qualifiying 
strategies’.45 For Kaplan, Austen allows Elizabeth to engage in ‘aggressive’ 
verbal communication only with male characters, with the exception of Lady 
Catherine. This effectively serves to place Elizabeth, along with Lady Catherine, 
outwith the ‘community of women’ in her readers’ eyes, and thus disguises any 
support the author may have for the greater empowerment of women.  
Such an interpretation of Elizabeth’s behaviour, which aligns Elizabeth’s 
manner with that of Lady Catherine, does provide support for a view of Austen 
as equivocal in her support of greater autonomy for women. For me, however, it 
is possible to construe Austen’s characterisation of Elizabeth in this way only if 
one assumes that the word ‘autonomous’ is synonymous with the words ‘bold’, 
‘dictatorial’, ‘domineering’, and ‘forceful’, and that the terms ‘aggressive’ and 
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 Deborah Kaplan, Jane Austen Among Women (London: The John Hopkins Press, 1994), p. 186, p. 
194. 
44
 This opinion was expressed most starkly by Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar in their influential 
feminist polemic regarding women writers of the Nineteenth Century, The Madwoman in the Attic. The 
Woman Writer and the Nineteenth Century Literary Imagination (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1984). For a range of comments on Austen’s work from a feminist perspective, see also Judith 
Lowder Newton, Women, Power, and Subversion: Social Strategies in British Fiction, 1778-1860 
(Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1981), LeRoy W. Smith, Jane Austen and The Drama of 
Woman (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1987), Claudia Johnson, Jane Austen: Women, Politics, 
and the Novel (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988) and Mary Poovey’s commentary on 
Austen in The Proper Lady and the Woman Writer: Ideology as Style in the Works of Mary 
Wollstonecraft, Mary Shelley, and Jane Austen (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984). 
45
 Kaplan, p. 190. 
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‘assertive’ are synonymous with each other. From my perspective this is far 
from the case. In fact, according to the definitions of the terms ‘autonomous’, 
‘aggressive’ and ‘assertive’ that inform my approach, autonomy exists in 
opposition to dominance over others, and assertiveness in interactions with 
others is quite different in quality and intention from aggression or 
forcefulness. As I stated above, for me autonomy involves not only a person’s 
ability to determine their own values, choices and actions, but also their 
willingness to allow others to do likewise. This enables the individual to adopt a 
form of communication through which they express their thoughts, feelings and 
wishes clearly and confidently without belligerently or forcefully attempting to 
impose their will upon others, for example by manipulations, threats or 
personal insults. This constitutes the definition of assertiveness which informs 
my understanding of Austen’s characters.46   
Seen in this light, my perception is that while Lady Catherine has a great 
degree of authority, she is almost entirely lacking in autonomy. The character’s 
sense of self appears to be nearly wholly dependent upon the esteem in which 
she is held by others and by the degree to which they will accept her 
dictatorship over them. Lady Catherine’s conduct is aggressive even when she 
speaks quietly or smiles, because her consistent intent is to stifle the autonomy 
of others and gain dominance over them. Elizabeth, on the other hand, 
commands little authority in terms of social status, yet she models the nature 
and assertive expression of autonomy consistently in her interactions with all 
of the other characters in the novel, both male and female.47 For example, I note 
                                            
46
 The OED defines ‘assertion’ as, ‘Of the nature of, or characterized by, assertion; declaratory, 
affirmative; positive, dogmatic’. In psychotherapeutic, personal developmental terms, assertive 
communication essentially and explicitly takes into account the views, needs and beliefs of others. I 
draw clear distinctions between passive, aggressive, passive-aggressive and assertive 
communication styles in my own published work, see Adrienne Green and John Humphrey, Coaching 
For Resilience A Practical Guide to Using Positive Psychology (London: Kogan Page, 2012), see pp. 
109-122. See also, for example, Robert Alberti and Michael Emmans, Your Perfect Right: 
Assertiveness and Equality in Your Life and Relationships (Oakland, CA: New Harbinger Publications, 
2017), Conrad and Suzanne Potts, Assertiveness: How To Be Strong in Every Situation (Oxford: 
Capstone, 2013), Julie de Azevedo Hanks, The Assertiveness Guide for Women: How to 
Communicate Your Needs, Set Healthy Boundaries and Transform Your Relationships (Oakland, CA: 
New Harbinger Publications, 2013), and Windy Dryden and Daniel Constantinou, Assertiveness Step 
by Step (London: Sheldon Press, 2004). 
47
 The OED dates the use of the word ‘autonomy’ back to 1591, at which time the term was used in a 
political context to denote the self-government of a State or Institution. The concept acquired more 
individualistic connotations through moral philosophy from the late eighteenth century, however the 
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her straightforward response to Jane Bennet’s ambivalence when Elizabeth 
relays to her Mr. Wickham’s account of Mr. Darcy’s alleged treatment of him. 
Jane remarks: ‘“It is difficult indeed—it is distressing.—One does not know 
what to think.”’, to which Elizabeth replies: ‘“I beg your pardon;—one knows 
exactly what to think.”’48 While Elizabeth may be misguided in her judgement of 
Mr. Darcy at this point, this does not detract from the assertiveness of her reply 
to Jane. The character is similarly self-assured with her mother and her friend, 
Charlotte Lucas, as well as with Miss Bingley whose aggressive approaches she 
counters without recourse to similarly personal attacks: 
“Miss Eliza Bennet,” said Miss Bingley, “despises cards. She is a great 
reader and has no pleasure in anything else.” 
“I deserve neither such praise nor censure,” cried Elizabeth; “I am not a 
great reader, and I have pleasure in many things.”49 
Elizabeth speaks her mind and expresses her views and wishes ‘boldly’ at times, 
and she behaves according to her own values even where this incurs other 
people’s displeasure and disapproval. Yet she is never aggressive. Elizabeth at 
no time attempts to force, manipulate or cajole any other character to act as she 
would herself, or as she would wish them to.  
From this perspective, one may observe that Elizabeth is equally 
assertive, yet never aggressive, in her encounters with Lady Catherine. I expand 
on my perceptions of Elizabeth and Lady Catherine in Chapter Three of this 
thesis. To illustrate briefly here, however, I contrast the behaviour of the two 
characters during their climactic confrontation over Elizabeth’s possible 
engagement to Mr Darcy.50 To paraphrase Elizabeth’s own reflection towards 
the end of their exchange, Lady Catherine insults her personally and her family 
                                                                                                                                       
more general usage of the word to denote ‘liberty to follow one's will; control over one's own affairs; 
freedom from external influence, personal independence’ is first recorded by the OED in 1803. Austen 
does not use the precise word in her writing, however, as I aim to demonstrate in this thesis, 
autonomy is a continuous and central theme in Austen’s novels, and her interpretation of the notion of 
autonomy and the ways in which that state of being is manifested closely resembles that which 
underlies the aims and practices of modern-day psychotherapy. 
48
 Pride and Prejudice, I:17, 96. 
49
 Pride and Prejudice, I:8, 40-41 (Austen’s italics). 
50
 See Pride and Prejudice, III:14, 391-397. 
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in every way possible in order to gain her acquiescence. Yet Elizabeth does not 
respond in kind. She challenges and questions Lady Catherine, however she 
makes no attack on Lady Catherine at a personal level. I note further that, as 
their argument draws to a conclusion, Elizabeth does not attempt even to 
persuade Lady Catherine to the courtesy of returning into the house with her. 
When her mother questions her as to why the visitor did not come in, Elizabeth 
replies simply that, ‘She did not choose it […] she would go.’51 In these aspects 
of the interaction between the two characters, I recognise the distinctions that I 
myself would make between ‘aggressive’ and ‘assertive’ forms of both verbal 
and non-verbal communication, and between ‘autonomy and ‘authority’. This 
leads me to a reading of the characters, and thus of Austen’s purpose for them, 
that is very different from those exemplified by Kaplan above. Furthermore, for 
me, the contrast that I highlight between Elizabeth and Lady Catherine throws 
into question Gilbert and Gubar’s proposition that Lady Catherine ‘is herself in 
some ways an appropriate mother to Elizabeth because the two women are 
surprisingly similar’, and that of Smith who states of Elizabeth that ‘she wishes 
to prove the superiority of her own judgement in order to feel a sense of 
power’, and through this runs the risk of becoming like Lady Catherine, ‘a 
shrew, the caricatured opposite of the compliant woman’.52 From my 
perspective, Elizabeth and Lady Catherine are different in such a fundamental 
way that they are not, nor could ever be, by any means alike.  
The discipline-specific definitions of terms that I bring to my reading 
inform my understanding of the behaviour exhibited by the characters of 
Elizabeth and Lady Catherine. I perceive additionally that Austen offers an 
insight into the psychological and emotional implications of the possession of 
autonomy or otherwise of these two characters. To use Alan Richardson’s term, 
the insight that I observe in Austen’s portrayal of the characters resonates 
strongly with a reading that a psychotherapist might draw of their internal 
states. Essentially, from the standpoint of the Rogerian principle as summarised 
above, an individual’s psychological and emotional well-being depends upon 
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the possession of autonomy. Therefore, from this therapeutic viewpoint, I 
would anticipate that the absence of autonomy would be likely to constitute a 
source of uncomfortable and sometimes even painful anxiety for the individual 
involved. It is a sense of this discomfort and unease that I glean from the 
character of Lady Catherine from the first moments of Austen’s introduction of 
the character into the novel. In Chapter Three of this thesis, I demonstrate ways 
in which, from a psychotherapeutic perspective, it is possible to adduce clear 
evidence for an intention on Austen’s part to reveal this element of 
vulnerability within Lady Catherine, and for her readers to respond to the 
character with an element of compassion. 
The words ‘vulnerability’ and ‘compassion’ are not terms that 
commentators on Austen’s novels have employed to describe Lady Catherine, 
as I will show in an overview of responses to the character in Chapter Three. 
Aside from the views of critics writing from a political perspective such as 
Kaplan, for the most part, Lady Catherine has been regarded as a minor 
character, a one-dimensional figure, a comic caricature used by the author 
simply to contribute to the humorous element of the novel, or to emphasise the 
complexity and centrality of the more major characters. This is the case even on 
the rare occasions on which writers have remarked more penetratingly on Lady 
Catherine’s lack of ability to make self-directed choices and her psychological 
dependency on others. For Alex Woloch, Lady Catherine’s dependency is 
comical.53 Marvin Mudrick proposes that the character’s lack of self-awareness 
and self-determination places her in the category of ‘the simple people’.54 I 
would agree that, on one level, Lady Catherine is a comic character. However, as 
I explain above, from Austen’s portrayal of her I infer a state of mind and 
emotion in the character that is more inductive of concern than amusement. 
Furthermore, from my perspective, lack of autonomy is as complex as the 
possession of it, and at least as interesting. Therefore, for me, Lady Catherine is 
as complex and significant a character as Elizabeth Bennet, and the relationship 
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between the two is as important as that between Elizabeth and Mr Darcy in 
fulfilling what I perceive to be Austen’s purpose for the novel.  
The example I provide above from a Rogerian psychotherapeutic 
perspective demonstrates one of the ways in which my background in 
psychotherapy leads me to perceptions of Austen’s characters that differ from, 
or expand upon, the views presented by other critics. As I state above, I discuss 
the characters of Elizabeth Bennet and Lady Catherine in greater depth in 
Chapter Three of this thesis. I also present interpretations of Catherine Morland 
and Charlotte Lucas who, from this Rogerian viewpoint, emerge as surprisingly 
autonomous individuals. As well in Chapter Three, I explore Mary Crawford’s 
character and Persuasion’s Mrs. Smith from the perspectives of Transactional 
Analysis and Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy respectively. In Chapter Two I 
engage in an extensive analysis of Elinor and Marianne Dashwood in the 
context of the model of Emotional Intelligence. In Chapter One to follow, I 
identify the proponents of each of schools of psychotherapy that inform this 
thesis, provide details of seminal and other relevant publications, and explain 
the theories and principles that underlie each of the models under discussion.  
Over the course of this thesis I engage also with a central question that 
has occupied commentators on Austen’s work. This is the question of whether 
Austen took a didactic moral stance in her novels, and it is one that has given 
rise to differing opinions. Eighteenth-century novelist and literary historian, 
Clara Reeve, states that ‘the great and important duty of a writer is, to point out 
the difference between Virtue and Vice, to shew one rewarded, and the other 
punished’.55 According to Marilyn Butler, Jane Austen shared Reeve’s opinion, 
and was strongly influenced by religious and other conservative conduct-advice 
literature of the time.56 Butler’s perception of Austen is of an author shielded by 
her religion against the intellectual influences of the Enlightenment, and using 
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her literary art for morally didactic ends; ‘not for the sake of the subject, but in 
order to give an appropriate morally objective ground against which the 
character can be judged’.57 Thus, for Butler, Austen is unforgiving and punitive 
towards those of her characters who fall short of the author’s ‘pre-conceived 
and inflexible’ morality, and writes as such in the service of her readers’ moral 
instruction and improvement.58 Mary Waldron takes the contrary view that 
Austen was discontented with the fiction that existed because of ‘the fixed 
moral programme which justified the existence of many a contemporary novel’ 
and which ‘led to the interpolation of passages of “solemn specious nonsense — 
about something unconnected with the story”’.59 Waldron’s view is that Austen 
was concerned primarily to ‘keep faith with her readers’, and not to abandon 
her commitment to relate natural conduct and credible scenarios in order to 
make moral points.60 She also considers that Austen ‘complicates the interplay 
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of fictional forms and leaves the reader unsure whether to approve or 
disapprove of the heroine’, thus deliberately creating moral ambiguities and 
inviting readers to reach their own conclusions.61 Waldron is supported in her 
opinion by Peter Knox-Shaw who confronts Butler’s arguments directly with his 
belief that the author was influenced significantly by the moral scepticism of 
Enlightenment thinkers, especially Adam Smith.62  
I am in agreement with Waldron and with Knox-Shaw. As Knox-Shaw 
points out, Adam Smith’s interest was on an individual’s development of self-
command mediated by their need for social approval and empathy for others 
and, from my perspective as a psychotherapist, I perceive this summary to 
encapsulate Austen’s primary concern in her writing. Like Waldron, I observe 
Austen’s presentation of moral ambiguities in her novels. In diametric 
opposition to Butler’s opinion, I see in Austen’s portrayal of all of her characters 
a non-judgemental and empathic sense of the instinctive and psychological 
needs that underlie and drive human behaviour, as well as forthright 
congruence in her illustration of their foibles. For example, while John Carey 
interprets Austen’s critical description of Mrs Musgrove’s emotionally 
demonstrative grieving for the loss of her son as unempathetic and morally 
contemptuous, my view is that Austen’s comment on the artificiality of the 
character’s mourning is not a moral one.63 To me, Austen does not condemn 
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Mrs. Musgrove for her behaviour, she simply reveals her overblown 
expressions of grief to be inappropriate and inauthentic, and therefore more 
likely to elicit amusement than sympathy. Austen registers this in Captain 
Wentworth’s ‘too transient an indulgence of self-amusement to be detected’ 
and immediately counteracts that response with a quite poignant illustration of 
Wentworth ‘almost instantly afterwards coming up to the sofa […] and entered 
into a conversation with (Mrs. Musgrove), in a low voice, about her son, doing it 
with so much sympathy and grace, as shewed the kindest consideration for all 
that was real and absurd in the parent’s feelings.’64 Here, Austen is congruent in 
articulating the lack of authenticity in Mrs. Musgrove’s emotionality, yet, 
through the character of Wentworth, still demonstrates acceptance of, and 
empathy with, both the mother’s genuine grief and her need to exaggerate her 
heartbreak. These are all qualities that Carl Rogers deemed to be essential 
qualities for a psychotherapist to adopt in order to build an effective 
psychotherapeutic relationship, as I explain in the chapter to follow.  
It is important to note here that, although I identify Rogerian 
psychotherapeutic conditions in the example that I discuss above, I do not 
intend to argue that Austen set out to adopt the role of a ‘psychotherapist’ in 
relation to her readers. However, my perception of psychotherapeutic 
principles throughout Austen’s work leads me to suggest a possible 
intentionality on the part of the author to bring about what we would now call a 
‘therapeutic’ shift in her readers towards an enhanced understanding, not of 
any form of fixed moral code, but of the self, and a movement towards greater 
self-directed autonomy.65 My view is that Austen achieves this effect by leading 
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her readers through a process which closely compares to that which Stanley 
Fish refers to as ‘not so much a teaching as an ‘intangling’’ [sic].66 That is, I 
suggest that Austen involves the reader in a negotiation through uncertainties, 
as opposed to attempting to influence her readers in a particular direction by 
the more straightforwardly didactic means employed by contemporary 
commentators such as Johnson, Gregory and Fordyce.67 Over the course of this 
thesis I indicate instances which strike me as particularly indicative of Austen’s 
intention in this regard. To this extent, one may locate this project within the 
sphere of contemporary biblio-therapeutic publications which draw on literary 
works to provide therapeutic guidance to readers. Alain de Botton, for example, 
refers to the works of Proust for this purpose, while a number of writers note 
the potential therapeutic benefits of guidance based on Austen’s novels.68  
I concur with Alan Richardson that it would be inappropriate to suggest 
that Austen’s novels reveal a prescience of future models of psychotherapy on 
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her part. However, I propose that there are strong resonances between features 
of Austen’s characterisations and narratives and twentieth-century 
psychotherapeutic understandings and formulations. I propose also that this 
occurs to an extent that not only validates critical acknowledgements of her 
unique psychological insights but also provides systematic, structured 
theoretical frameworks, constructs and concepts by which the author’s insights 
may be more specifically defined. My primary intention in this thesis is to 
identify these resonances where I observe them to arise, and to demonstrate 
the ways in which they illuminate aspects of Austen’s characterisations and, 
thereby, her extraordinary perceptiveness in respect of the nature of human 





THE PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC MODELS 
Twill not, in this respect, be sufficient for us to use the seeming Logick of a 
famous Modern, and say “We think: therefore We are. […] the question is, 
“what constitutes the We or I?” (Earl of Shaftesbury)69  
In this chapter I provide explanations of the twentieth- to twenty-first-century 
models of psychotherapy which have informed my reading of Austen’s novels. 
There are three major schools within the field of modern psychotherapy: 
Psycho-Analytic, Cognitive-Behavioural and Humanistic. Offshoots within each 
of these schools modify the schools’ central theoretical formulations and 
practical applications to a greater or lesser extent.70 It is not within the scope of 
this thesis to examine all of these aspects of the different major models of 
psychotherapy, nor would it be necessary to do so to reveal the extent to which 
a view from my psychotherapeutic perspective offers a differently nuanced 
understanding of the themes and characters of Austen’s novels. This chapter 
will focus only on the theoretical propositions and emergent psychotherapeutic 
practices encompassed by the most influential branches of each, as propounded 
and practiced by their originators. 
Sigmund Freud is credited with the development of the first of the 
structured, non-medicalised treatments of psychological disorders.71 Therefore, 
this account of the different models of psychotherapy inevitably begins with 
Freud and the theory and practice of psychoanalysis. The following explanation 
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of the principles of psychoanalysis and the way in which these evolved will 
provide further substance for the reservations with regard to psychoanalytic 
readings of Austen’s novels that I expressed in the Introduction to this thesis. It 
will also illustrate the fundamental elements of Freud’s theory which, in spite of 
these reservations, I believe serve to explain to some extent the potentially 
psychotherapeutically transformational effects of Austen’s novels on her 
readers.  
1.1. Psychoanalysis: Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) 
Psychoanalysis is based on Freud’s theory of the dynamic relationship between 
the unconscious and conscious minds. His theory is often referred to as 
‘psychodynamic’ for this reason. The recognition that there are aspects of 
human beings’ conscious experience that appear to originate from somewhere 
outside of conscious awareness pre-dates Freud by some centuries.72 Crucially 
however, following Descartes’ delineation of conscious awareness as the 
defining characteristic of the mind, phenomena that appeared to emerge 
without conscious consideration such as dreams, imagination or suddenly 
occurring ideas or revelations, were deemed to be by-products of somatic or 
physiological processes operating within the body, and thus placed outside the 
scope of an understanding of the mind.73 Yet, as Law Whyte states, the 
phenomenon of the unconscious as experienced by religious, literary, 
philosophical and scientific thinkers of the time seemed inexplicable within the 
constraints imposed by Descartes’ dualism. They were therefore drawn to 
explore the possibility that unconscious processes were actually mental events. 
Law Whyte reflects: ‘the idea of unconscious mental processes was, in many of its 
aspects, conceivable around 1700, topical around 1800, and became effective 
around 1900’.74 That is, with Freud.  
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Freud himself acknowledged that he was not the first to perceive, 
identify and attempt to articulate the nature of the unconscious.75 Yet, there can 
be little argument that his theory was unprecedented in the intricacy of its 
descriptions of the location, content and activity of the unconscious, and of the 
part that it plays in the behaviour of healthy people as well as in the aetiology of 
the various forms of mental ill-health. Freud’s great concern was that his work 
in the field of psychoanalysis should be regarded as scientific, with all the 
credibility that such a categorisation would afford it. This was substantially 
enabled by his location of the unconscious firmly within the realm of the mind 
and thereby to render it available for observation and measurement, and 
accessible to psychological analysis and psychotherapeutic intervention.76 The 
establishment of the unconscious within the mind formed the foundation of 
Freud’s theory, and the relationship that he posited between the unconscious 
and the conscious parts of the mind, which I describe below, became the basis 
for modern psychoanalytic psychotherapy.  
The Freudian conscious and unconscious minds 
Freud’s theory holds that not only is the unconscious a mental entity, but that it 
is, initially at least, all that is mental. For Freud, the conscious mind evolves out 
of the unconscious, and only a tiny fraction of the entire content of the psyche is 
in conscious awareness at any one moment.77 Freud proposed, therefore, that 
mental events of which a person becomes consciously aware must be, for 
periods of time, in what he called ‘a state of latency’; that is to say, they must 
exist as a continual presence even while there is no conscious awareness of 
them.78 This latent material makes itself known through consciously-
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experienced realisations, ideas and memories, both called for and uncalled for, 
or more subtly and obscurely by the way that it influences one’s unwitting 
behaviour or the nature of one’s dreams. Then, the material returns to the 
unconscious and may, or may not, reappear into conscious awareness at 
another time.  
The development of Freud’s theory of the relationship between the 
unconscious and the conscious is marked by two distinct phases. The first of 
these was underpinned by what he called the ‘Topographical’ Model.79 This 
model dealt with the conscious and unconscious areas of the mind in terms of 
their spatial positions in relation to one another and the process by which the 
material of the psyche could be transferred back and forth between them. 
Freud later re-formulated this conception under the title of the ‘Structural’ 
Model. It was at this point that he introduced the familiar terms; ‘Id’, ‘Ego’, and 
‘Super-ego’. I provide summaries of each of these models below, beginning with 
an outline of the Topographical Model.80 
The Topographical Model  
One may visualise the whole psychical structure topographically in three layers. 
The conscious is uppermost with its outer surface connecting directly with the 
external world. The conscious mind, self-evidently, constitutes all sensations, 
thoughts, memories, images and so on, of which a person is consciously aware. 
The pre-conscious lies just beneath the under-surface of the conscious. The pre-
conscious contains content which is not in an individual’s conscious awareness 
but could easily become so, for example, the name of a person’s pet, or the 
colour of their front door, a holiday experience, or the sum of two plus two. Any 
form of neutral psychical content emanating from the unconscious is allowed 
into conscious awareness via the ‘pre-conscious’. Finally, lying beneath the pre-
conscious, and so a whole layer of the psyche away from the conscious, is the 
unconscious. This deepest area of the mind contains material that is associated 
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with some form of physical, emotional or psychological trauma, and thus has 
the potential to damage the conscious psyche if recalled into awareness.  
The threatening content contained within the unconscious area of the 
mind is prevented from entering conscious awareness by ‘ego-defence 
mechanisms’ such as the well-known process of ‘repression’. In Freud’s words: 
‘the essence of repression lies simply in turning something away, and keeping it at 
a distance, from the conscious’.81 Even the apparently innocuous forms of 
knowledge or memory exemplified above could occupy this part of the 
unconscious if they were in some way associated with a traumatic event. 
Equally, this area contains instinctive drives, primarily of hunger and the need 
for love, which could lead to physical or mental harm if acted upon. 
Importantly, repressed contents of the unconscious do not exist in a motionless 
state. They are continually pushing to enter conscious awareness so that 
whatever physical, emotional or psychological need, desire or intention they 
represent may be satisfied. Since they are prevented by the defence 
mechanisms from entering the conscious mind in their original form, they 
reveal themselves indirectly through dream symbolism, unintentional 
behaviours and the psychopathologies.82 For Freud, patients seeking treatment 
might be relieved of their symptoms only once the content of the unconscious is 
revealed in conscious awareness and dealt with safely by the individual. This 
could be achieved through therapeutic work with methods that evade the 
defence mechanisms, such as hypnosis, free-association and the interpretation 
of dreams. Notwithstanding, there will always be some elements that are buried 
so deeply that they will never enter into awareness. 
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Following his analytic work with a number of his predominantly female 
patients, Freud declared what he considered to be the nature of the most 
important form of repression revealed to him by those patients; the sexual 
abuse, or sexual assaults that they had experienced as young girls at the hands 
of their fathers. Freud presented this conclusion in a paper which he read 
before the Society for Psychiatry and Neurology in April of 1896.83 The 
revelation was received with shock and disbelief, followed by a period during 
which Freud found himself ostracised by his fellow professionals, and 
abandoned by his patients. Freud’s experience in the aftermath of this lecture is 
revealed in letters between himself and his friend and colleague, Wilhelm 
Fleiss, and in 1914, he began to make public a full retraction of what has 
become known as his ‘seduction theory’ and to present his new formulation.84 
At this point he stated that accounts of childhood sexual experiences related to 
him by his patients were not recollections of incidents that had actually taken 
place. They were, instead, to be recognised as fantasies that embodied 
repressed wishes. 85 Now Freud began to propose the presence of a sexual 
instinct at birth, and he incorporated his view of the development of this 
instinct from birth to adolescence in a new form of his original theory. He called 
this the Structural Model, which I describe in the following section.  
The Structural Model  
Within Freud’s new theory, the sexual instinct takes the form of psychic energy 
called the ‘libido’, and the development of an individual’s sexuality follows the 
focus (the ‘cathexis’) of this libido through ‘oral’, ‘anal’ and ‘phallic’ phases 
between the ages of nought to around five or six years. The most significant 
feature of the phallic stage, which occurs between the ages of five and six years, 
is the ‘Oedipus complex’ in boys and the ‘Electra complex’ in girls. It is at this 
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point that girls and boys develop fantasies of sexual intimacy with the parent of 
the opposite sex. These unfulfillable and terrifying desires are repressed into 
the deep unconscious, never to appear in consciousness except, possibly later, 
as fantastical recollections of childhood sexual experiences during searching 
psychoanalysis.86  
In this new model, the unconscious is referred to as the ‘id’, the 
conscious as the ‘ego’, and there is an additional element which exists partly in 
the conscious and partly in the unconscious: the ‘super-ego’. The super-ego 
emerges upon the resolution of the phallic stage through the identification by 
the child with the same-gender parent, and the adoption by the child of that 
parent’s characteristics, behaviours and, most importantly, morals. So, in this 
formulation, there is the id from which libidinal urges continually push to enter 
consciousness, the ego which attempts to protect the individual from 
potentially harmful demands from the id, and the super-ego which exacerbates 
the continual psychic tension that exists between the unconscious and the 
conscious by imposing moral strictures on the ego.87 From this psychoanalytic 
viewpoint, symptoms of psychological, behavioural or emotional disturbance 
are the result of a weak ego’s inability to manage this dynamic psychic tension 
effectively. The aim of psychoanalytic therapy is, therefore, to strengthen an 
individual’s ego so that the person is able to create an identity separate from 
that embodied in the super-ego, and to manage conscious awareness of 
instinctual drives effectively without the need for defence mechanisms which 
are often damaging in themselves. In Freud’s own succinct summary, ‘Where id 
was, there ego shall be.’88 
Freudian psychoanalysis is still widely practiced in modern 
psychotherapeutic circles, yet his work has attracted some serious criticism. My 
concurrence to a large degree with the critical stance that questions the validity 
of Freud’s theory informs the reservations that I expressed in the Introduction 
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to this thesis regarding psychoanalytic readings of Austen’s novels. Among the 
most well-known critical opinions of Freud have been those of Jeffrey Masson 
who contends that Freud constructed his new theory, against evidence, to 
regain the acceptance of the scientific community.89 Other writers have offered 
different explanations for Freud’s departure from the seduction theory, inter 
alia that he was unable himself to accept the idea of fathers as seducers of their 
daughters, that he was unwilling to believe that such occurrences could be as 
widespread as he himself was suggesting, and that he could not bring himself to 
confront situations that had arisen in his own childhood. 90 It is impossible to 
know the true motivation behind Freud’s theoretical shift. However, it seems to 
me that the questions raised by these writers are sufficiently substantive to cast 
doubt on the relevance of interpretations of Austen’s novels which are based on 
a psychoanalytic theory of repressed sexual fantasies in which Freud himself 
may not have believed. Furthermore, Freud’s work is comprehensively 
questioned by Richard Webster, who argues convincingly that neither the 
seduction theory nor the later theory of infantile sexuality should be regarded 
as scientifically valid.91 Webster highlights elements of powerful suggestion and 
even coercion, on the part of Freud, in a significant number of the case histories 
of his patients who recalled sexual experiences in childhood. For Webster, this 
invalidates Freud’s theory of the Oedipus complex from a scientific point of 
view. Notwithstanding the significant contribution to the debate in support of 
Freud’s oeuvre, most notably those of Ernest Jones and Peter Gay, Webster 
concludes that the continuing influence of the psychoanalytic tradition owes 
more to Freud’s charismatic personality and rhetorical skills than to the validity 
of his theories. 92 For this reason, Webster suggests, the fact that Freud’s theory 
                                            
89
 Jeffrey Masson, The Assault on Truth: Freud’s Suppression of the Seduction Theory (New York: 
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, Inc., 1984; published with a new preface and afterword, London: Penguin, 
1985; re-issued with a new preface under the title Assault on Truth: Freud and Child Sexual Abuse, 
London: HarperCollinsPublishers, 1992). 
90
 For a review of these opinions see Allen Esterton, ‘The Myth of Freud’s Ostracism by the Medical 
Community in 1896-1905: Jeffrey Masson’s Assault on Truth’, in History of Psychology, 2002, 5:2, 
115-134. 
91
 Richard Webster, Why Freud Was Wrong. Sin, Science and Psychoanalysis (London: 
HarperCollinsPublishers, 1995). 
92
 Other critics have taken a similar stance to that of Webster. See, for example, Ellenberger’s 
comment on the difficulty of achieving an objective evaluation of Freud’s theories ‘before the true 
historic facts are separated from the legend’, The Discovery of The Unconscious, p. 548, cited in 
Webster, p. 16. See also, Frank Sulloway, Freud, Biologist of The Mind: Beyond the Psychoanalytic 
39 
 
is paradigmatic in our understanding of our psychological, emotional and 
intellectual lives is problematic, and it is my sympathy with his concerns that 
leads me to bring a certain scepticism to unquestioning psychoanalytic 
interpretations of any aspect of human experience; in particular, in the context 
of this thesis, to readings of Austen’s novels.   
Criticisms of Freud’s formulations notwithstanding, I agree also with 
supporters of Freud who recognise that his ideas could not have gained such a 
powerful foothold in modern cultural consciousness if there was not something 
in the nature of his theories that resonates deeply with people’s lived 
behavioural, emotional and psychological experience. For me, Freud’s genius 
lies in the fundamental elements of his early model which focus on the need 
that people have to resist the recognition and acceptance of certain threatening 
or unpleasant elements of their nature or psyche, and their tendency as a result 
to push these away, to repress, deny, sublimate or project them out of conscious 
awareness. Where this occurs, true to Freud’s conception, the challenge of 
psychotherapy is somehow to circumvent the individual’s defence mechanisms 
and thereby enable greater self-awareness and conscious self-efficacy. 
Psychotherapists use a number of different techniques towards this aim, which 
I summarise briefly below. 
Therapeutic circumvention of the ‘ego-defence’ mechanisms  
As I state above, in psychoanalysis the evasion of the ego-defence mechanisms 
may be achieved through hypnosis, free-association and dream-interpretation. 
Other psychotherapeutic methods such as art or drama therapy have much the 
same aim.93 This goal may also be accomplished by the telling of stories. 
Storytelling, specifically the use of metaphor, is a technique that is employed by 
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therapists across a range of psychotherapeutic disciplines.94 Theoretically, 
while the client, or patient, pays conscious attention to the nature and 
experiences of a fictional character, they are at the same time unconsciously 
absorbing ideas that relate to themselves, and which they may reject out of 
hand if approached with those suggestions more directly. This is the aspect of 
psychoanalytic theory that I will bring to bear when I explore the potentially 
therapeutic aspects of Austen’s novels in the concluding chapter of this thesis.  
In the remaining sections of this chapter I provide explanations of the 
key features of the Cognitive-Behavioural and Humanistic schools of 
psychotherapy, and of the model of Emotional Intelligence, which encompasses 
important elements of the psychotherapeutic principles of both of these major 
disciplines.  
1.2. Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy 
The theory and practice of Cognitive-Behavioural Psychotherapy (CBT) were 
established by Aaron Beck in the 1960s and 1970s, and his early publications 
remain the seminal texts for the study of this field of psychotherapy.95 While 
current practice of CBT is still based on the fundamental principles of Beck’s 
original model, there are now a number of different strands of therapeutic 
technique that are related to CBT. In this section I examine the classic 
formulation of CBT, as well as the additional elements of the school, insofar as 
these will be of note in my reading of the character of Mrs. Smith, and of my 
understanding of the character’s psychological resilience.   
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As the name ‘Cognitive-Behavioural’ suggests, Beck’s model incorporates 
principles underlying two distinct approaches to psychotherapy: ‘cognitivism’ 
and ‘behaviourism’. I will trace briefly the emergence of each as separate 
disciplines before I discuss the practice of the two in combination. In keeping 
with the historical development of these branches of psychotherapy, I begin 
below with behaviourism. 
1.2.1. Behaviourism 
The concept of behaviourism in relation to human psychology stems from the 
work of the Russian physiologist, Ivan Pavlov.96 Pavlov’s investigations into 
human psychology and behaviour ran concurrently with Freud’s work on 
psychoanalysis, yet their theories, and the methods of research from which they 
were derived, could not have been more different. In contrast to Freud, Pavlov 
regarded only that which could be objectively observed and measured to be a 
legitimate basis for the scientific study of human psychology and behaviour. 
The subjects of his studies were animals, and his findings then extrapolated to 
explain the functioning of the human brain.97 Pavlov is most well-known for 
experiments in which he paired the presentation of food to a dog with the 
simultaneous sounding of a bell. After a number of repetitions of this pairing, 
Pavlov discovered that the dog would salivate upon hearing the sound of the 
bell even in the absence of food. Essentially, Pavlov had manipulated an 
automatic, or ‘unconditioned’ reflex, salivation in the presence of food, to occur 
in response to a neutral stimulus, the sound of a bell. This salivation response 
was now a ‘conditioned reflex’.98 The conclusions reached by Pavlov in the light 
of his findings are as well-established in modern popular culture as those 
arrived at by Freud. Just as, for example, people’s slips-of-tongue are often 
                                            
96
 For Pavlov’s seminal work, see: Ivan Petrovitch Pavlov, Lectures on Conditioned Reflexes, 2 vols, 
ed. and trans. by W. Horsley Gantt (London: Lawrence & Wishart Ltd. 1941). 
97
 See Harry K. Wells, Pavlov and Freud: Ivan P. Pavlov, Toward a Scientific Psychology and 
Psychiatry (London: Lawrence & Wishart Ltd., 1956) p. 79 ff. for further clarification of Pavlov’s theory 
relating to human language and emotion, and the process of psychotherapy. Wells explains: ‘The 
theory underlying Pavlov’s use of psychotherapy is based on the regulative role of the secondary 
signalling system in human beings…there is nothing in the least mystical about this’, Pavlov and 
Freud, p. 164. The term ‘mystical’ is clearly a reference to Freud’s emphasis on the influence of the 
unobservable unconscious mind in the aetiology of the neuroses. 
98
 Pavlov’s experiments with animal reflexes are detailed in Lectures on Conditioned Reflexes: 
Volume II, Conditioned Reflexes and Psychiatry.  
42 
 
termed ‘Freudian’, so their seemingly unthinking, or apparently reflexive 
reactions to a set of external circumstances are often referred to as ‘Pavlovian’. 
Pavlov’s conception of human psychology gained considerable ground in 
the psychotherapeutic field, particularly with the concurrent work of American 
psychologist, John Broadus Watson, and later contributions to the field by 
Burrhus Frederic Skinner.99 Watson was as determined as Pavlov to equate all 
aspects of human emotion and behaviour to the observable physiological reflex 
reactions of non-human animals, however he expanded Pavlov’s research 
method to involve humans as subjects for his experiments. Research that he 
carried out with a nine-month-old boy known as ‘Little Albert’ is paradigmatic. 
Watson and his colleague, Rosalie Rayner, conditioned a fear of rats in Albert by 
clanging an iron rod whenever a rat was presented to him. After several 
repetitions of the pairing of the rat with the clanging rod, Watson and Rayner 
found that Albert became distressed in the presence of the rat which previously 
had not disturbed him at all.100 Watson’s methods would doubtless be 
considered ethically questionable at the very least by today’s standards. 
Nevertheless, the processes of sensitisation and desensitisation which both he 
and Pavlov demonstrated are still incorporated into current psychotherapeutic 
treatments for a range of conditions including phobias, addictions and 
obsessive-compulsive disorders.101  
Most importantly, neither Pavlov nor Watson postulated the operation 
of intermediary thought processes within the development or inhibition of the 
conditioned reflex. Burrhus Skinner maintained the behaviourist position to a 
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large extent, and employed animals as subjects for his classic experiments. 
However Skinner considered it a great over-simplification to conceive of highly 
complex human cognition, emotionality and physical skills purely as the 
outcomes of sequences of the conditioning of reflexes. Consequently, he 
developed methods to investigate the possibility of at least some intentionality 
in the actions of animals which he could then extrapolate to human behaviour. 
Through his researches, Skinner found that animals learned to act on the world 
to invoke certain consequences. When the animals’ behaviour resulted in a 
reward such as food, they repeated that behaviour (the food is a positive 
reinforcement, and the behaviour followed by the positive reinforcement is 
termed an action–reward contingency). The animals also repeated behaviour 
that resulted in the cessation or avoidance of an unpleasant experience, for 
example an electric shock or a loud noise (again the outcome is positive for the 
animal and so this is also an action–reward contingency, although it is termed 
‘negative reinforcement’ as it involves the avoidance of an unpleasant 
experience rather than the achievement of a pleasant one). Animals ceased 
behaviours that led directly to a disagreeable or painful outcome such as a 
shock or loud noise (the pain of the shock or noise is a punishment, and so the 
behaviour followed by the pain is termed an action–punishment 
contingency).102 Skinner applied the term ‘operant conditioning’ to the 
manipulation of animals’ behaviour in his experiments to reflect the element of 
their active operation on the environment for particular outcomes. It is simple 
enough to make a comparison between the behaviour of the animals in 
Skinner’s experiments and that of human beings. Like Skinner’s subjects, people 
do not only react reflexively to environmental circumstances that impinge upon 
them, they also act intentionally on the environment to seek out or produce 
pleasure for themselves, and to avoid or prevent displeasure or pain.103 On this 
basis, it is possible to construct programs of psychotherapeutic treatment 
which identify, address, and possibly attempt to reverse detrimental action – 
consequence contingencies that an individual has encountered. For example, 
where a damaging form of compulsive behaviour such as physical self-harming 
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or addiction has been reinforced by a consequent reduction of anxiety or 
production of pleasure, psychotherapeutic treatment aims either to replace the 
behaviour with a non-destructive activity which delivers the same rewards, or 
to reverse the contingency by instigating a ‘punishment’ such as a painful or 
nausea-inducing outcome.  
Thus the behaviourist model contributes some useful strategies in 
present-day psychotherapy. However, behaviourist techniques are generally 
combined with cognitivist and/or humanistic approaches. Cognitivist and 
humanistic perspectives hold that the behaviourists’ focus on similarities 
between the actions and reactions of human beings and those of other animals 
severely limits their ability to explain humans’ vastly more complex intellectual 
abilities, behavioural patterns and emotionality, as well as other aspects of 
human experience such as morality and spirituality. I will explore the 
cognitivist and humanistic positions further shortly. However, since Austen has 
provided a rich array of human behaviour in her novels, I will introduce my 
discussion of these two models, and demonstrate the central cognitivist and 
humanistic concerns regarding the limitations of behaviourism, with a brief 
reference to a small selection of Austen’s characters. 
Austen’s characters illustrate the explanatory limitations of behaviourism  
Before I refer to Austen’s characters to illustrate issues relating to the 
behaviourist approach, I should re-emphasise that the proponents of 
behaviourism that I discuss above equated the reactions and responses of 
human beings to those of any other animal. This crucial aspect of the model 
indicates two key points. Firstly, in behaviourist terms, the concepts ‘reward’, 
‘reinforcement’ and ‘punishment’ carry no moral significance. Thus, when I 
identify the outcome of the behaviour of a character of Austen’s as a ‘reward’ or 
‘punishment’, I do not mean this to suggest any adherence to, or promotion of, 
any particular moral code on the part of Austen.104 Secondly, a behaviourist 
reading of Austen’s novels would offer a universal as opposed to an 
individualistic understanding of Austen’s characters to an even greater extent 
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than the psychoanalytic interpretations of Austen that I review in the 
Introduction to this thesis.105 Therefore any comment about the effects of 
reward or punishment contingencies that one might apply to a particular 
character would apply to all. For me, as with the psychodynamic readings, this 
universalising obscures rather than clarifies the psychological complexities of 
Austen’s characterisations. In addition, as a result, the model veils rather than 
reveals the nature of Austen’s psychological insight or purpose. It is for these 
reasons, as well as in light of the additional limitations of the behaviourist 
paradigm that I will explore below, that I do not look at Austen’s characters 
from a purely behaviourist perspective any further in the chapters that follow.  
To start to sketch Austen’s characters from a behaviourist viewpoint, 
one might look at Lydia Bennet and Mr. Wickham. Lydia’s self-centred and 
irresponsible behaviour is reinforced by the indulgence of her parents, and Mr. 
Wickham’s by Mr. Darcy’s early financial concessions to him, and Mr. Darcy’s 
desire to suppress news of Mr. Wickham’s attempt to seduce and abduct Mr. 
Darcy’s young sister.106 Lydia and Mr. Wickham repeat their patterns of 
behaviour throughout the course of Pride and Prejudice since, in behaviourist 
terms, they never suffer any form of punishment in consequence of their 
actions.107 In contrast, we see a swift change of behaviour in Emma following 
Mr. Knightley’s admonishment for her insensitive and hurtful comment to Miss 
Bates during the picnic at Box Hill. A behaviourist would liken Mr. Knightley’s 
reprimand to an administration of a sudden electric shock to Emma.108 
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Similarly, from a behaviourist viewpoint, in Persuasion, Anne Elliot experiences 
Lady Russell’s disapproval of Captain Wentworth as a punishment, and thus 
relinquishes her attachment to him.109 In both cases, the characters then 
continue in their altered behaviour. Austen makes it clear that Anne has never 
even alluded to the episode involving Captain Wentworth in the nearly eight 
years that have followed his departure, and that Emma will never again be rude 
to Miss Bates, or indeed anyone like her.110 For a behaviourist, the characters’ 
modified behaviour is positively reinforced by the reward of resultant approval, 
or, in other words, negatively reinforced by aversion to the recurrence of the 
unpleasantness of disapproval.  
The above examples are illustrations of behaviour-consequence 
contingencies that are simple enough to elucidate in behaviourist terms. 
However, this becomes a little more complicated when the presence of multiple 
and simultaneous reward-punishment eventualities is apparent. For instance, 
in Sense and Sensibility, Mr. Willoughby runs away from Marianne and her 
impoverished state as one of Skinner’s animals would run from an electric 
shock. At the same time, Mr. Willoughby’s marriage to a woman whom he does 
not love produces sustained discomfort from which he struggles to escape. 
Thus there is punishment in store for Mr. Willoughby whichever way he turns, 
and a behaviourist might compare the character’s anguished and emotional 
confusion at that time, and his desperate search for some reassurance to ease 
his suffering, to the frantic dashing of a rat from one end of a cage to the other 
in search of a spot that is both quiet and un-electrified.111 To some extent this 
would appear to constitute a reasonable enough explanation of Mr. 
Willoughby’s actions and reactions in his given set of circumstances. However, 
when one reads of the multifarious thoughts and feelings that underlay his 
decision to relinquish Marianne, along with the complex mixture of grief, 
frustration, guilt and self-justification that he expresses in his emotional 
interview with Elinor, questions arise as to the scope of a strictly behaviourist 
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model to provide a sufficiently comprehensive understanding of the 
psychological depth of Austen’s portrayal of the character. The same concerns 
may be applied to the behaviourist reductions of Austen’s depictions that I 
presented above of Emma and Anne Elliot, and even of Lydia and Mr. Wickham. 
There is a yet further weakness in behaviourism as a fully explanatory 
model with reference to Austen’s characters. One will recall that animals in 
Skinner’s experiments ceased behaviours that resulted in punishment. How 
then could the behaviourist model account for those of Austen’s characters 
whose actions deliver, and promise to continue to deliver, only punishment, 
with no externally observable reward in evidence? It is possible to identify an 
element of reward in the situations of all of those characters already 
mentioned; even Mr. Willoughby who loses the woman he loves but at least 
gains financial security in his unhappy marriage. However, Edward Ferrars 
proceeds with his engagement to Lucy Steele even though he stands to lose his 
love, his family ties and his fortune in consequence.112 Fanny Price maintains 
her rejection of Henry Crawford’s marriage proposal in spite of the relentlessly 
punishing anger from Sir Thomas that she faces as a result.113 Catherine 
Morland refuses to agree to go on a carriage ride with her brother, Isabella and 
John Thorpe, even though the three place her under a great deal of sustained 
emotional duress.114 The behaviourist model would struggle to an even greater 
extent to account for characters whose behaviour brings about punishment in 
more subtle forms that are not outwardly perceptible or measurable, for 
example: Elinor Dashwood’s agonising secrecy on behalf of Lucy Steele 
regarding Lucy’s engagement to Edward, and Elizabeth Bennet’s discomforted 
yet determined refusal to submit to Lady Catherine de Bourgh’s offensive and 
overbearing demands.115 Behaviourism simply lacks the subtlety and compass 
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to illuminate the sources and forms of motivation, determination and 
emotionality in these cases.  
The development of psychotherapy beyond Behaviourism 
The limitations of the Behaviourist model that I illustrate above in the light of 
Austen’s characters are the same as those that concerned early theorists and 
practitioners working with people in the fields of psychiatry, psychology and 
psychotherapy. Thus, although Pavlov and his colleagues were convinced that a 
comprehensive understanding of behaviour in animals would lead eventually to 
knowledge of human psychology and the source of psychopathology in human 
beings, the further development of the field of non-psychoanalytic 
psychotherapy has in fact depended largely upon cognitivist and humanistic 
approaches to psychotherapy. 116 Proponents of these two major schools of 
psychotherapy were unwilling to discard from the scope of their interest any 
aspect of human psychology that could not be categorised as an automatic 
physiological reaction, nor could they conceive of Skinner’s theory of operant 
conditioning as remotely sufficient to explain the complexities of human 
psychology. For the original cognitivists such as Aaron Beck, in order to 
understand the human psyche, it was both necessary and scientific to work 
with human beings themselves, and to take into account their subjectively 
reported cognitive and emotional experiences. The cognitive-behavioral model 
emerged with the incorporation of Pavlovian reflexive reactions and Skinnerian 
operant behaviour into the cognitivist psychotherapeutic framework. At around 
the same time, the founders of humanistic psychotherapy revisited 
psychoanalytic conceptions of the unconscious mind, and explored, 
additionally, aspects of self-awareness, self-development, autonomy, 
spirituality and so on, that they regarded as intrinsically human. I outline the 
central theoretical and practical bases of cognitive-behavioural and humanistic 
psychotherapy in the sections below. Then, over the following two substantive 
chapters of the thesis, I illustrate the particular light that these perspectives are 
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able to throw on the nature of the themes and characterisations within Austen’s 
novels. 
I begin here with an explanation of the theory and practice of cognitive-
behavioural therapy (CBT). I will draw primarily on Aaron Beck’s original 
formulation for my presentation of the model since, while there have been, and 
are still, numerous significant contributors to the discipline, Beck is held to be 
the ‘father’ of CBT by researchers and practitioners in the field.117 Beck’s 
interest was initially on the cognitive aspects of people’s experience and the 
effects of their thought processes on their emotions and behaviour. He 
subsumed the more behaviouristic approaches into his model at a later stage, 
and I reflect this development towards the end of the following overview.  
1.2.2. Cognitivism, leading to Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT): Aaron 
Beck (b. 1921)118 
In the Introduction to one of his most influential publications, Beck presents a 
clear and succinct distinction between his own therapeutic formulation and the 
approaches to psychological disturbance that had, up to that point, been most 
widely employed: neuropsychiatric and biological, psychoanalytic, and 
behaviourist.119 While Beck acknowledges the fundamental differences 
between these three treatment methodologies, he notes that ‘they share one 
basic assumption: the emotionally disturbed person is victimized by concealed 
forces over which he has no control’ (p. 2). The first of the three assigns 
biological or neurological causes to emotional or behavioural disorders, and 
seeks to correct maladjustments with the application of drug medication or the 
imposition of physical restraints or hardships. Psychoanalysis conceives of a 
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troubled person as driven by elements of the psyche of which they have no 
conscious awareness and therefore over which they can exercise no conscious 
will. Finally, behaviourists base their therapeutic framework on theories of 
deviant conditioning of automatic reflexes, or dysfunctional reward-
consequence contingencies which are unmediated by cognitive processing. 
From this Beck concludes, ‘Because these three leading schools maintain that 
the source of the patient’s disturbance lies beyond his awareness, they gloss 
over his conscious conceptions, his specific thoughts and fantasies’ (p. 3). Beck 
continues to develop his proposition and its relevance to psychotherapeutic 
practice as follows: 
Suppose, however, that these schools are on the wrong track. Let us 
conjecture, for the moment, that a person’s consciousness contains 
elements that are responsible for the emotional upsets and blurred 
thinking that lead him to seek help. Moreover, let us suppose that the 
patient has at his disposal various rational techniques he can use, with 
proper instruction, to deal with these disturbing elements in his 
consciousness. If these suppositions are correct, then emotional disorders 
may be approached from an entirely different route: Man has the key to 
understanding and solving his psychological disturbance within the scope of 
his own awareness. He can correct the misconceptions producing his 
emotional disturbance with the same problem-solving apparatus that he 
has been accustomed to using at various stages in his development. (p. 3. 
Beck’s italics) 
Thus, in contrast to the existing schools of psychotherapeutic theory and 
practice, which placed the treatment of people’s difficulties outwith their direct 
control, Beck’s view was that individuals have the ability within themselves to 
ameliorate their own dysfunctional emotions and behaviour. He proposed that 
people’s emotional states are brought about by the content of their conscious 
thoughts, and that their behaviour is consequent to their emotions. Further he 
observed that emotions and behaviours that are detrimental to the well-being 
of an individual arise from certain forms of unnecessarily negative or anxiety-
provoking misperceptions of reality that are contained within the individual’s 
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conscious thoughts. Finally, Beck considered that it is possible to use the same 
cognitive processes that give rise to injurious thoughts (that is, ‘the same 
problem-solving apparatus that he has been accustomed to using at various 
stages in his development’, see quotation above) to adjust the content of those 
thoughts towards more rational and therefore potentially less disturbing 
perceptions.120 The role of the therapist in Beck’s cognitive-therapeutic 
procedure may be summarised therefore as follows: to pay close attention to a 
client’s reflections on their lives and on themselves, to draw the person’s 
attention to any irrational or misconceived perceptions that are bringing about 
their stress, or distress, and to teach them certain strategies and techniques 
that enable them to make a conscious and deliberate therapeutic adjustment to 
those aspects of their thoughts.121  
The general theoretical principles of cognitive therapy that I explain 
above form the background for an important aspect of my understanding of 
Austen’s psychological position and purpose in the portrayal of certain of her 
characters. However, in this context, I also recognise certain very specific 
components of Beck’s psychotherapeutic model in the characterisations in 
Austen’s novels. These are the concepts of ‘schemas’, and of the ‘cognitive triad’ 
which he derived primarily from his research into the aetiology and treatment 
of depression. Although these two formulations emerged from Beck’s 
investigations into a psychological disorder and were directed towards the 
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amelioration of that disorder, nevertheless they are equally useful as tools to 
identify the determinants of psychological well-being. Later in this thesis, I 
demonstrate how my understanding of both schemas and the cognitive triad 
plays a significant part in my comparison, for example, between Mary Elliot 
Musgrove who lives in reasonable comfort and yet is constantly frustrated and 
miserable, and Mrs Smith who maintains a surprisingly high level of 
contentment despite her straitened circumstances. Therefore, it will be 
worthwhile to summarise these two features of the model here.  
The Components of Cognitive Therapy: Schemas and the Cognitive Triad 
i. Schemas 
For Beck, the ways in which people perceive themselves and interpret the 
circumstances they encounter arise out of an underlying set of beliefs that they 
hold about themselves, about the nature of their relationships with other 
people and about the world in general. Beck refers to these beliefs as ‘schemas’. 
He writes: 
Any situation is composed of a plethora of stimuli. An individual 
selectively attends to specific stimuli, combines them in a pattern, and 
conceptualizes the situation. Although different persons may 
conceptualize the same situation in different ways, a particular person 
tends to be consistent in his response to particular types of events. 
Relatively stable cognitive patterns form the basis for the regularity of 
interpretations of a particular set of situations. The term “schema” 
designates these cognitive patterns.122  
To illustrate the notion of ‘schemas’, Beck identified certain negatively-skewed 
patterns of perception and understanding in his depressed patients. He found 
that, in these cases, schemas would often take the form of imperatives which 
are impossible to achieve. For example, to paraphrase and summarise Beck’s 
full exposition, a depressed individual’s schemas might be something like; ‘In 
order to be happy I must be liked by everyone at all times’, or ‘I should be 
successful in everything I undertake’, or ‘If I make a mistake that means I am 
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useless’.123 As Beck points out, it is simply not possible always to succeed or be 
liked by everyone, or never to make a mistake, and so unhappiness or feelings 
of worthlessness are inevitable if one maintains such a belief system.124  
ii. The Cognitive Triad 
As well as noting a range of idiosyncratic schemas such as those described 
above, Beck identified a set of three generalised, overarching dysfunctional 
assumptions made by depressed people. He applied the term ‘cognitive triad’ to 
this set of assumptions, and indicated three more functional modes of thinking 
towards which the cognitive therapist should guide the depressed person.125 In 
my book, Coaching for Resilience, I apply the descriptor ‘the ‘Three Ps’’ to the 
dysfunctional triad, namely ‘personal’, ‘pervasive’ and ‘permanent’, and I 
identify their alternate forms to which people are directed in CBT as, 
respectively, ‘external’, ‘specific’ and ‘flexible’.126 I explain the nature of each of 
the Three Ps and their counterparts below.  
a. Personal to External 
First within the triad is the tendency of depressed people to attribute the cause 
of all negative circumstances, from localised bad weather to tragic world 
events, to their own actions, to some defect within themselves, or even to their 
very existence. The aim of CBT is to lead an individual who displays this form of 
thought process towards a more external thinking style, and enable them to 
recognise that there are many contingencies that are entirely independent of 
any actions, or the presence or otherwise, of the individual concerned.  
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b. Pervasive to Specific 
Secondly within the triad, the pervasive style is manifested by people for whom 
negativity is all-pervading. They perceive everything, everybody, and all life-
events in a deeply pessimistic light. If one person betrays them they will believe 
that no-one is trustworthy. If one friend is out of touch for a while they will 
believe that no-one likes or cares about them. If a pervasive thinker hears a 
report of one tragic event, then, for them, the whole world is a terrible place. If 
they themselves make a mistake, then they tell themselves that they get 
everything wrong. People who engage in this form of cognitive processing find 
it very difficult to compartmentalise the different aspects of their lives. 
Unhappiness or difficulty in one area encroaches on everything else that they 
experience. For example, if they are finding work challenging then they will be 
unable to enjoy the company of friends or activities outside of work. The 
pervasive style relates also to a person’s tendency to ascribe their potential for 
happiness, their sense of self-worth or even their identity to a single element of 
their lives, for example, their job, their partner, their home, and so on. Self-
evidently, people who evince any or all of these forms of pervasive thinking are 
extremely vulnerable to feelings of isolation and worthlessness. At times of loss 
they may even experience themselves to be ‘nothing’, or incapable of happiness.  
In the case of the pervasive style, CBT guides the individual towards a 
more specific cognitive approach: to recognise the uniqueness of individuals, to 
notice the good and the beautiful things that exist in the world, to identify their 
successes, to take pleasure in some areas even while they are experiencing 
difficulties in others, and finally to recognise the many and varied elements that 
constitute their lives and the contribution that each of these elements makes to 
their well-being.  
c. Permanent to flexible 
The third form of cognitive processing in Beck’s triad is manifest when 
depressed people look ahead to the future and anticipate that any difficulties 
they experience will be permanent and unchanging. They believe that their 
suffering, for example physically through illness, emotionally with bereavement 
or the end of a relationship, or practically and financially from the lack of a job, 
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will continue unremittingly and indefinitely. Further, from a slightly different 
angle, the permanent cognitive style leads people also to predict the future on 
the basis of previous negative experience. Thus, for example, they expect to be 
unsuccessful in an examination or job interview if they have failed at either in 
the past. CBT demonstrates that situations, emotions, and physical and 
emotional states are constantly changing, and that, by extension, it is not 
possible to predict the future from what has happened in the past. This enables 
people to become more flexible in their perception of the future.  
It is important to note that cognitive therapy is applicable only where 
the person’s views are dysfunctional, that is to say, where a person maintains 
their belief patterns in the absence of evidence to support their position, and 
even in the presence of evidence to the contrary.127 The task of the therapist is 
to encourage the individual to view their belief ‘as a hypothesis rather than as a 
fact; that is, as a possible but not necessarily true proposition. […] Through 
careful scrutiny and consideration of the belief, the patient can gradually arrive 
at a different view.’128 There are a number of different techniques and 
strategies that therapists working in this field employ to enable a client to 
achieve this cognitive transformation. I will outline these interventions below 
and, in doing so, will address the connection between cognitive and behavioural 
approaches within the CBT model.  
Cognitive and Cognitive-Behavioural therapeutic techniques and 
strategies  
The technique that cognitive therapists most commonly employ to bring clients 
to analyse and evaluate their beliefs more objectively is that of the Personal 
Journal. People who undertake cognitive therapy are most often advised to 
keep a written daily record of the situations that they have encountered, the 
emotions that they experienced in response to those situations, and the beliefs 
that they had about the situations at the time that may have given rise to those 
emotions. They are asked to engage in the ‘careful scrutiny and consideration’ 
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that I referred to above, to identify alternative and more realistic ways of 
thinking about the impact and meanings of an event or circumstance, and 
finally to record the effect on their emotional state of this analysis and the 
reconstruction of their beliefs. In theory, the process as a whole should 
ameliorate clients’ difficult emotions and, in line with Beck’s original findings, 
we generally find this to be the case in practice.129 Alongside this record-
keeping strategy, cognitive therapists identify the schemas that underlie their 
clients’ views of themselves. They challenge the logic and achievability of the 
‘must’ and ‘should’ messages that are embedded in schemas, and encourage 
clients to adopt views and aspirations that are, again, more realistic and 
appropriate.130  
The approaches that I have explained are typically viewed as purely 
cognitive strategies since they operate on modes of thinking. However, there is 
a range of different techniques at the disposal of a therapist working within this 
model, which draw on behavioural theory and practices. In Cognitive Therapies 
and the Emotional Disorders, Beck delineates two approaches within cognitive 
therapy: the ‘intellectual’, discussed above, and the ‘experiential’, which he 
described as ‘the stock-in trade of behaviour therapists’ (p. 215). Therapeutic 
techniques that would fall into the category of ‘experiential’ include, for 
example, ‘counter-conditioning’ and ‘modelling’ treatments introduced by 
Joseph Wolpe. Clients who experience distressing phobic responses may be 
desensitised through the employment of relaxation techniques (counter-
conditioning) and/or by the demonstration (modelling) of lack of fear by the 
therapist.131 Additionally, there are methods such as those which involve the 
use of reward and self-reward for desired behaviours (Skinnerian 
reinforcement explained earlier in this chapter) and unpleasant consequences 
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for those that a client wishes to cease (aversion therapy, based on Skinnerian 
negative reinforcement and punishment contingencies).  
Of particular interest in the context of this thesis are different 
behavioural approaches which include elements of meditation and mindfulness, 
one manifestation of which is the experience of ‘flow’.132 The concept of ‘flow’ 
was applied by Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi to the state that one might achieve 
through complete absorption in a task or activity to the extent that one loses 
awareness of external surroundings and occurrences, and even of the passage 
of time. So, in the state of flow, all potentially disturbing or anxiety-provoking 
ruminations are pushed outside of awareness, and this enables calm 
peacefulness, and possibly even feelings of happiness or joy to pervade. Note-
worthy here is Csikszentmihalyi’s comment that the condition of flow brings 
about a ‘loss of self-consciousness’, which ‘does not involve a loss of self, and 
certainly not a loss of consciousness, but rather, only a loss of consciousness of 
the self. […]. And being able to forget temporarily who we are seems to be very 
enjoyable.’133 Also relevant are the techniques promulgated by the therapeutic 
model, ‘Neuro-Linguistic Programming’ (NLP).134 In keeping with 
behaviourists’ reluctance to become involved with the content of people’s 
thoughts, practitioners of NLP are concerned, not with what people think, but 
with the ways in which their thoughts are represented in their minds, as an 
inner voice (auditory) or a movie clip or photograph (visual), or even in their 
bodies as a physical sensation (kinaesthetic). Once a therapist is aware of the 
representational form of the source of their client’s distress or anxiety, then 
they begin to work towards transforming the qualities, as opposed to the 
content, of that representation. Thus, for example, if the client is hearing 
negative pervasive messages as a voice speaking in their head, they do not need 
to challenge or change the message, they can just turn the volume down, push it 
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away into the distance, or simply imagine that they turn and walk away from 
it.135  
I outline the elements of CBT theory and therapeutic methods in some 
detail above because I perceive that Austen both describes, and places 
significance on, methods that are remarkably similar to these approaches. I 
refer again to Austen’s portrayal of Mrs Smith. Through the apparently natural 
and un-self-conscious use of techniques that almost exactly match those that I 
have explored in the sections above (although not in the same terms), Mrs. 
Smith is able to maintain her psychological wellness in spite of loss and 
hardship, an ability which the author describes as ‘the choicest gift from 
Heaven’.136  
A note on the philosophical background to the CBT paradigm 
One may detect the position of Greek and Roman Stoic philosophers such as 
Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius in Beck’s cognitive-therapeutic model, as Beck 
himself is keen to point out.137 The notion that people’s thoughts influence their 
emotions, and that individuals themselves have the capacity to alter the way 
that they think and thereby change how they feel, is clear in passages such as 
this from The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius Antoninus: 
If you suffer pain because of some external cause, what troubles you is not 
the thing but your decision about it, and this it is in your power to wipe 
out at once. But if what pains you is something in your own disposition, 
who prevents you from correcting your judgement?138 
It would not have occurred to Austen to conceive of and include features of CBT 
in her novels in the terms used to refer to and about the model today. 
Nevertheless, it is quite likely that the author absorbed elements of the Stoic 
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philosophical approach directly from translations of the philosophers’ writings, 
or indirectly through her reading of commentators such as Samuel Johnson, 
who promoted rational stoicism in his publications, and whose works we know 
Austen followed and admired.139  
The subject of the next part of this chapter is the third major school of 
psychotherapy, the Humanistic school. I focus my discussion of the Humanistic 
field of psychotherapy primarily on the Rogerian Client-Centered model and on 
the framework of Emotional Intelligence. I perceive that aspects of the Rogerian 
formulation permeate Austen’s portrayal of her characters, and that an 
understanding of these Rogerian elements within Austen’s work illuminates 
both the subtle features of the author’s characterisations and psychological 
insights that inform those characterisations. The Emotional Intelligence model 
encompasses principles of both the cognitive and the humanistic 
psychotherapeutic approaches, and provides the basis for my detailed analysis 
of Elinor and Marianne Dashwood in the next chapter of this thesis. I include an 
explanation of Transactional Analysis (TA) within the following overview of the 
Humanistic field. This is a formulation which informs my understanding of a 
range of Austen’s characters, exemplified in Chapter Three in my analysis of 
Mary Crawford.  
1.3. Humanistic Psychotherapy  
Humanistic psychotherapy is underpinned by a theoretical stance which, as I 
remarked earlier in this chapter, goes beyond both the behaviourists’ 
concentration on perceptible and measurable responses and actions, and the 
cognitivists’ concern with conscious thought patterns. For humanistic 
therapists, it is not possible for therapy to be effective unless it takes all 
elements of human experience into account. The humanistic framework 
therefore seeks to encompass all aspects, consciously observable and 
otherwise, of both past and present experiences of the human subject. As well 
as the analysis of a client’s present-moment behaviour and psychological and 
emotional condition, the strong influence of Freudian psychoanalytic concepts 
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is in evidence within the humanistic model, as well as a focus on other qualities 
that are not empirically measurable, such as spirituality. Modes of exploration 
of this breadth of human experience in the practice of humanistic 
psychotherapy take numerous different forms, including a range of drama, art 
and experiential meditative therapies. In very simple terms, these methods are 
formulated to reveal the contents of a person’s unconscious mind through role 
play or the creation of artworks, and through procedures such as ‘rebirthing 
therapy’ that employ deep breathing techniques to draw the client into a state 
of deep awareness of the self and thereby to bring about therapeutic healing 
and change.140 The eclecticism of the modus operandi within humanistic 
psychotherapy notwithstanding, the central concern within this school of 
psychotherapy is for the self-awareness and personal autonomy of the 
individual, and for the individual’s capacity for development and growth in 
these areas. 
There are certain proponents of the principles and practice of 
humanistic psychotherapy whose contributions to the school have been, and 
continue to be, especially significant. Arguably the most influential of these is 
Carl Rogers, originator of Client-Centered Therapy which I explain below.  
1.3.1. Client-Centered Therapy: Carl Rogers (1902-1987)141 
It would be difficult to over-emphasise the importance of the work of Carl 
Rogers within the current field of psychotherapy. To all intents and purposes, 
and supported by research to which I shall refer shortly, practitioners within all 
schools of psychotherapy accept that the application of the principles devised 
by Rogers is a necessary foundation for the effectiveness of their practice. 
Essentially, Rogers’ influence stems from three key elements within his 
theoretical and practical framework. First is his emphasis on an instinctual 
drive within all organisms, and therefore within humans, to seek to develop 
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their ability to function and thrive independently of others, a drive to which he 
applied the term ‘actualizing tendency’. Second is the explicit identification of 
the facilitation of the client’s development of this personal autonomy as the 
primary aim of psychotherapy. Finally, the third is his prescription for the 
ethical, philosophical, psychological and emotional stance of the therapist, and 
the ways in which the therapist should relate to their clients in order to achieve 
the most effective therapeutic process.  
In the section below, I begin with an explanation of Rogers’ perception of 
the nature and significance of the actualizing tendency, and of the development 
of personal autonomy within psychotherapy. I then expand upon the three 
conditions of the therapist-client relationship which Rogers deemed to be 
required for the success of the therapeutic process, namely the non-judgmental 
approach, the empathy and the congruence that I mention and ascribe to 
Austen’s approach to her characters in my Introduction to this thesis. I should 
reiterate here the point that I clarified in the Introduction, which is that it is not 
my intention to propose that Austen adopted these three qualities in her 
approach to her writing in order deliberately to create some form of a 
therapeutic relationship with her readers. It is rather that, as a therapist myself, 
I perceive a thread of the qualities defined by Rogers running through and 
underlying the author’s writing. This leads me, later in this thesis, to consider a 
possible intentionality on the part of the author to bring her readers to adopt a 
similar stance in order to understand more fully the nature of her characters, 
and, possibly thereby, themselves.  
Carl Rogers: the ‘actualizing tendency’ and the three ‘core conditions’ 
i. The ‘actualizing tendency’ 
As I state above, one of the foremost tenets of Rogers’ model of psychotherapy 
is that all human beings are driven by what he called the ‘actualizing tendency’, 
an instinctive motivation towards the development of their ability to live 
independently of others. In Rogers’ words, ‘The organism has one basic 
tendency and striving — to actualize, maintain and enhance the experiencing 
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organism.’142 The proposition here is to a large extent self-evident at a 
biological level. It is that the behaviour of all organisms, including humans, is 
instinctively geared towards the maintenance and enhancement of their 
physiology through feeding and reproduction, in short, towards survival. 
However, the theory further describes the drive of all organisms, ‘to move in 
the direction of maturation, as maturation is defined for each species.’ This 
constitutes, ‘movement in the direction of greater independence or self-
responsibility.’ Rogers writes (of the organism):  
Its movement […] is in the direction of an increasing self-government, 
self-regulation, and autonomy, and away from heteronymous [sic] control, 
or control by external forces. This is true whether we are speaking of 
entirely unconscious organic processes, such as the regulation of body heat, 
or such uniquely human and intellectual functions as the choice of life 
goals.143  
So, for Rogers, in all humans, the drive towards autonomy of thought, values 
and beliefs, and in the way these are expressed, along with an urge to grow and 
fulfil potential creativity, learning and so on, is as inherent as the instinct for 
their survival. 144 Crucially therefore, just as threats to the physical survival of a 
human being induce stress, so any constraint upon a human being’s ability to 
develop autonomy leads to stress. For Rogers, it is possible for an individual to 
become more able to express themselves autonomously, and to experience the 
consequent internal psychological and emotional ease, only when they have a 
clear and authentic sense of themselves: their own thoughts, feelings and 
behaviours, and of what motivates them to think, feel, or act as they do. Thus, 
self-awareness is the sine qua non of autonomy. 
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In the light of this definition of autonomy and its inherent requirement 
for self-awareness, I return to references that I make earlier in this chapter to 
behaviourist interpretations of Austen’s characters. There I question the ability 
of the behaviourist model to explain the psychological complexity that Austen 
presents in her portrayals of Mr. Willoughby and Edward Ferrars. I describe the 
potential behaviourist interpretation of Mr. Willoughby that would liken the 
character to one of Skinner’s rats dashing around a cage to avoid noise and 
electric shocks and find a safe and peaceful spot. The Rogerian concept of the 
actualizing tendency offers a different and more nuanced reading of Mr. 
Willoughby’s state. The character refuses to marry Eliza to appease his cousin, 
which suggests that he behaves autonomously. However he abandons Marianne 
because he is unable to overcome his ‘“dread of poverty”’ which he now realises 
Marianne’s ‘“affection and her society would have deprived of all its 
horrors”’.145 Here we see that Willoughby acts, in Rogers’ terms, under 
‘heteronymous [sic] control’. This is because, when he relinquishes Marianne, 
he does so because he lacks self-awareness. Willoughby states: 
“I did not then know what it was to love. But have I ever known it?—Well 
may it be doubted; for, had I really loved, could I have sacrificed my 
feelings to vanity, to avarice?”146 
When Willoughby abandons Marianne he acts against his own personal feelings 
and self-will because, at the time, he has no self-understanding. He experiences 
this restriction to his instinctive drive towards maturation and autonomy with 
the same physiological, emotional and psychological stress that would arise 
instinctively from a threat to his physical survival.  
From this point of view, it is possible also to more fully understand 
Edward Ferrars’ choice. In contrast to Willoughby who appears to act 
autonomously and yet does not, Edward seems to act without autonomy and 
yet, in Rogerian terms, the character’s determination to maintain his 
engagement to Lucy Steele is a model of autonomous behaviour. Edward 
apparently acts very much against his own wishes, and indeed his own 
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interests, in his resolution to honour his engagement to Lucy Steele in spite of 
his love for Elinor. He appears to adhere to a code of conduct imposed by his 
social and cultural milieu to the detriment of his own personal happiness. 
However, when Mrs. Ferrars makes it clear that Edward must withdraw from 
his engagement to Lucy in order to fulfil his duty to meet the expectations of his 
social sphere and those of his family, she absolves him of any externally 
imposed responsibility to marry Lucy. Nevertheless, he persists with the 
engagement, and therefore there must be another, more powerful factor that 
motivates Edward’s resolve.  
From a Rogerian perspective, this factor is the character’s understanding 
of himself and of his own independent values. Edward knows he has made a 
promise, and he knows that, for him, a promise must be kept. This strong sense 
of self facilitates his decision. More importantly from a Rogerian 
psychotherapeutic point of view, Edward’s self-awareness and his ability to act 
according to that sense of self manifests the movement of the actualizing 
tendency towards independence, and this ensures peace of mind at a profound 
level in spite of the immediate discomfort and unhappiness he experiences 
through his choice. Edward would never be able to experience the satisfaction 
he should feel at gaining his mother's approval nor the happiness he could find 
in marriage with Elinor, with or without the comforts acquired through his 
inheritance, at the cost the violation of one of his deeply held values and thus 
obstructing the development of his autonomous self.  
I explore the resonances between Austen’s portrayals of autonomy and 
lack of autonomy in her characters and Rogerian principles in greater depth 
and detail in the chapters to follow in this thesis. For now, I return to my 
exposition of Rogers’ theory, and focus on the primacy that he gives to the 
enhancement of an individual’s self-awareness as a necessary means to the 
development of personal autonomy in the therapeutic process.  
Rogers considered that the context in which a person’s actualizing 
tendency may be realised are present within the context of a certain form of 
therapeutic relationship. This is a relationship in which the therapist provides 
65 
 
an environment in which the client is able to come to their own self-
realisations, and determine for themselves the ways in which they may achieve 
their therapeutic aims independently of any observations, opinions or agenda 
that the therapist might hold. In this way the relationship that the therapist 
develops with the client is one of an alliance of equals rather than one in which 
the therapist presents themselves as the expert or teacher (as may be the case 
in the cognitive-behavioural therapies for example). As Rogers states 
succinctly: 
I can state the overall hypothesis in one sentence, as follows. If I can 
provide a certain type of relationship, the other person will discover 
within himself the capacity to use that relationship for growth, and change 
and development will occur. (p. 33) 
The ‘certain type of relationship’ to which Rogers refers is one in which the 
client does not feel judged, in which they perceive that the way that they 
experience themselves at each moment is understood and to some extent 
shared at that moment by the therapist, and in which honesty and transparency 
is offered as well as invited by the therapist. This therapeutic context requires 
the therapist to provide three conditions in relation to their client, often termed 
the ‘core conditions’.147 Respectively, these conditions are, as identified earlier 
in this section: unconditional positive regard, empathy and congruence. I will 
explore each of these in turn in a little more detail now since they are the 
guiding principles of the practice of Client-Centered therapy. My work as a 
psychotherapist has been significantly influenced by Rogerian theory and 
principles of practice. Inevitably therefore, the reading that I present of 
Austen’s novels in this thesis reflects my knowledge and understanding of the 
Client-Centered model, and I refer a great deal to these three therapeutic 
conditions in my exploration of Austen’s writing over the course of the chapters 
of this thesis to follow. 
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ii. The core conditions for an effective therapeutic relationship 
a. Unconditional positive regard 
In Rogerian psychotherapy the term ‘unconditional positive regard’ refers to 
the attitude of care and respect that the therapist holds towards their client, 
regardless of the degree to which the therapist agrees with or approves of the 
client’s feelings, thoughts or actions. In Rogers’ words, the therapist’s stance is 
‘“I care”; not “I care for you if you behave thus and so.”’ To be very clear, the 
condition of unconditional positive regard does not require a therapist to 
concur with a client’s views or to be at ease with all feelings, wishes or 
behaviours that the client expresses or describes. It calls for the therapist 
simply to accept the client as they are without making judgements or attaching 
‘conditions of worth’. The definition of unconditional positive regard is refined 
further by Rogers as he states, ‘It involves an acceptance of and a caring for the 
client as a separate person, with permission for him to have his own feelings 
and experiences, and to find his own meanings in them.’ (p. 283. Rogers’ italics) 
The notion of the therapist’s acceptance of the separateness of the other person 
shows that the therapist does not require acquiescence, submission or 
compliance to their opinions, beliefs or authority in order to maintain their own 
sense of self. Thus the therapist provides a model of personal autonomy that 
leads the client not only to begin to trust and express their own feelings and 
responses without looking for external validation, but to begin themselves to 
accept the unique feelings and values which exist in another person. 
The element of Client-Centered therapy that emphasises the acceptance 
of the autonomy of others as part of the development of one’s own autonomy is 
a significant factor in my analysis of the characters in Austen’s novels in 
Chapter Three of this thesis. In that chapter I show that this aspect of autonomy 
is one of the defining characteristics of Catherine Morland’s behaviour, and I 
contrast Elizabeth Bennet, who demonstrates this quality of acceptance, with 
Lady Catherine de Bourgh, who is consistently unable to respect the 
autonomous decisions and actions of others.  
In relation to unconditional positive regard, Rogers points out that this 
condition is meaningless unless it is offered in the presence of as complete and 
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accurate an understanding of the client as possible. It is easy to show 
acceptance of another person if their thoughts, feelings and actions are 
superficially similar to our own, or to those that we appreciate or admire. 
However, for the client, it is the sense of being cared for as a person despite 
their expressions of deeper and perhaps more uncomfortable or challenging 
emotions or views that is of most therapeutic value. Therefore, it is incumbent 
on the therapist to seek to understand the client at this more profound level 
and to maintain their regard for the client no matter how troubling their 
revelations may be. The form that this understanding takes is encompassed 
within the term ‘empathy’, which is the core condition I explore next.  
b. Empathy 
The OED defines ‘empathy’ as, ‘The ability to understand and appreciate 
another person's feelings, experience, etc.’, and I would imagine that this is a 
commonly held understanding of the meaning of the term. To gauge the full 
implication of the concept however, it is useful to compare it to a related term, 
‘sympathy’, which the OED defines partially as, ‘The quality or state of being 
affected by the condition of another with a feeling similar or corresponding to 
that of the other; the fact or capacity of entering into or sharing the feelings of 
another or others; fellow-feeling’, and further as, ‘The quality or state of being 
thus affected by the suffering or sorrow of another; a feeling of compassion or 
commiseration’. For psychotherapeutic purposes, there is a crucial distinction 
to be made between the definition of empathy and that of sympathy. That 
distinction lies in the element of separateness of emotional experience. 
Sympathy denotes a sense of one finding in oneself a feeling of one’s own that 
‘corresponds’ with that which another person is experiencing, or indeed feeling 
the same way about something and thus ‘entering into’ or ‘sharing’ another 
person’s feelings. Empathy, on the other hand, involves one in becoming aware 
of the emotional experience of another without engaging one’s own emotions to 
bring about that connection, or bringing oneself to have the same emotional 
reaction as another person to a given circumstance or situation.148 Rogers’ 
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explanation of empathy in the therapeutic context draws on this distinction 
between the two concepts, as follows: 
To sense the client’s private world as if it were your own, but without ever 
losing the “as if” quality […]. To sense the client’s anger, fear or confusion 
as if it were your own, yet without your anger, fear or confusion getting 
bound up in it, is the condition we are endeavoring [sic] to describe. (p. 
284) 
It is the ‘as if’ element that is key here in a therapeutic context. If the therapist 
were to exhibit their own anger, fear or grief alongside their client, or indeed 
become consumed with compassion or sorrow for their client, they would be 
unable to maintain the client’s sense of being in a safe environment and the 
client might even begin to reassure or comfort the therapist. The therapist feels 
what the client is experiencing in an empathic way in order to achieve two main 
outcomes. First, it is to understand the client’s position more deeply and clearly, 
and to reflect their understanding back to the client. It is possible that the 
therapist will be able to communicate something of the client’s experience of 
which the client is not aware, thus developing the individual’s self-awareness. 
Second, it is to be able to show the client the therapist’s informed non-
judgmental regard, so that the client may feel more able to explore further their 
thoughts, feelings, desires, motivations, fears and so on. 
Thus, the condition of empathy, closely aligned with the non-judgmental 
acceptance of the client’s state by the therapist, provides the client with an 
experience of being valued even during the emergence and external 
observation of potentially challenging or disturbing aspects of themselves. This 
leads the client to be open to developing greater awareness and acceptance of 
themselves. The effects of the non-judgmental acceptance and empathy that I 
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have discussed above are facilitated further by the way in which the therapist 
communicates with their client. This aspect of the relationship is defined by the 
third of Rogers’ three core conditions, ‘congruence’, which I will explain below. 
c. Congruence 
The condition of congruence requires that the therapist is aware of their own 
thoughts, feelings and reactions at each moment of a therapy session, and that, 
where appropriate and constructive, they communicate those thoughts, feelings 
and reactions to their client. When they do decide to present something of their 
own experience to the client, they must proceed with genuine honesty and 
transparency. Rogers explains thus: 
Being genuine […] involves the willingness to be and to express, in my 
own words and my behavior, the various feelings and attitudes which 
exist in me. It is only in this way that the relationship can have reality […]. 
It is only by providing the genuine reality which is in me, that the other 
person can successfully seek for the reality in him. I have found this to be 
true even when the attitudes I feel are not attitudes with which I am 
pleased, or attitudes which seem conducive to a good relationship. It 
seems extremely important to be real. (p. 33. Rogers’ italics) 
So, to fulfil the condition of congruence, the therapist must know themselves, 
and be themselves, even when this entails knowledge and expression of less 
than appealing, or even threatening, elements of the self. For a simple example, 
if a therapist is irritated with a client who repeatedly arrives late for 
appointments, it is the therapist’s responsibility to acknowledge that response 
both inwardly to themselves and outwardly to the client. The therapist must 
experience the internal discomfort, and risk unease and perhaps even 
confrontation between themselves and the client, rather than attempt to 
pretend to themselves and to their client that they are relaxed and fine in order 
to maintain a ‘nice’ or ‘good’ relationship.  
It is important for the therapist to be congruent in order to build the 
trust necessary for therapy to advance successfully. However, congruence 
serves a further purpose at a deeper level. It is a means by which the therapist 
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manifests the nature and the achievability of the therapeutic goal of self-aware 
autonomy. With the therapist as a model, the client is able to observe 
objectively that it is possible for a person to know themselves, to accept 
themselves and to be themselves, and still to survive. They learn also that it is 
possible for a person to be congruent within a relationship and for that 
relationship still to survive, even when, to paraphrase Rogers’ quotation a little 
earlier, the attitudes that they discover within themselves seem to be 
unconducive to that relationship. Thus, the self-aware congruence of the 
therapist has the potential to heighten the client’s own levels of self-awareness, 
self-determination and authentic self-expression. For Rogers, this is the 
foundation for therapeutic growth and transformation.149 
As I indicate above, and in the Introduction to this thesis, I perceive a 
strong resonance in Austen’s writing with the central features of the Rogerian 
Client-Centered model of psychotherapy. However, my interpretation of a 
certain aspect of Austen’s characterisations has emerged in the light of another 
major psychotherapeutic model within the Humanistic school, namely 
Transactional Analysis, which I discuss in the section below. 
1.3.2. Transactional Analysis: Eric Berne (1910-1970) 
I will focus on the work of Eric Berne in the following account as key elements 
of Berne’s Transactional Analysis (TA) model are of particular relevance to my 
discussion of Austen’s work. However, it would be remiss not to mention at 
least, in this context, the contribution to the humanistic paradigm that was 
made by Fritz Perls, the originator of Gestalt therapy.150 Contemporaneous with 
Carl Rogers, and like Rogers, both Perls and Berne emphasised the centrality to 
the work of psychotherapy of the development of the authenticity and 
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autonomy of the individual. The latter two psychologists were especially 
interested in investigating the challenges involved in the transition from 
childhood to adulthood, embodying, as they saw it, the potentially threatening 
and anxiety-provoking shift from dependence to independence.  
Berne’s TA model is distinguished by his systematic theory of the 
structure of personality that exists within an individual at different points in 
their psychological transition between childhood and adulthood, and by how 
people’s communicative interactions with others reveal the position they 
occupy in that transition at any one moment. His formulation gained 
prominence, in large part, from the way in which he represented it in a simple 
but compellingly interpretative diagrammatic form. Below I examine the 
defining features of Berne’s theory, and illustrate the way in which his theory is 
depicted diagrammatically in accordance with his model. This will prove to be 
particularly apt in my interpretation of the character of Mary Crawford in 
Chapter Three of this thesis, however it could provide an interesting viewpoint 
from which other of Austen’s characters may also be analysed. I begin with an 
explanation of the foundational concept of Berne’s theory of the structure of 
personality, that is the concept of the ‘ego states’. 
Eric Berne: the ‘ego states’151 
The basis of Berne’s model of the structure of personality is his 
conceptualisation of three separate entities that represent elements of an 
individual adult’s personality. He termed these entities, ‘ego states’. One of 
these ego states pertains to the individual’s present experience as an adult, and 
as such is called the ‘Adult ego state’, or more simply, the ‘Adult’. The other two 
ego states are those that relate to the individual’s past experiences. These are 
the Parent ego state, and the ‘Child ego state’; simply the ‘Parent’ and the 
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‘Child’.152 Berne’s theory holds that, ‘ego states of former age levels are 
maintained in potential existence within the persona’ (p. 19). In other words, 
while a person may have reached adulthood by virtue of their age, they retain 
traces of their personalities that were formed at different stages, or ages, of 
their development. In consequence, at any moment, an individual may inhabit 
and exhibit any one of the three ego states that form their personality as a 
whole. There are clear echoes of Freud’s topographical model in Berne’s 
terminology (see my discussion of Freudian psychoanalytic theory earlier in 
this chapter). However, Berne is quick to point out that the Parent, Adult and 
Child in TA are not the equivalents of the Freudian Superego, Ego and Id.  
In Berne’s theory, the ego states are not, as Freud would have it, psychic 
phenomena that operate at different levels of consciousness in the mind and 
which are experienced by a person in symbolic, or otherwise disguised or 
distorted forms. For Berne they are, as he puts it ‘phenomenological realities’ 
(p. 23). For example, when a person inhabits the Parent ego part of their 
personality, they do not behave like a parent, they behave as their own parent 
would. Similarly, if a person feels petulant or needful, this is not a revelation of 
their dynamic psychical Id, it is a re-emergence of themselves as they were 
when they were a child. Again, they are not reacting like a child, or childishly, 
they are reacting in the way that they would have when they themselves were a 
child. In some people, one or other of the three ego states is dominant and they 
react recurrently to situations in their Parent, Adult or Child personality. In 
other people there is a more frequent shift between ego states. It is important 
to be clear that no one of the ego states is to be viewed as either wholly 
beneficial, or entirely detrimental, to an individual’s ability to function. As 
Berne states, the terms Parent, Adult and Child are ‘biological and not 
prejudicial’.153 The Adult is essential for the individual’s ability to survive and 
thrive since, in this ego state, the individual brings their own uniquely 
developed, mature personality to bear on their processes of analysis, 
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evaluation, decision-making and communication in their current circumstances. 
However, it is important that the Child ego state is able to dominate from time 
to time, since the Child contributes spontaneity, creativity, intuition, playfulness 
and, what we might call, ‘charm’, to an individual’s personality. Equally, it is 
helpful for the Parent to emerge at times. The Parent has the potential to 
enhance the individual’s capacity for nurturing others, in particular, children, 
and thus may enable an individual to function effectively as an actual parent 
themselves. So, all three aspects of the personality have value. Therapeutic 
intervention is only indicated when one or other of these ego states becomes 
inappropriately dominant and disrupts or undermines the equilibrium of the 
individual or the quality of their relationships. Below, I go on to explain the 
components and process of TA psychotherapy.  
TA psychotherapy: structural and transactional analysis 
TA psychotherapy begins with a ‘structural analysis’ to discover which, if any, of 
the ego states dominates in an individual’s emotions and behaviour. This is 
followed by the ‘transactional analysis’ which explores the ways in which the 
individual’s ego states affect their communicative interactions, or ‘transactions’, 
with other people. The process of the analysis of transactions may itself be 
diagnostic as a person’s ego states are revealed by the ways in which they 
communicate with others. It is this function of the transactional analysis that 
comes into play in my observation of Austen’s characters, so it is this aspect of 
the model that I will review in greater detail in the section below. 
Diagnosis of ego states by transactional analysis 
In transactional analysis, a transaction is, quite simply, any single piece of 
verbal or non-verbal communicative exchange between two people. When two 
or more people encounter one another, it is most usual for one of them to begin 
to speak. This opening piece of communication is called the ‘transactional 
stimulus’. The other person, or, in a group, another person, will respond. This is 
called the ‘transactional response’. The transactional response now becomes a 
transactional stimulus for the contributor of the original stimulus, or another 
person, to produce a transactional response, which then becomes a 
transactional stimulus, and so on. Transactional analysis involves the scrutiny 
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of these transactional segments in order to identify from which ego state each 
of them has arisen. Berne summarises the rationale for the diagnostic process, 
and the terminology he applied to it, as follows: 
The position is, then, that at any given moment each individual in a social 
aggregation will exhibit a Parental, Adult or Child ego state, and that 
individuals can shift with varying degrees of readiness from one ego state 
to another. These observations give rise to certain diagnostic statements. 
‘That is your Parent’ means: ‘You are now in the same state of mind as one 
of your parents (or a parental substitute) used to be, and you are 
responding as he would, with the same posture, gestures, vocabulary, 
feelings, etc.’ ‘That is your Adult’ means: ‘You have just made an 
autonomous, objective appraisal of the situation and are stating these 
thought processes, or the problems you perceive, or the conclusions you 
have come to, in a non-prejudicial manner.’ ‘That is your Child’ means: 
‘The manner and intent of your reaction is the same as it would have been 
when you were a very little boy or girl.’154 
Thus, Berne articulates the basic qualities of the forms of communication that 
emerge from the different ego states.  
Communication from the Adult ego state reflects the present moment 
experience of the adult communicator. It is recognised as such by the speaker’s 
clear statements about, or evaluations of, current situations, and by their 
unambiguous and straightforward declarations of, for example, their intents 
and wishes. The form that these observations and declarations take reveals the 
nature of the adult personality of the adult speaker. On the other hand, both 
Parent and Child ego states are drawn from an individual’s personality as it was 
in the past. Communication from either of these ego states may be identified by 
the observation of a speaker’s projection of the needs of their past personalities 
onto others. For example, an adult communicator who is being influenced by 
their Child ego state may attempt to create, in their listener, a parental figure 
with whom they can interact to gain the parent-like attention they crave. This 
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projection may take the form of expressions of neediness or dependency in 
order to elicit a guiding, comforting or nurturing response from the listener. 
However, the Child ego’s need for attention will be met even, and sometimes 
especially, if this takes the form of a critical scolding. Actual children who feel a 
lack of attention are understood to misbehave or put themselves at risk 
deliberately, whether with or without conscious intent, in order to generate this 
kind of reaction from their parents or carers.155 If this was the way that a 
person sought and gained attention during their childhood, then this will be the 
manner in which they seek attention in their adulthood. By that token, an adult 
communicator who is being prompted by their Parent ego state may be seen to 
project that ego state’s needs by criticising, reprimanding, advising or soothing 
other adults, as if those adults were naughty or needy children.  
At this point, it will be useful to illustrate the aspects of Berne’s model 
that I have outlined above with an example of an interaction that involves 
elements of communication from each of the three ego states. I will do so with 
the use of the diagrammatic form of representation that is distinctive of Berne’s 
model (see Figs. 1, 2 and 3 below). The example is drawn from Transactional 
Analysis, and is one in which Berne analyses an exchange between three 
women: Camellia, Rosita and Holly, in a clinical group-therapy situation (see pp. 
91-96). At one instance in the session, Camellia reports that she has told her 
husband that she no longer wants to have intercourse with him, and that he 
should go and find another woman. This constitutes a transactional stimulus 
that comes from Camellia’s Adult. In theory, communication from the Adult is 
clear of projections from the past, and thus its intention is always to evince a 
transactional response directly from the Adult of another person. In accordance 
with this, Rosita’s reply comes from her Adult as she asks Camellia, in a 
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straightforward manner, why she made that approach to her husband, (“Why 
did you do that?” (p. 91)).  
At the moment the transaction is Adult to Adult as illustrated in Fig. 1. It 
is a ‘complementary transaction’ because the ego state of the speaker receives a 
response from the ego state of the listener as intended. As is shown in Fig. 2, 
Rosita’s reply now becomes a stimulus from her Adult towards Camellia, with 
the expectation of a response from Camellia’s Adult. This might have taken the 
form of a statement by Camellia on the reason, or reasons, for her action, and 
the conversation would then have continued to flow. However, instead, 
Camellia reacts to Rosita’s enquiry by bursting into tears and complaining that 
she is being criticised no matter how hard she tries, (“I try so hard and then you 
criticize me.” (p. 91)). In the analysis of this transaction, one would observe that 
Camellia has misinterpreted Rosita’s ego-state as a critical Parent and 
responded to that in her vulnerable Child ego-state. Camellia’s misperception 
may have been triggered by a similarity between the words, manner or tone of 
Rosita’s response, and those that Camellia would have experienced from her 
parent, or parents, at some time in her childhood. If Rosita had, in fact spoken in 
her Parent, then her stimulus and Camellia’s response would have constituted a 
‘complementary transaction’. However, since Rosita’s enquiry came from her 
Adult, and Camellia responded in her Child, the transaction is ‘crossed’ (see Fig. 
2) and the smooth course of the exchange is interrupted. Rosita, still in her 
Adult, is confused and silenced by Camellia’s outburst.  
Now, another participant, Holly, steps into the conversation. While 
Camellia’s Child reaction has not activated Rosita’s Parent, it has tapped into 
that ego state in Holly, who proceeds to take it upon herself to comfort and 
reassure Camellia’s Child. Berne writes:  
Holly […] immediately began to comfort Camellia and apologize for Rosita, 
just as she might talk to a hurt child. A free version of her remarks would 
read: “Don’t cry, honey, everything will be all right, we all love you and 
that stupid lady didn’t intend to be mean.” […] Camellia responded with 
grateful “self-pity”. (p. 94) 
77 
 
Here, in the way that I described earlier, Camellia has created a parental figure 
in Holly and receives the consolation that her criticised Child craves, and, in her 
Parent, Holly has effectively projected the nurturing style of her own parent, or 
parents, onto Camellia. As illustrated in Fig. 3 below, the transaction between 
Camellia and Holly is a complementary one, and therefore they could have 
persisted in this manner. However, an interjection from Rosita’s Adult (“This 
love-making could go on forever!”) brings Holly into her own ‘hurt and 
frightened Child’, Camellia herself now resorts to silence, and the therapist is 
called upon to return all parties to their Adult ego states in order to engage 
























































Diagrammatic Representation of Transactional Analysis of interactions 




It is not only in a clinical context that it is possible to observe the 
transactional dynamics revealed in the study above. According to Berne’s 
proposition, the ego states exist within the structure of human personality, 
therefore they will be in evidence in one form or other in any and all human 
interactions. In theory, therefore, it would be possible to dissect the exchanges 
between all characters in all literature in transactional-analytical terms. This is 
certainly the case with regard to the characters portrayed in Austen’s novels. In 
Chapter Three of this thesis, I examine particular sequences of complementary 
and crossed Parent-Adult-Child transactions that are perceptible in an 
exchange between Mary Crawford, Edmund Bertram and Mrs. Grant in the 
garden at the Grant’s parsonage. This analysis demonstrates the way in which 
Berne’s model serves to illuminate subtle aspects of the complex character of 
Mary Crawford, and throws further light on the specific nature of Austen’s 
perceptions of human psychology and the dynamics of interpersonal 
relationships. 
In the final section of this chapter, I explore the model of Emotional 
Intelligence (EI). Although the concepts upon which EI is based inform much of 
the practice of formal psychotherapy, EI does not, as a paradigm in itself, 
constitute a separate school of psychotherapy. I include the model in this thesis 
as it encompasses aspects of both the CBT and Humanistic schools of 
psychotherapy that I have discussed above. Earlier in this chapter I presented 
Aaron Beck’s cognitive-therapeutic theory which holds that people’s painful or 
damaging emotions and behaviours arise as a consequence of unnecessarily or 
inappropriately negative thought patterns. At that point I alluded, in footnotes, 
to the emphasis that Beck placed on the influence of thoughts upon the 
emotions, as opposed to the reverse, as argued by Beck’s correspondent, 
Norman Harvey.156 The question of the sequence of the emergence of thoughts 
and emotions is one that is a significant issue in the EI model. Further, the EI 
model picks up the themes of autonomy, self-awareness, non-judgemental 
acceptance, congruence and empathy that are incorporated within Rogerian 
theory and are now subsumed to a greater or lesser extent into the practice of 
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all forms of psychotherapy. The EI model provides a framework by which one is 
able to illustrate how the principles that underlie the major schools of 
psychotherapy might operate in, and explain, people’s everyday experience of 
themselves and the way that they relate to others. It is by this means that the 
model of EI has highlighted for me certain aspects of Austen’s characters and 
their interrelationships.    
The first of my substantive discussions of Austen’s novels in this thesis is 
based on the framework of EI. In Chapter Two to follow, I present an in-depth 
exploration of the characters of Elinor and Marianne Dashwood, and their 
relationship with each other and with other characters in Sense and Sensibility 
from the perspective of the EI model. In anticipation of this detailed discussion I 
will focus on the key features of the model below.  
1.3.3. Emotional Intelligence (EI): Peter Salovey (b. 1958) and John D.  
Mayer (b. 1953)157 
The term ‘emotional intelligence’ was introduced by psychologists Peter 
Salovey and John Mayer in 1990.158 While cognitivists, such as Beck, focused on 
the influence of people’s cognitions over their emotional states, Salovey and 
Mayer explored the relationship between thought and emotion from a different 
angle. In their paper ‘Emotional Intelligence: Implications for personal, social, 
academic and workplace success’, Marc Brackett reflects, with Susan Rivers and 
Peter Salovey, upon an historical context in which ‘emotion’ and ‘intelligence’ 
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were regarded as functioning in opposition to one another, with emotionality 
seen as detrimental to the effective operation of rational intelligence.159 
However, as they reflect in their overview of EI, ‘The theory of emotional 
intelligence suggested the opposite, emotions make cognitive processes 
adaptive and individuals can think rationally about emotions.’ So, for these 
researchers, the relationship between rationality and emotionality is reciprocal. 
That is to say, while intellectual assessments or interpretations mediate the 
experience and/or expression of emotional states, equally emotions inform and 
enhance cognitive tasks such as the storage and retrieval of memories, the 
analysis and evaluation of situations, as well as reasoning and decision-making. 
Another important factor in the development of the concept of emotional 
intelligence was what Brackett and his co-authors identify as ‘an evolution in 
models of intelligence itself’.160 This ‘evolution’ encouraged the categorisation 
of more creative and practical abilities, including the ability to become aware of 
one’s own emotional condition and to monitor the emotions and moods of 
other people, as forms of ‘intelligence’. In this regard the authors cite 
psychologist and educationalist, Howard Gardner’s notion of ‘personal 
intelligences’, a concept that incorporates ‘the capacities involved in accessing 
one’s own feeling life (intrapersonal intelligence) and the ability to monitor 
others’ emotions and mood (interpersonal intelligence).161 Salovey and Mayer 
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conceived of both the possession of these intra- and interpersonal forms of 
intelligence, and the aptitude for the use of such emotional awareness in the 
management of thought and behaviour, as essential components of EI. Further, 
they viewed emotional intelligence, as a whole, to be ‘a set of interrelated 
abilities’ which could be measured and developed towards enhanced personal 
efficacy, as opposed to ‘an eclectic mix of traits […] such as happiness, self-
esteem, optimism, and self-management’, many of which, firstly, are aspects of 
one’s disposition or personality, and secondly, are neither emotions nor aspects 
of intelligence.162 All of this is encapsulated in their definition of EI that I 
present below.  
The definition of EI 
Salovey and Mayer introduced EI as ‘[...] the subset of social intelligence that 
involves the ability to monitor one’s own and other’s feelings and emotions, to 
discriminate among them and to use this information to guide one’s thinking and 
actions.’163 In a later, elaborated definition of the concept, the psychologists 
indicate the nature and purpose of EI more fully:  
[….] the definition of emotional intelligence that we prefer is: “the capacity 
to reason about emotions, and of emotions to enhance thinking. It 
includes the abilities to accurately perceive emotions, to access and 
generate emotions so as to assist thought, to understand emotions and 
emotional knowledge, and to reflectively regulate emotions so as to 
promote emotional and intellectual growth.” This definition combines the 
ideas that emotions make thinking more intelligent, and that one thinks 
intelligently about emotions. Both connect intelligence and emotion.164 
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As the definition above indicates, emotional intelligence does not denote states 
such as motivation, persistence, happiness, self-esteem, initiative, drive and so 
on as Goleman would have it, nor even, as Mayer, Salovey and Caruso point out, 
the ability to develop qualities such as optimism and assertiveness, even if 
these do serve to enhance one’s life experience.165 It is the connection between 
aspects of emotionality and capacities of the intellect that is important here, 
and the ways in which an individual’s ability to use that connection may serve 
to enhance either or both entities. Mayer and Salovey, with Caruso, conceived 
their ‘four-branch’ model of EI to depict their specific definition of emotional 
intelligence that I outlined above. As its name implies, the model consists of 
four levels, each of which represents a more sophisticated measure of ability in 
emotional intelligence, and within each of which too there is a development of 
degrees of skill. I explain the four-branch model in more detail in the following 
section. 
The four-branch model of EI166 
The Mayer, Salovey and Caruso model of EI describes a hierarchical structure 
that reflects the development of four separate but interrelated abilities. All of 
the skills that are designated within each of the four branches of the hierarchy 
require an active connection between an individual’s emotionality and intellect, 
building from what the three psychologists describe as ‘basic psychological 
processes (i.e., perceiving emotions)’ to ‘more advanced psychological 
processes (i.e., conscious, reflective regulation of emotion)’ (p. 91). I summarise 
each of the branches of the four-branch model below.  
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i. EI Branch One: Perception of emotion 
In the most straightforward terms, the first branch of the model encompasses 
the ability of an individual to perceive and differentiate emotions in themselves 
and others. As I noted above, there is a calibration of the increasing 
sophistication of skills within each of the branches as well as between them. At 
the very base level of the first branch, people are able to use their awareness of 
their own physiological states or sensations, as well as of the content of their 
thoughts, to identify the specific form of emotion that they are experiencing. 
For example, the physiological sensations that arise from excitement are very 
similar to those that are brought about by anxiety. At this basic level, an 
individual is able to combine their awareness of the feeling of the emotion with 
an intellectual assessment of the situation. They arrive thus at an apt 
perception of the emotion at play and proceed accordingly in their responses 
and behaviour.  
A more advanced skill in this branch is the ability of an individual to 
identify the emotions that other people are experiencing. This is achieved by 
the observation of another’s verbal and non-verbal signals such as facial 
expression, posture, gestures, tone of voice, pace of speech and so on. 
Sometimes people’s non-verbal signals are not congruent with their verbal 
communication so, at a yet more highly-developed level of this branch of the 
model, individuals are able also to distinguish between congruent and non-
congruent expressions in other people, perhaps by means of the smallest of 
micro-signals such as ‘the movements of blood under the skin’.167  
In my Introduction to this thesis I discuss ‘Theory of Mind’, and I draw 
attention to the importance for an individual’s inter-relational skills that 
Richardson and Zunshine place on the individual’s awareness of other people’s 
states of mind. However, EI goes further than Theory of Mind in its scope of 
exploration of the connection between mental knowledge and emotional 
awareness. Theory of Mind is concerned with one’s cognitive ability to know 
that another person may have emotions and thoughts that are different from 
one’s own, and to be able, again at a cognitive level, to discern what the 
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thoughts and emotional states of another might be. Proponents of EI identify 
this capacity as a feature of the first branch of the EI model. However, for these 
psychologists, the emotionally intelligent individual has a sense of the other 
person’s condition at an emotional as well as at an intellectual level. That is to 
say, as well as intellectual knowledge, the emotionally intelligent individual 
possesses the skill of empathy, which Salovey and Mayer describe in their 
original 1990 paper as ‘the ability to comprehend another’s feelings and to re-
experience them oneself’. In the same publication, Salovey and Mayer draw on 
the work of Carl Rogers, explained earlier in this chapter, to highlight the 
importance, for them, of the ability to empathise with others in the 
enhancement of people’s experience of everyday life relationships, as well as of 
their potential to enable the development of emotional intelligence in others. 
They write: 
Rogers believed an active striving to understand other people and to 
empathize with them is a priceless gift as well as a prerequisite for 
helping another grow. Empathy may be a central characteristic of 
emotionally intelligent behavior. 168 
So, to be capable of both an intellectual understanding and an emotional sense 
of another person’s position is a central feature of the first level of emotional 
intelligence. Finally, as Salovey and Mayer put it, at the most sophisticated level 
of this branch, ‘These skills enable individuals to gauge accurately the affective 
responses in others and to choose socially adaptive behaviors in response.’169 
Quite simply, at this point in the branch a person brings their conscious 
cognitive and emotional awareness of the feelings of others to bear on the way 
in which they respond to other people’s emotions, concerns and needs.  
ii. EI Branch Two: Use of emotion to facilitate thinking 
The second level branch of the EI model links a person’s awareness of their own 
emotional states to the functioning of their cognitive processes such as 
reasoning, decision-making and problem solving. As I mention earlier in this 
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section, Salovey and Mayer refer to historical views of the relationship between 
emotions and rationality in which emotionality is seen as disruptive to an 
individual’s intellectual thought processes. However, for them, a person’s 
ability to perceive and pay attention to their emotions is crucial for effective 
engagement in cognition-based tasks. Research carried out by 
neuropsychologists on the functioning of patients who have suffered some form 
of brain damage has supported the psychologists’ claims. Particularly well-
known in this respect is the seminal research carried out by Antonio Damasio. 
Damasio discovered that when the connection between the amygdala (the area 
of the brain that gives rise to emotions), and the pre-frontal cortex (the 
information processing area of the brain where analysis, decision-making, 
problem solving and so on take place), was damaged, even though the frontal 
cortex was still intact, people found it practically impossible to make simple 
decisions and would make disastrous choices in important areas of their 
lives.170 Damasio concludes that a person’s emotional reactions constitute 
crucial information about meanings and significances within a given set of 
circumstances or choices, and this enables the individual to arrive at the most 
appropriate and constructive evaluations and decisions. At a more advanced 
level of this branch, once an individual has perceived their emotional reaction 
to circumstances, they actively engage with those emotions and generate more 
powerful feelings in order to facilitate their intellectual processes further.  
iii. EI Branch Three: Understanding and analysing emotions 
Given the significance of the perception of emotion to the constructive 
outcomes of rational thought processes, it is important that an individual is able 
to identify and name precisely the emotions that they are experiencing at any 
one moment; sorrow, anger, fear, joy and so on. The base level of this branch 
involves simply the ‘comprehension of the language and meaning of emotions’ 
(p. 91). At a more advanced level within the branch, people are able to 
distinguish, for example, sadness from grief, or frustration from anger, and to 
pinpoint and label in minimal gradations the milder antecedent forms of the 
emotion, and the more severe manifestations that might develop from it. Thus, 
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for example, gradually more moderate variants of ‘sad’ might be ‘miserable’ and 
‘blue’. Emotions of greater intensity might be graded as ‘wretched’ and 
‘grieving’.171 The most sophisticated skill located within the third branch is the 
ability to identify and interpret different emotions simultaneously experienced. 
For example, sadness and anger may be experienced as part and parcel of grief, 
with all three emotions experienced at the same moment. A person who is 
emotionally intelligent at this advanced level is able to pick apart complex 
combinations of emotional reactions and, without self-judgement, use their 
understanding of their emotional experience to inform their greater self-
awareness and guide their subsequent thoughts and actions.    
iv. EI Branch Four: Reflective regulation of emotions 
The fourth and highest branch of the EI model comprises the ability of an 
individual to use all of their interrelated emotional and intellectual skills in the 
service of the regulation of their emotions, towards the most constructive 
outcomes for themselves and others within a particular situational context. 
Mayer, Salovey and Caruso explain that the fourth branch of the EI model  
[…] includes the ability to prevent, reduce, enhance, or modify an 
emotional response in oneself and others, as well as the ability to 
experience a range of emotions while making decisions about the 
appropriateness or usefulness of an emotion in a given situation. Basic 
emotion regulation ability involves attending to and staying open to 
pleasant and unpleasant feelings, while more advanced ability involves 
engaging or detaching from an emotion depending on its perceived utility 
in a situation. Monitoring and reflecting on one’s own emotions and those 
of others (e.g., processing whether the emotion is typical, acceptable or 
influential) also represents more complex problem solving within this 
branch. (pp. 91-92) 
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So, this branch of EI is concerned with the ways in which an individual is able to 
preside over their own emotional states and, where possible, to have some 
beneficial influence over those of others. This requires the ability of the 
individual to maintain an intellectual overview of the appropriateness and 
usefulness of the external expression of their and others’ emotions that is 
concurrent with their personal internal emotional experience and observation 
of, and empathy with, the feelings of other people. From the point of view of the 
CBT and Humanistic schools of psychotherapy presented in previous sections of 
this chapter, the achievement of this level of emotional intelligence requires a 
very advanced degree of skill. From a CBT perspective, the branch reflects the 
management of emotion by the identification of thought processes that give rise 
to those emotions, and the evaluation of the rationality of perceptions and 
reactions at a cognitive level. As previously discussed, the element of empathy 
contained within the EI model is one of the key components of the humanistic 
psychotherapeutic paradigm. Further related to the Humanistic model, this 
stage of EI requires an individual’s non-judgmental acceptance of their own and 
others’ emotions. By this means, a person avoids the suppression, denial or 
rejection of any of their own or others’ emotional states in the interests of 
deepening their self-awareness, enhancing their cognitive processing, and thus 
maintaining, as far as possible, their own and other peoples’ well-being. 
At this point I reflect again on Lisa Zunshine’s view that the most skilful 
communicators in Austen’s novels are those who have a well-developed theory 
of mind, and who use that capacity to mediate their actions and expressions. 
From my perspective, the complexity of Austen’s portrayals of the 
psychological, emotional complexity of her characters resonates more closely 
with the subtle layering of aspects of human intra-and inter-personal 
psychological dynamics that is encapsulated within the EI model. In the 
following chapter, with the focus on Sense and Sensibility as a case study, I 
demonstrate how the view from an EI perspective constitutes the basis for my 
observations on whether Austen was motivated by a moral imperative in her 
exploration of the rational and emotional elements of human experience, and 
show how an understanding of the model gives rise to perceptions and 
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evaluations of Elinor and Marianne that both contribute to, and at times differ 





EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE IN JANE AUSTEN 
some of us tend to one thing, some to another; and this will be 
recognizable from the pleasure and the pain we feel. We must drag 
ourselves away to the contrary extreme; for we shall get into the 
intermediate state by drawing well away from error, as people do in 
straightening sticks that are bent. (Aristotle)172 
A Case Study: Sense and Sensibility  
In the previous chapter I provided explanations of the foundational models of 
psychotherapy encompassed within the three major twentieth-century schools 
of psychotherapy: Psychoanalytic, Cognitive-Behavioural and Humanistic. 
Within that exposition I draw particular attention to the therapeutic 
frameworks that I perceive to be prefigured in Austen’s novels, and which have 
thereby influenced, to a substantial degree, my understanding of the nature of 
the characters that the author portrays within those novels, as well as my sense 
of Austen’s purpose in the production of her work. As I state in the Introduction 
to this thesis, for me, aspects of the psychotherapeutic theories and practices 
that I explain in the preceding chapter are in evidence within Austen’s work to 
an extent that leads me to infer an intentionality on Austen’s part to engage her 
readers in a process of the development of self-awareness and self-directed 
autonomy by means of therapeutic as opposed to didactic approaches.  
I present my substantive arguments relating to Austen’s novels from my 
psychotherapeutic perspective in this and the following chapter. In Chapter 
Three, I draw on Carl Rogers’ Person-Centred Therapy, Eric Berne’s 
Transactional Analysis and Aaron Beck’s Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy 
paradigm as I focus on the theme of the development of personal autonomy 
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evident in Austen’s novels. In the current chapter, I explore my reading of 
Austen’s work within the context of Mayer, Salovey and Caruso’s model of 
Emotional Intelligence (EI). As I demonstrate in the final section of Chapter One 
above, this model encompasses aspects of both the Person-Centred and 
Cognitive models, and offers a framework for an understanding of the way in 
which human rationality and emotionality operate in conjunction with each 
other to guide, or determine, consequential behaviour. I draw primarily on 
Sense and Sensibility for this discussion, as it is within this novel that issues 
relating to EI, and the relationship between intellectual reasoning and the 
experiencing of emotions, arise most patently through Austen’s portrayal of the 
characters of Elinor and Marianne Dashwood. However, to me, the principles of 
EI that I perceive to be central to this novel equally underlie Austen’s 
presentations of individual characters and the ways in which they relate to 
other characters in all of her novels, and in due course I will offer further 
illustrations from Northanger Abbey, Persuasion, and Emma to support this 
view.  
In the analyses to follow, I do not intend to imply in the least that I am 
able to, or indeed wish to, map Mayer, Salovey and Caruso’s distinct definitions 
of rationality and emotion onto meanings that Austen may herself have applied 
to the terms ‘sense’ and ‘sensibility’. Nor would I propose an exactly direct 
comparison between the psychologists’ four-branch model of EI, and the forms 
of interrelatedness between intellectual reasoning and emotional experience 
and awareness that I perceive in Austen’s work. However, in the process of 
reading Sense and Sensibility, I was struck at numerous points by an impression 
of the author’s exploration of the complex natures of rationality and 
emotionality, and the ways in which each operates in relation to the other both 
within and between individuals, that resonated strongly with my knowledge 
and understanding of the principles of EI. My engagement with this resonance 
refers back to my discussion in the Introduction to this thesis of N. Katherine 
Hayles’ notion of ‘constrained constructivism’ and Alan Richardson’s 
explanation of ‘listening for resonance’ and ‘allowing that resonance to help 
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reopen [sic] avenues for scholarly investigation’.173 It is this resonance, my 
consequent comprehension of the characters within Austen’s novels, and the 
author’s purpose in her particular portrayal of them that I will be discussing 
here.  
A second point of clarification picks up the reference in my Introduction 
to Richardson’s advice regarding the placement of modern psychological 
analyses of Austen’s novels within the appropriate historical and cultural 
context. As I identify and define elements of Austen’s keen psychological insight 
on the basis of my knowledge of modern psychotherapeutic formulations, I do 
not mean to suggest that Austen was the first writer to have perceived human 
psychology in such ways, nor would I propose that she could somehow have 
foretold future discoveries and psychotherapeutic notions and theories. Ideas 
relating to human nature encompassed within the fiction, and the philosophical, 
political, moral and social debates of which Austen would have been aware, 
directly or indirectly, undoubtedly would have drawn her to notice and 
consider certain aspects of the nature of the human being. I will indicate and 
comment upon these potential influences on Austen’s writing as they relate to 
emotional intelligence in the concluding section of the current chapter.  
The canon of critical responses to Austen’s work is, of course, immense 
and so the examples that I interrogate and comment upon within the sections 
below are, by necessity, a greatly distilled selection of views that represent 
opinions most specifically related to this discussion. I will begin with a brief 
look at writers whose views have differed significantly from my own. I will 
proceed then with a discourse on my understanding of the novel, in particular 
of the characters of Elinor and Marianne, acknowledging other critical works 
that, albeit via different routes, incorporate many features that are in 
agreement with my reading.   
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A preliminary review of existing critiques of Sense and Sensibility   
In his Introduction to the Cambridge Edition of Sense and Sensibility, Edward 
Copeland states, ‘There is nothing that makes a teacher’s heart sink lower than 
to find yet another student essay in the stack claiming that Elinor represents 
‘Sense’ and Marianne represents ‘Sensibility’, or some variation on the theme.’ 
(p. li).174 He then draws attention to Austen’s departure from the ‘oppositional 
structure’ of novels by her contemporaries, Maria Edgeworth and Jane West, in 
which rationality is rewarded and sensitive emotionality punished, with the 
inherent evident moral implication. Copeland’s view, that in writing Sense and 
Sensibility Austen intentionally subverted expectations grounded in the 
moralistic currency of publications such as those of Edgeworth and West, lies in 
clear contrast to that held by writers such as Marilyn Butler.175 I refer here, as I 
did in my Introduction, primarily to Butler’s War of Ideas in my discussions of 
moral conservatism and didacticism in Austen’s novels as Butler’s book is 
seminal in this regard. However, the same stance is taken by Peter De Rose who 
holds the view that, with Johnson as her guiding light, morality is ‘an 
inseparable part of Jane Austen’s artistic achievement’. For De Rose, Elinor 
‘remains to the end a ‘“type” of rationality’, and Marianne, equally, ‘is a type, a 
figure of burlesque, a caricature whose responses to character and situation 
represent only the enthusiasm and eagerness of a weak-minded “feeler”’.176 De 
Rose’s opinion echoes A. C. Bradley’s essay of 1911, in which Bradley writes of 
Austen that, ‘like Johnson, she is in the strict sense, a moralist’, and that this 
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leads her to a ‘marked mistrust of any indulgence in emotion or imagination 
where these are not plainly subservient to a resolve to do the right thing’ and 
thus ‘to approve of such heroines as Elinor Dashwood, Fanny Price and Anne 
Elliot.’177 A slight movement away from these critics’ unreserved adherence to 
the perception of an ‘oppositional structure’ within the novel is perceptible in A. 
Walton Litz’s summary.178 Commenting on the ‘standard thematic pattern set 
by late eighteenth-century moralistic fiction, in which opposed qualities of 
mind are dramatized through opposed personalities’, he allows that Austen 
‘sought to modify this antithetical structure in creating Sense and Sensibility’. 
Litz nevertheless concludes that, in this novel, Austen ‘never escaped from it; 
we are still justified in saying that Marianne represents Sensibility while Elinor 
stands for Sense.’179 His conclusion notwithstanding, there is, in Litz’s 
commentary, more than a hint that the differentiation to be drawn between the 
‘rationality’ of Elinor and ‘emotionality’ of Marianne is not quite as clearly 
distinct as is so often postulated. 
Claire Tomalin, for example, states initially that, ‘In Sense and Sensibility 
Elinor and Marianne act out a debate about behaviour in which Austen 
compares the discretion, polite lies and carefully preserved privacy of one 
sister with the transparency, truth-telling and freely expressed emotion of the 
other.’ However, later she expresses doubts, sensing that ‘Marianne’s morality, 
unfortunate as its effects are on her own life, is not so bad after all, and Austen’s 
answer to the questions posed at the beginning becomes uncertain.’180 
Likewise, while John Mullan cites Sense and Sensibility, along with 
Wollstonecraft’s Maria, as a critique of contemporary ‘celebration of feeling’ 
since, as he sees it, these books describe ‘the discrepancy between sensibility 
and capacities for productive action or effective judgement’, he concedes too 
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that ‘sensibility is not simply valueless or illusory in either of these novels.’181 
Tony Tanner too perceives the ‘complexity of Jane Austen’s vision’, and is 
sanguine in his conclusion that, ‘no very simple verdicts are being invited in this 
early novel’.182  
Not all critics have found the ambiguity in question here as 
unproblematic as Mullan and Tanner. In A Fine Brush on Ivory, Richard Jenkyns 
expresses concern that, as a result of her lack of consistent differentiation 
between the natures of the two characters and of the relative worth of each of 
‘sense’ and ‘sensibility’, and of the lack of clarity even of her definitions of the 
terms, Austen ‘does not seem to be fully in control of her effect’, and that her 
intention for the novel, ‘has not been entirely carried out’. For, he asks, ‘Does it 
not claim to demonstrate that sense is right and sensibility wrong?’183 Jenkyns 
puts forward a number of propositions to resolve this seeming dilemma. As 
these ideas will form a useful starting point for my discussion of the novel from 
my own perspective, they will reward a little more detailed attention here. He 
suggests firstly that it might be possible to regard the novel as more successful 
if we surmise from the ‘and’ in Sense and Sensibility that Austen’s intention was, 
in fact, to demonstrate the moral equivalence of each of these qualities. 
However, he finds that, in this aim too, Austen has been less than completely 
successful. He points to the asymmetry of the characters of Elinor and Marianne 
as the result of the position of Elinor as the ‘focalizer, the pair of eyes through 
whom most of the action is seen’ in the narrative, and considers that, even 
though Marianne is the ‘emotional heart’ of the book, nevertheless, that Elinor 
carries too much ‘weight’ for Marianne to gain equal standing.184 Furthermore, 
Jenkyns points out that the limitations of sense are not drawn sufficiently to 
match those of sensibility. He allows that it is possible to detect Austen’s 
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amusement at too great a degree of ‘sense’ at times, for example, when Edward 
makes the prosaic remark while commenting on the Devonshire countryside 
that, ‘“It is a beautiful country,” […]; “but these bottoms must be dirty in 
winter”’, and the author’s seriousness when she conveys Marianne’s shock at 
the composure with which Elinor had tolerated the knowledge of Edward’s 
engagement to Lucy Steele for four months.185 Still, Jenkyns’ view is that, while 
these could be seen to illustration Austen’s wish to present the desirability of 
sensibility, they do not match the level of the damaging effects of Marianne’s 
lack of ability to control the force of her emotional distress in the face of the 
withdrawal of Willoughby’s affections for her. Elinor comes to no actual harm 
as a result of her more managed responses to her own situation, nor does her 
more controlled manner cause disturbance to others, while Marianne brings 
herself close to death, and creates very great concern and distress among her 
family and friends as a result.  
Finally, Jenkyns proposes that Austen’s ideal could have been for the two 
qualities to act together in ‘equilibrium’ rather than to be merely of equal value. 
However, in this too he struggles to reconcile the apparent moral pre-eminence 
attributed by Austen to sense over sensibility. In sum, from this analysis, 
whether one takes the view that Austen’s objective was to advocate sense over 
sensibility, to present the two as equally of value, or to suggest the benefit of 
equilibrium, it seems to be possible to demonstrate that the author has been 
less than entirely successful in achieving her aim in this novel. This leads 
Jenkyns to conclude ultimately that, 
This is a book about a conflict of values or ideas which is at conflict with 
itself, a book which promises a clarity of conclusion which it fails to 
deliver. At one moment we may feel the fault to be that the characters are 
too much types; at another that they are not types enough, and have 
acquired sufficient autonomy to refuse to fit within the boundaries that 
the author has designed for them.186  
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There is an explicit assumption here, and on the part of each of the critics whom 
I have discussed so far, that Austen’s aim in writing Sense and Sensibility was to 
engage with the debates of her time around the relative moral value of the two 
qualities, even if, as Tanner proposes, she intended to leave her own conclusion 
open to interpretation or to allow personal judgement on the matter. To me, it 
is this assumption that Austen is preoccupied with moral value that leads to the 
difficulties with the novel which I have reviewed above. I suggest that this holds 
especially for those commentators for whom, as Jenkyns writes, the novel 
‘claims to demonstrate that sense is right and sensibility wrong.’ For me, the 
questions that most naturally arise from this observation are: whether, in fact, 
the novel does make this claim, whether Austen herself states this to be the 
case, and if so, where she does that.  
For me, there is no evidence of a claim or statement about moral 
judgement either within the book, or even contained in the title. As Jenkyns 
points out, it is meaningful to reflect on why the author used the word ‘and’ in 
the title, as opposed to, for example, ‘or’, which would have implied a debate, or 
even, ‘over’, which would have anticipated not only a debate but also its likely 
conclusion. Still, the word ‘and’ need not imply an equivalence of moral value 
between rationality and emotionality. A different conclusion from that 
discussed by Jenkyns is reached by Joseph Wiesenfarth who considers the ‘and’ 
to reflect Austen’s intent simply to indicate the necessity to marry the two 
qualities within human experience. He writes, ‘Surely the title of the novel uses 
the word and conjunctively, not otherwise: to be a whole person, one must have 
sensibility enlightened by sense.’187 This construal begins to reflect more 
closely the interpretation of Austen’s ‘and’ that I would make from an EI 
perspective. From this viewpoint, while in agreement that one must have both 
sensibility and sense, I depart from Wiesenfarth’s perception of the meaning of 
the ‘and’ when he assigns to sense a position of influence over sensibility. From 
the EI viewpoint, and, I would propose, Austen’s, each of the qualities equally 
enlightens the other. Or, to put it more accurately, I should say each of the 
qualities equally influences the other, since the term ‘enlightens’ suggests an 
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enhancement of outcome, and this is not always the result of the 
interrelationship between the two.188 To pick up again on Jenkyns’ proposed 
interpretation, within my proposition of an equality of influence there is no 
suggestion that the two qualities are, or even should be ideally, in ‘equilibrium’. 
From an EI stance, or even, I would contend, from a human one, it is difficult to 
imagine how a state of thought and feeling in equilibrium might be achieved 
since emotions and thoughts are both naturally in constant flow, the one 
continually and reciprocally transforming the other. Ultimately, I perceive in 
Sense and Sensibility only the inseparability of rationality and emotionality, and 
of the dynamics involved in the relationship between the two. For me, it is the 
nature of this interrelationship between thought and feeling that Austen 
anticipates in the title with her use of the word ‘and’.189  
The understanding of a dynamic relationship between sense and 
sensibility fits the formulation within EI that ‘combines the ideas that emotions 
make thinking more intelligent, and that one thinks intelligently about 
emotions’, and that, ‘Both connect intelligence and emotion’.190 There is no 
notion within EI of a primacy of value to be placed on either emotional 
expression or intellectual reasoning, nor is either endowed with any element of 
moral superiority. From this perspective, I observe in the novel a much more 
intricate and involving study of interplay between both rationality and 
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emotionality within Elinor and Marianne than that claimed by other writers. I 
note, of course, the differences in the nature and outcomes of this interplay 
within each of the characters which is manifest in the very different 
personalities and behaviour. However, my impression is of equality between 
them at the level of the form of the internal interplay of thought and emotion 
from an EI point of view. In other words, I do not perceive the characters of 
Elinor and Marianne as representative of, or even as typifying, respectively, the 
qualities of ‘sense’ and ‘sensibility’. Rather, as understood through the model of 
EI, they each demonstrate, in their unique and characteristic ways, the 
perpetual and necessary dynamic interaction between thought and feeling that 
constitutes human experience, as well as their conscious awareness of the 
operation of their will in the formation and expression of this internal dynamic 
interaction.  
I would make a distinction here between the basis for my dissent from 
the view of an oppositional structure within Sense and Sensibility that I explain 
above, and that of Mary Waldron, who traces the near-invisibility of the 
oppositional framework to the ambiguity of the meanings of the terms ‘sense’ 
and ‘sensibility’ at the time of Austen’s writing.191 It is certainly interesting to 
note that, while Samuel Johnson’s writings evidence his advocacy of the moral 
primacy of sense over sensibility, the meanings that he ascribes to each of the 
terms in his authoritative dictionary of the time are by no means distinctly 
differentiated.192 Amongst the definitions that he attaches to ‘sense’ are: ‘faculty 
or power by which external objects are perceived’; ‘perception of intellect, 
apprehension of mind’; ‘sensibility, quickness or keenness of perception; 
understanding, soundness of faculties, strength of natural reason; reason, 
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reasonable meaning; opinion, notion, judgement’; ‘moral perception’. For 
‘sensibility, he gives ‘quickness of sensation; quickness of perception, delicacy’. 
I notice also that he defines the related word, ‘sensible’, as ‘perceiving by either 
mind or senses’; ‘having moral perception, having the quality of being affected 
by moral good or ill; having quick intellectual feeling, being easily or strongly 
affected’. Interestingly, Austen uses the word ‘sensible’ to describe Marianne in 
a context that I will explore in some detail later in this chapter.193 The word 
‘sensitive’ is the only one that Johnson defines in terms of a complete lack of 
rationality: ‘having sense or perception but not reason’, and this is not a term 
that Austen employs either in the title of the novel or in her descriptions of 
Marianne.  
The picture is complicated further when one brings the concepts of 
‘sentiment’ and ‘sentimentality’ into the discussion. Ann Jessie Van Sant draws 
on the works of Richardson, Sterne and Mackenzie as she traces the evolution 
of definitions of ‘sensibility’ and ‘sentiment’. While Van Sant is able to identify 
certain distinctions between the two concepts, she nevertheless concludes that 
‘eighteenth-century writers and speakers were neither precise nor consistent. 
Their usage frequently implies that sentiment, sensibility, and their variants are 
interchangeable.’194 Michael Bell similarly traces the semantic shift in the 
literary use of the word ‘sentiment’ in his observation that, for Samuel 
Richardson, the word denoted ‘moral principles’, while Lawrence Sterne took 
the word to mean ‘feelings’ twenty or so years later.195 Chris Jones, in Radical 
Sensibility: Literature and Ideas in the 1790s, reflects upon this change in the 
meaning of ‘sentiment’. Jones regards the replacement of the terms ‘sentiment’ 
and ‘benevolence’ by ‘sensibility’ as an attempt to locate a term that would 
encompass all forms of an individual’s authentic emotional responses to 
situations and interactions within a social context.196 
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The ambiguities indicated by the various definitions and commentaries 
that I cite above throw a particularly interesting light on interpretations of 
Austen’s intention in her characterisations of Marianne and Elinor from an EI 
perspective. For example, I note that Johnson’s definition of ‘sense’ includes the 
word ‘sensibility’ itself, which he relates to ‘strength of natural reason; reason, 
reasonable meaning’. These are qualities that I perceive to be aspects of the 
character of Marianne, as well as of Elinor, just as I perceive ‘quickness of 
sensation; quickness of perception, delicacy’, Johnson’s definition of 
‘sensibility’, to be as characteristic of Elinor as they are of Marianne. Thus, I 
would agree with Waldron that, due to the ambiguity, flexibility and instability 
of the meanings of the terms in question, any straightforward distinction 
between the personalities of characters in terms of their relative degrees of 
rationality or emotionality, and, by extension their relative moral standings, is 
problematic. However, for me, it is not necessary to draw on similarities in the 
personalities of Marianne and Elinor in order to challenge perceptions of 
moralistic didacticism on the part of the author. In fact, it seems to me to be 
evident that Austen intended to make the differences as well as the similarities 
between the two characters very clear from the outset of the novel, and she 
brings to life their contrasting approaches and responses to each new 
circumstance throughout. Still, I do not discern a moralistic commentary in 
Austen’s portrayal of these characters.  
As I state earlier in this chapter, beneath the contrasting outward 
behaviours of Elinor and Marianne, I perceive within each of the characters the 
inseparability of thought and feeling that EI theory proposes.197 Within the EI 
model, thought and emotion are seen to be interdependent for the effective 
psychological functioning of the individual, and so the two qualities are equal in 
value. Neither can be morally, or in any other way, intrinsically ‘better’ or 
‘worse’ than the other. Therefore, from a psychotherapeutic EI perspective, 
when I read Sense and Sensibility, the questions I ask are not whether a 
character’s degree of rationality or emotionality is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’, or ‘good’, 
‘or bad’ in a moralistic sense, I am interested only in how effective that 
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character’s behaviour is in terms of the consequences of it for their well-
being.198 Psychotherapeutic personal development in the context of EI involves 
the growth of an individual’s awareness of the way in which the dynamic 
interrelationship between thought and feeling takes place within themselves, 
and of the effects of the outcomes of this psychological process, that is, their 
behaviour, on themselves and on others. This self-awareness gives the 
individual the ability to make a conscious and deliberate choice either to 
continue in the same manner, or to change their approach. It is an exposition of 
this non-moralistic and non-didactic approach that I perceive Austen to present 
in her portrayals of Elinor and Marianne.  
Thus, to me, in this novel, Austen is concerned with a number of issues 
relating to the qualities of rationality and emotionality. Rather than for any 
moralistic purpose, the author provides points of focus for an enquiry on her 
part, and consequently on the part of the reader, into the nature of the qualities 
of ‘sense’ and ‘sensibility’, and of matters associated with those qualities; the 
dynamic interaction between thought and emotion; and the ways in which the 
nature of that interaction relates to the nature of the self, self-awareness and 
self-development of the individual. While there are no instances of Austen’s use 
of free indirect speech, as such, in Sense and Sensibility, the author’s detailed, 
moment-by-moment descriptions of the thoughts and feelings of Elinor and 
Marianne provide clear insight into the interaction between thought and 
emotion that takes place within the characters.199 Further, it is through the 
close and loving relationship between Elinor and Marianne that Austen further 
reveals the way that both of the characters process their thoughts and 
emotions, and thereby articulates her own enquiry into the nature of the 
interdependent interrelationship between thought and emotion in general.  
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In the next section below, I provide a brief introductory review of 
literary critiques that approximate to my views. I then analyse certain scenes in 
Sense and Sensibility in some detail to demonstrate the ways in which Austen 
illustrates her perception of the dynamic interaction between thought and 
emotion. I discuss the implications of Elinor’s and Marianne’s different 
approaches and the more self-developmental aspects of EI in further sections to 
follow.  
The dynamic interrelationship between thought and emotion 
The perception of thought and emotion as separate and opposed entities, with 
emotion seen to disrupt and undermine rationality (a view exemplified by 
Mullan above), has shifted in the literature concerned with this topic. Critics are 
keen to emphasise the inseparability and interdependence of the two qualities, 
bringing the essential contribution of emotion within the psychological process 
as a whole to the fore. For example, writing within the developing field of the 
investigation of the importance of emotion in the genesis and shaping of 
historical events, Rob Boddice puts emotions ‘at the heart of what it means to 
be human’. Boddice states, ‘far from being merely irrational noise, emotions are 
the fundamental meaning-making phenomena in human life. They are part of 
cognitive processes, undergirding social relations, colouring in reasoned 
discourse’.200 This is a view that captures one of the key principles within EI 
which holds that the effectiveness of thought processes depends upon the 
connection between the emotional centres of the brain and those that are 
involved in analytical cognitive processing. Wendy Jones encapsulates 
Boddice’s point specifically in relation to Austen when she states, ‘Feeling can 
never escape thought, and more important, prudence always implicates feeling’. 
Jones’ view further reflects my own understanding of Sense and Sensibility from 
an EI perspective when she continues, ‘If we are entrapped by Austen’s binaries 
to begin with […], we are always shown that we have been foolish for thinking 
that such neatly bounded categories might govern something as morally and 
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psychologically complex as human judgement and behaviour’.201 I am in accord 
with Jones’ position as my strongest impression on reading Sense and Sensibility 
from a psychotherapeutic EI perspective is of Austen’s acute awareness of, and 
wish to communicate, the complexities involved in the human experience of 
thought and emotion. This view of the author is reinforced by Michael Bell’s 
observation that, in the literature of the eighteenth-century, ‘beneath the 
optimistic attempt to identify ‘reason’ and ‘feeling’ lies the deeper, as yet 
unformulated, intuition that, if they cannot be simply identified, neither can 
they be completely separated.’202 Certainly, for me, this was Austen’s intuition, 
and this is an important aspect of the affinity between EI and Austen’s approach 
that I read in Sense and Sensibility.  
I am aware of that affinity, for example, when I compare Marianne’s and 
Elinor’s reactions to the separate departures of Willoughby and Edward from 
Barton Cottage and note the reciprocal relationship between thought and 
emotion in each of the characters. When Willoughby leaves suddenly and 
unexpectedly, Marianne immerses herself in her thoughts in order to intensify 
her feelings of distress: ‘When breakfast was over she walked out by herself, 
and wandered the village of Allenham, indulging in recollection of past 
enjoyment and crying over the present reverse for the chief of the morning’ 
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(I:16, 96).203 On the other hand, on Edward’s unhappy departure, Elinor derives 
her reflections from her emotions: ‘Elinor found every day afforded her leisure 
enough to think of Edward, and of Edward’s behaviour, in every possible 
variety which the different state of her spirits at different times could produce’ 
(I:19, 121). Further, in relation to the same scenes in the novel, I note Austen’s 
perception that it is not just emotion that may become difficult to control, but 
also thoughts. The author writes of Marianne’s opinion: ‘The business of self-
command she settled very easily;—with strong affections it was impossible, 
with calm ones it could have no merit’ (I:19, 121). Austen then applies the same 
understanding to the condition of thought when she writes of Elinor that, even 
though the character strives to avoid reflecting on her situation, in moments of 
solitude or silence: ‘her thoughts could not be chained elsewhere; and the past 
and the future, on a subject so interesting, must be before her, must force her 
attention, and engross her memory, her reflection and her fancy’ (I:19, 121). 
Thus, Austen gives us to understand that she views not only emotion, but 
thought too, to be a potentially disruptive force, and herein lies the foundation 
for a perception of the author’s non-judgemental position with regard to the 
two qualities. Further, Austen clearly intimates her non-judgemental attitude to 
the two sisters’ contrasting approaches when she writes, ‘Their means were as 
different as their objects, and equally suited to the advancement of each’ (I:19, 
120). This simple explanatory statement reinforces the contrast between 
Marianne and Elinor in terms of the methods that each employs in order to 
achieve their opposite aims: the former deliberately ruminating on her 
situation to magnify her emotional experience, the latter attempting to distract 
and distance herself from thoughts about her circumstance in order to 
minimise her discomfort. At the same time, Austen’s straightforward comment 
contains no suggestion of a query on the part of the author about the 
characters’ comparative worth relative to their different behaviours and 
objectives. Austen gives no indication that she conceives of either one of the 
characters’ approaches or aims to be more valid than the other’s. However, as 
Austen ends a paragraph with this statement, it seems to me that she does leave 
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a question hanging in the air. That is, whether or not those means, while being 
‘suited’, are actually effective.  
With regard to the scenarios that I discuss above, neither Marianne nor 
Elinor appear effectively to achieve their ends. In spite of Marianne’s attempts 
to maintain and increase her own suffering, Austen shows that, ‘Such violence 
of affliction indeed could not be supported forever; it sunk within a few days 
into a calmer melancholy’ (I:16, 97), and, although Elinor’s efforts to ‘subdue’ 
her personal emotional experience do prevent an increase in her sorrow, still, 
‘she did not lessen her own grief’ (I:19, 120). One might reasonably wonder, 
therefore, whether both of the characters might have been more successful if 
they had each adopted the other’s strategy. However, the key point here is the 
way in which Austen’s understanding of the internal dynamic between thought 
and emotion resonates closely with that which underlies the EI model. Austen’s 
reflections on the outcomes for each of the two characters demonstrate her 
perception firstly that the internal dynamic between thought and emotion is 
constantly evolving, and secondly, again, that it does so in ways that are, at 
times, independent of the will of the individual.204 In these illustrations, I see 
Austen’s appreciation of the interconnectedness of thought and emotion, and of 
the equally mutual influence that each of the qualities has over the other, and 
over the individual who experiences them. Below, I show how the author 
demonstrates this more extensively in her presentation of the two characters’ 
responses to their later, more challenging circumstances; Elinor on hearing of 
Lucy Steele’s engagement to Edward Ferrars, and Marianne on Willoughby’s 
rejection of her in London. 
Elinor’s initial reactions to Lucy’s revelation of her long-standing 
engagement to Edward are primarily emotional experiences. Following Lucy’s 
confirmation of her engagement to Edward, the question that Austen asks of 
Elinor’s initial reaction is not, ‘What thought Elinor in that moment?’, but ‘What 
felt Elinor in that moment?’ The answer that Austen gives to her own question 
is,  
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Astonishment, that would have been as painful as it was strong, had not 
an immediate disbelief of the assertion attended it. [...] she stood firmly in 
incredulity and felt in no danger of an hysterical fit, or a swoon. (I:22, 148. 
My italics)  
Thus, Elinor’s ‘astonishment’ is followed instantly by a disbelief on Elinor’s part 
that has no evidential basis. It arises spontaneously as a response to what the 
character is feeling. The rationalisation itself then has a consequential effect on 
Elinor’s emotional state. The character’s disbelief protects her from 
experiencing unmanageable emotional distress, and that same incredulity 
accompanies the rise in Elinor’s emotions with each new piece of information 
that Lucy offers to verify her story. For instance, Lucy asks, ‘“Did you never hear 
him talk of Mr. Pratt?”’ and Elinor replies that she thinks she has, ‘with an 
exertion of spirits, which increased with her increase of emotion’. Then, even 
though Lucy provides further details to corroborate her account, Elinor 
declares almost perversely, ‘with revived security of Edward’s honour and love, 
and her companion’s falsehood’, 
“Engaged to Mr. Edward Ferrars!—I confess myself so totally surprised at 
what you tell me, that really—I beg your pardon; but surely there must be 
some mistake of person or name. We cannot mean the same Mr. Ferrars.” 
Lucy’s retort is understandably dismissive, ‘“you must allow that I am not likely 
to be deceived, as to the man on who all my happiness depends”’, with her 
knowingly italicised ‘I’ intimating heavily towards the fact that it is Elinor who 
has been deceived in considering herself to be attached to Edward (I:22, 149-
50. Austen’s italics). We now see that Elinor is faced not only with the loss of 
the man with whom she herself had hoped to be happy, but also the loss of her 
faith in her own judgement. Each time Lucy produces more evidence, Elinor 
becomes more agitated and more fearful, and more incredulous. When Lucy 
shows her a miniature of Edward that she has in her possession, Elinor refuses 
to accept that it is Edward’s face even though she can see that it is his likeness. 
Through all of this Austen shows thought and emotion relating to each other, 
and, up to this point, only to each other. Elinor’s disbelief has no basis other 
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than the shock or upset that brings it about, and the easing of emotion that 
enables Elinor to remain reasonably stable has no foundation other than her 
disbelief. Thus, the interrelationship between thought and emotion that Austen 
presents here is an internal dynamic in which thought and emotion influence 
each other, as envisaged by the EI model. In Elinor’s case, in this scene, the two 
qualities are engaged in a process of emotional management that operates 
spontaneously towards the maintenance of the integrity of the self.205 
Gradually, however, the weight of evidence that Lucy produces disables 
this protective cycle and, as Elinor becomes bound to believe Lucy, her painful 
emotions intensify. When Lucy shows her a letter addressed to herself in 
Edward’s hand, Elinor is no longer able to doubt her word. Austen describes 
Elinor at this point as ‘almost overcome—her heart sunk within her, and she 
could hardly stand’ (I:22, 154). Elinor struggles against being overwhelmed by 
her feelings, and she succeeds briefly, until Lucy mentions the lock of hair in the 
ring that Elinor and Marianne had noticed Edward wearing at Barton Cottage. 
Elinor acknowledges that she had seen it, ‘with a composure of voice, under 
which was concealed an emotion and distress beyond anything she had ever 
felt before. She was mortified, shocked, confounded.’ When she is alone at last 
she can ‘think and be wretched’ (I:22, 155). Conscious realisation of her 
situation has become unavoidable, and Elinor has now to consider how to 
handle the circumstances, and her own response to them. In this too, Austen 
shows the interaction between thought and emotion as Elinor moves from one 
interpretation of Edward’s conduct to another. This time her reflective process 
begins with rationality as Elinor recognises that Lucy’s story of Edward must be 
true, and that, 
the picture, the letter, the ring, formed altogether a body of evidence, as 
overcame every fear of condemning him unfairly, and established as a 
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fact, which no partiality could set aside, his ill-treatment of herself. (II:1, 
159)  
While Elinor’s initial disbelief had protected her from the pain that would arise 
from a negative view of Edward’s behaviour towards herself, now feelings of 
‘resentment’ and ‘indignation’ arise in response to these more evidence-based 
thoughts. These new feelings in turn lead to a stream of rationalisations by 
which Elinor brings herself from anger towards forgiveness:  
Had Edward been intentionally deceiving her? Had he feigned a regard for 
her which he did not feel? Was his engagement to Lucy, an engagement of 
the heart? No; whatever it might once have been, she could not believe it 
such at present. His affection was all her own. She could not be deceived 
in that. […]. He certainly loved her. What a softener of the heart was this 
persuasion! How much could it not tempt her to forgive! (II:1, 159-60) 
Even where Elinor finds herself unable to defend Edward, she manages to turn 
herself from blame to pity for him: ‘He had been blameable […]; but if he had 
injured her, how much more had he injured himself; if her case were pitiable, 
his was hopeless’ (II:1, 160). Elinor begins to feel more compassion towards 
Edward than she does for herself, and in doing so, she brings herself to a state 
of managed control that enables her feel able to conceal the reality of her 
situation from her mother and sisters.  
I perceive within Austen’s portrayal here of the shifts in Elinor’s 
ruminations and emotions the interaction between rationality and emotionality 
that is the core principle of EI. This is something that, for me, the author takes 
to an even deeper and more subtle level when she adds of Elinor that,  
The necessity of concealing from her mother and Marianne, what had 
been entrusted in confidence to herself, though it obliged her to unceasing 
exertion, was no aggravation to Elinor’s distress. On the contrary it was a 
relief to her, to be spared the communication of what would give such 
affliction to them, and to be saved likewise from hearing that 
condemnation of Edward, which would probably flow from the excess of 
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their partial affection for herself, and which was more than she felt equal 
to support. (II:1, 161) 
It strikes me that Austen could have left her narrative of Elinor’s psychological 
and emotional condition at the point at which the character feels able to keep 
her emotions in check sufficiently to sustain Lucy’s confidence. However, the 
author goes on to reveal that secrecy is a relief to her. The emotion of relief 
draws a number of further rationalisations from Elinor that, in turn, reinforce 
and maintain her in that state of relief: 
From their counsel, or their conversation she knew she could receive no 
assistance, their tenderness and sorrow must add to her distress, while 
her self-command would neither receive encouragement from their 
example nor from their praise. She was stronger alone, and her own good 
sense so well supported her, that her firmness was unshaken. (II:1, 162)  
Thus, by means of this rationale, Elinor perceives that the necessity to keep the 
reality of her situation secret has benefits not only for her family, but also for 
herself. Ultimately, the necessity to keep the reality of her situation secret suits 
her very well.  
In the scene under discussion above, I perceive that Austen takes the 
reader into the psyche of a character, and then, rather than concluding her 
exposition of the character with a description that would suffice perfectly well 
to carry the narrative of the story along, she reveals yet deeper layers of 
additional and increasingly specific and subtle psychological complexity. My 
recognition of this leads me to reflect on Virginia Woolf’s famous comment on 
Austen that, ‘of all great writers she is the most difficult to catch in the act of 
greatness’.206 One could hardly disagree with Woolf’s summation, not least 
given the vast body of critical analysis that has been undertaken in the attempt 
to do just that. Austen’s ‘greatness’ has been, and will continue to be discovered 
in various ways according to the different backgrounds, interests and 
perspectives of her readers. I see it most clearly in moments of psychological 
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insight such as the one that I illustrate above, and well-exemplified again in the 
same scene when Elinor anxiously surmises that Lucy’s intention in disclosing 
her engagement to Edward was in order to gain superiority and to warn her 
away from Edward. Anxiety leads Elinor to re-open the conversation with Lucy 
regarding the engagement partly because ‘she could not deny herself the 
comfort of endeavouring to convince Lucy that her heart was unwounded’ (II:1, 
163. My italics). As in the previous excerpts to which I refer above, my 
interpretation from an EI perspective of Elinor’s behaviour here is that 
rationality and emotionality are working in conjunction with each other to 
enable the character to endure her circumstances. With immense subtlety, 
Austen conveys an emotional unease which leads to a rational caution, or vice 
versa, which warns the character to depend for her increased comfort not upon 
success in denying Lucy cause for exultation but in the effort alone. In Coaching 
For Resilience, I discuss the significance of the element of one’s degree of control 
in the setting of interpersonal goals. I suggest that readers should articulate 
their desired outcomes as statements of what they themselves will do, think or 
feel, rather than in terms of any expected change in another person’s attitudes 
or behaviours. This is because, however skilfully one approaches another 
person, one is never guaranteed to achieve the hoped-for effect. Thus, if one 
needs another person to do something differently, it would be more 
constructive to determine to put one’s point across as eloquently and 
persuasively as possible than it would be to plan to make that person change 
their behaviour. In other words, in relation to having an effect on other people, 
it is most emotionally intelligent to decide to make one’s best efforts, or, as 
Austen puts it, to endeavour, quite possibly more than once, in more than one 
way. 207 Elinor is safe to conceive that only the attempt to convince Lucy will be 
sufficient to soothe her anxiety, as this, at least, is an aim over which she has 
complete control.  
I continue below to illustrate my interpretation of Marianne’s reactions 
following her receipt of Willoughby’s letter from the same EI perspective. 
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However, before I do so, it is important for me to emphasise that it is not my 
intention to evaluate the degree of emotional intelligence overall in either 
Elinor or Marianne, nor to indicate which of the characters is (in our terms) 
more emotionally intelligent than the other. I believe that such an exercise 
would result simply in the construction of another unenlightening binary. The 
last specific example, above, demonstrates this point. While Austen’s careful 
description of Elinor’s purpose in relation to Lucy reveals an element of 
emotional intelligence on Elinor’s part, one might wonder how emotionally 
intelligent it is for Elinor to concern herself with Lucy’s impression of her in the 
first place. Elinor’s hurt pride merely adds another layer of discomfort to the 
pain of her heartbreak and, instead of becoming aware of this and addressing 
her own view of herself internally, she looks to Lucy’s perception of her as the 
source of, and therefore the means of recovery from, her feelings of humiliation. 
In terms of the EI model, this approach would not constitute a very constructive 
approach towards healing and well-being. I explore the self-developmental 
aspects of the four-branch model of EI in later sections of this chapter, so will 
not analyse this in further detail here. For the moment, my purpose in drawing 
attention to this aspect of Austen’s portrayal of Elinor is simply to illustrate the 
complexities involved in an evaluation of the character in terms of a global 
measurement of her level of EI. The same is true of the character of Marianne. 
My aim, therefore, is not to assess the characters of Elinor and Marianne against 
each other in EI terms, but to demonstrate the ways in which I perceive 
Austen’s portrayal of both to resonate with the model of EI in the psychological 
processes that underlie the characters’ contrasting natures and reactions.   
One of the most obvious differences in the responses of the two 
characters emerges in relation to the issue of pride that I explore in the 
paragraph above. Where Elinor’s pride moves her to suppress and conceal her 
emotions, Marianne will not even countenance the possibility that her 
heartbreak over Willoughby’s abandonment of her could constitute any 
element of pride. She declares, ‘“misery such as mine has no pride. I care not 
who knows that I am wretched. […]. I must feel—I must be wretched”’ (II:7, 
215-16). Yet, in this scene, one is able to perceive the same ‘immune system’ 
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operating within Marianne that is evident earlier in Elinor’s psychological 
process. Although Marianne wishes to experience her emotional reaction to 
Willoughby’s behaviour as fully as possible, she cannot resist a certain amount 
of rationalisation to relieve the intensity of her anguish to some extent. At one 
point, she recalls signs that Willoughby had given her of his attachment to her 
during their time together at Barton and her distress increases to the point at 
which she can no longer speak. A couple of moments later, her words manifest 
the same dynamic between thought and emotion that I discuss above in relation 
to Elinor. In the brief silence, Marianne manages to absolve Willoughby of 
responsibility for his actions, and thereby relieve herself of the need to feel 
angry and resentful towards him. This enables her to talk again, and more 
firmly. She states: ‘“Elinor, I have been cruelly used; but not by Willoughby”’. 
Again, like Elinor, Marianne has no evidence for her rationalisation. When 
Elinor asks who but Willoughby himself could be responsible, Marianne’s reply 
ranges from ‘“all the world”’, and ‘“every creature of my acquaintance leagued 
together”’, to ‘“This woman of whom he writes”’, and back again to ‘“any one, in 
short, but your own dear self, mama and Edward”’. There is no foundation for 
her search for someone else to blame other than the fact that it is less painful 
for her to suspect others rather than Willoughby himself. Indeed, Marianne 
demonstrates conscious awareness of this as she asks rhetorically, ‘“Beyond 
you three, is there a creature in the world whom I would not rather suspect of 
evil than Willoughby […]”’, to which she adds revealingly, ‘“whose heart I know 
so well?”’ (II:7, 215). Therein Austen reveals another layer of Marianne’s 
distress. The character is struggling not only with her grief at the loss of 
Willoughby but also, like Elinor before in relation to Edward, with her fear that 
her own judgement is untrustworthy. Now, after another quiet and calmer 
pause, Marianne picks up Willoughby’s letter again and the emotions intensify 
once more as she begins to centre responsibility on Willoughby again: ‘“it is too 
much! Oh! Willoughby, Willoughby, could this be yours! Cruel, cruel—nothing 
can acquit you. […] Willoughby, where was your heart when you wrote those 
words? Oh! Barbarously insolent!”’. When this becomes too much to bear, 
Marianne’s thoughts turn away from the possibility of Willoughby’s cruelty: 
‘“And yet this woman—who knows what her art may have been—”’, but, she is 
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then compelled to acknowledge that he had given her no inkling that there was 
anyone else who might have a claim on his affections: ‘“Oh! No one, no one—he 
talked to me only of myself”’ (II:7, 216). Finally, in the last of Marianne’s 
attempts to protect herself from the full extent of her wretchedness, Marianne 
projects her agony onto her mother as she demands to go home immediately, 
‘“to comfort mama”’ (II:7, 217). When this retreat is denied to her for the 
moment, she perceives rationally that it is for her own comfort that she wishes 
to depart from London, and she succumbs to her despair. Interestingly, here 
Marianne reveals that she has concern for her pride after all when she states 
that she needs to leave town because she cannot endure ‘“The pity of such a 
woman as Lady Middleton!”’ (II:7, 217). Except for the words ‘such a woman’, 
one might have gathered that Marianne feared that the questions and concerns 
of others would induce further intense emotions within her that would make 
her heartache even more difficult for her to bear. As it is, she reveals herself to 
be not quite as careless of pride as she would like to imagine herself to be. Thus, 
I perceive the deeper psychological dynamics that are articulated within the 
model of EI to be at work in both Elinor and Marianne. 
Michael Bell refers to D. H. Lawrence’s concept of the ‘emotional mind’, 
stating that, ‘All argument in Lawrence encompasses, and is structured on, 
emotional realization. Most typically, saying what he thinks involves finding out 
what he feels’.208 Bell quotes Lawrence’s description of the dynamic 
relationship between thought and emotion that captures the process very aptly. 
Lawrence writes:   
Now the emotional mind, if we may be allowed to say so, is not logical. It is 
a psychological fact that, when we are thinking emotionally or 
passionately, thinking and feeling at the same time, we do not think 
rationally: and therefore, and therefore, and therefore. Instead the mind 
makes swoops and circles. It touches the point of pain or interest, then 
sweeps away again […]. It ‘repeats itself […] stoops to the quarry, then 
leaves it without striking, soars, hovers, turns, swoops […], yet again 
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turns, bends, circles slowly, swoops and stoops again, until at last there is 
the closing in, and the clutch of a decision or resolve.’209 
Bell concludes that the purpose of the swooping and circling of the mind 
illustrated here by Lawrence is to enable an individual to tolerate and resolve 
distressing circumstances. As I demonstrate above, I perceive Austen to have 
encapsulated in Sense and Sensibility precisely the operation and the purpose of 
the dynamic interrelationship between thought and feeling that Lawrence 
articulates. Further, I consider that the fact that she shows this to occur in the 
same way within characters who are so different in their externally observable 
natures reveals an understanding of the nature and purpose of this dynamic to 
be an important aspect of Austen’s insight into underlying human psychology.  
Earlier in this chapter I note that the similarities between Elinor and 
Marianne are highlighted when one recognises the ambiguity and fluidity of the 
meanings of the terms ‘sense’ and ‘sensibility’, and in the section above I 
demonstrate the qualities that the two characters share at a deeper 
psychological level. However, as shown, Austen equally draws out the 
differences between Elinor and Marianne in the scenes that I analyse above. For 
me, the ways in which Austen portrays both the similarities and the differences 
between the characters indicate that Austen had an exploratory, and possibly 
even a personal-developmental intent towards her readers, rather than a 
moralistic purpose in her writing of Sense and Sensibility. I have focussed my 
discussion up to this point on the exposition of EI’s central theoretical principle 
of the relationship between thought and emotion that I perceive within 
Austen’s portrayal of the characters of Elinor and Marianne. I turn now to the 
more self-developmental aspect of EI to expand further on my argument. 
Below, I explore the characters of Elinor and Marianne from the perspective of 
the structured hierarchical framework of skills and qualities delineated by the 
four-branch model of EI.210 
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A four-branch model reading of Elinor and Marianne 
Austen compares and contrasts the characters of Elinor and Marianne distinctly 
in the first chapter of Sense and Sensibility when she describes the responses of 
each of the characters to the loss of their beloved home, and the untimely and 
inconsiderate occupation of it by their brother, John Dashwood, and sister-in-
law, Fanny. Of Elinor, Austen writes that she ‘possessed a strength of 
understanding, and coolness of judgement’, and in greater detail that, 
She had an excellent heart;—her disposition was affectionate, and her 
feelings were strong; but she knew how to govern them: it was a 
knowledge which her mother had yet to learn, and which one of her 
sisters had resolved never to be taught. 
Austen portrays Marianne thus: 
Marianne’s abilities were, in many respects, quite equal to Elinor’s. She 
was sensible and clever; but eager in everything; her sorrows, her joys, 
could have no moderation. She was generous, amiable, interesting: she 
was everything but prudent. (I:1, 7)  
The author then elaborates: 
Elinor saw, with concern, the excess of her sister’s sensibility; but by Mrs 
Dashwood it was valued and cherished. They encouraged each other now 
in the violence of their affliction. The agony of grief which overpowered 
them at first, was voluntarily renewed, was sought for, was created again 
and again. They gave themselves up wholly to their sorrow, seeking 
increase of wretchedness in every reflection that could afford it, and 
resolved against ever admitting consolation in the future. Elinor, too, was 
deeply afflicted; but still she could struggle, she could exert herself. She 
could consult with her brother, could receive her sister-in-law on her 
arrival, and treat her with proper attention’. (I:1, 7-8) 
                                                                                                                                       
use of emotion to facilitate thinking, Level 3: Understanding and analysing emotions, and Level 4: the 
ability of an individual to use their interrelated emotional and intellectual skills in the regulation of their 
emotions. It is important to keep in mind that, in the context of this model ‘regulation’ can involve the 




In these brief depictions it is possible to observe Austen subtly using the 
ambiguities in the meanings of the terms she employs to draw parallels 
between the two characters’ personalities, as well as stating outright the ways 
in which the two characters are ‘quite equal’. Austen’s use of the word ‘sensible’ 
in her portrayal of Marianne is especially interesting to note here since the 
meanings attached to the term by Johnson include ‘having quick intellectual 
feeling’, as well as, ‘being easily or strongly affected’. It seems reasonable to 
suppose that Austen selected this word deliberately to convey a combination of 
rationality and emotional responsiveness within the character of Marianne.211 
Also worthy of notice is that Austen writes of Margaret, the youngest of the 
three Dashwood daughters, that ‘she had already imbibed a good deal of 
Marianne’s romance, without having much of her sense’, (I:1, 8), rather than, as 
she might have done, ‘without much of Elinor’s sense’. Thus, for me, there can 
be little doubt that, from the outset of the novel, Austen intended her readers to 
gather that Elinor and Marianne are alike in the degree to which they possess 
both rationality and emotionality. This is not a great revelation at this point 
given my discussion earlier in this chapter regarding other critical reviews of 
the novel, and my explanations above of the ways in which I view the complex 
relationship between the two qualities to operate similarly within each of the 
characters. However, the four-branch model provides a structure of criteria by 
which I will now elucidate further the dynamic interrelation between thought 
and emotion for each of the characters, and trace the effectiveness and 
development of this psychological process relative to each of them.   
To begin with, it is significant from the four-branch perspective that not 
only are Marianne and Elinor both capable of experiencing strong emotions, 
they are also both consciously aware of the nature of their emotions. Crucially, 
in addition, Austen makes clear the element of choice that this awareness 
affords for the two characters. Paradoxically, we comprehend these similarities 
between the two characters through a fundamental difference between them, 
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that is, the difference between what each of them chooses to do with their 
emotions. We know that Elinor must be conscious of her feelings because she 
manages them, and we know that Marianne apprehends the nature and 
intensity of her emotions because she instigates a renewal of them. While 
Elinor brings her rationality to bear on her ‘struggle’ to contain her emotions, 
Marianne’s intellectual ability is what enables her to seek the ‘increase of 
wretchedness in every reflection that could afford it’. Thus, the outcomes of the 
interplay between thought and feeling are different for each of the characters, 
and this difference is manifested through the contrasting behaviour of each of 
them. However, the form of the interplay is exactly the same for each: they both 
feel emotions, they are each consciously aware of their own emotions, both of 
them know that they have options in terms of what they do with their emotions, 
and each makes a choice. Elinor has opted to know how to manage her 
emotions and to put that knowledge into practice. Marianne has ‘resolved’ to 
not even learn how to contain her emotionality.  
No doubt those who would tend to ascribe a rationalistic moral tone to 
Austen’s characterisations of Elinor and Marianne could perceive, even in this 
analysis, a higher regard on the part of the author for Elinor’s choice to apply 
her awareness of her emotional state to the suppression of her emotions than 
for Marianne’s to use hers towards the full experience and outward expression 
of her emotional state. However, if one suspends one’s own judgement, or 
anticipation of judgement on the part of the author, Austen’s initial illustrations 
of each of the characters emerge as purely descriptive. There is an exact parallel 
in the structure and tone of the author’s introductions of each of the characters. 
First, for each, she presents a summary of the nature of the character, and then 
reveals a balancing, contrasting quality within the character. I note particularly 
that the conjunction between these elements of Austen’s descriptions is, for 
both characters, the word ‘but’. A reader might deduce a preference for either 
of the characters’ choices if, for either, the structure had been different, and the 
author had used the word, ‘and’ instead of ‘but’. For example, if the descriptions 
of the two characters had appeared differently in this way: ‘Elinor had an 
excellent heart;—her disposition was affectionate, her feelings were strong, and 
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she knew how to govern them’, while Marianne ‘was sensible and clever; but 
eager in everything; her sorrows, her joys, could have no moderation.’ The 
imaginary use of the different conjunction implies a value judgement in a way 
that Austen’s actual consistent use of ‘but’ does not.  
Thus, from this reading, Austen attributes no greater value to Elinor’s 
government of her emotions than she does to Marianne’s open expression and 
enhancement of hers. This view of Austen’s position is reinforced later in the 
novel as we discover that Marianne’s expressiveness is appreciated, not only by 
her equally emotionally-inclined mother, but also by the eminently ‘sensible […] 
gentlemanlike’ Colonel Brandon, who urges Elinor not to wish for Marianne to 
learn to act with greater propriety and thereby replace her ‘“romantic 
refinements”’ with ‘“opinions as are but too common, and too dangerous!”’ (I:7, 
41 and I:11, 67).212 An example from another of Austen’s novels reflects again 
the perception of the author’s appreciation of the need for a self-conscious 
heightening of the awareness and experience of emotions. In Pride and 
Prejudice, at the point at which Elizabeth Bennet has received and read Mr. 
Darcy’s letter to her, Austen writes of Elizabeth, ‘Reflection must be reserved 
for solitary hours; whenever she was alone, she gave way to it as the greatest 
relief; and not a day went by in which she might indulge in all the delight of 
unpleasant recollections.’ Elizabeth ruminates in this way to a point at which 
her spirits were ‘so much affected as to make it almost impossible for her to 
appear tolerably cheerful.’213 Yet, in spite of her emotional discomfort, 
Elizabeth’s process of reflection leads her to clarify and in some ways transform 
both her cognitive understanding of, and her emotional response to, her 
situation. Austen has Marianne engage with her emotions in a way that is more 
extreme and, ultimately, more dangerous, which is perhaps why Austen has 
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been so often perceived as disapproving of Marianne while not of Elizabeth. Yet 
Marianne’s self-awareness and process are the same as Elizabeth’s and, as I will 
discuss in due course in the current chapter, the outcome of her traumatic 
experience is, like Elizabeth’s, one of clarification and transformation.  
The presentation by Austen of characters as different in nature as Elinor 
and Marianne in ways that emphasise the equivalence of their psychological 
functionality strikes me as a pre-figuring of a core principle of the EI model. 
This model holds no preference for an individual’s choices that lead to the 
control of emotions over ones that allow the full emergence and expression of 
feelings. The manifest behaviour of both Elinor and Marianne is the outcome of 
choices that emerge out of their conscious and self-aware interrelated 
intellectual and emotional processes. Thus, in modern terms, we could conclude 
from this that both Elinor and Marianne (as well, as it happens, as Elizabeth 
Bennet) are emotionally intelligent at branch four of the four-branch model EI 
model. By the same criterion, we may surmise that both Dashwood sisters are 
more emotionally intelligent than their mother. While the outward emotional 
responses of Marianne and her mother are exactly the same, Mrs Dashwood’s 
lack of knowledge as to the management of her emotions is simply a 
circumstance yet to be altered by learning, and not the outcome of a self-aware 
choice as it is for Marianne. 
However, the picture is not quite so straightforward. There are three 
other major factors involved in the analysis and evaluation of an individual’s 
level of emotional intelligence which I perceive Austen to encompass in her 
portrayal of Elinor and Marianne.214 First, the level of an individual’s attainment 
of emotional intelligence depends upon the degree to which the ways in which 
they employ their EI skills lead to constructive and beneficial outcomes for 
themselves and other people. If an individual’s behaviour results in harm or 
damage to themselves or another person, then that individual could not be 
regarded as having acted with emotional intelligence simply because their 
choices were made with conscious self-awareness. One may easily observe and 
evaluate whether the external outcomes of an individual’s behaviour are 
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beneficial or detrimental. However, it is more challenging to determine the 
consequences of a person’s choices on their own internal psychological and 
emotional states. This requires an understanding of the rational basis for the 
person’s choice of behaviour. In other words, we need to know what motivates 
a person in terms of their personal values or ethical codes. From a 
psychotherapeutic point of view, an individual is likely to maintain their 
internal well-being if their inter- or intrapersonal actions are in accord with 
their own values, even if their external situation becomes more difficult as a 
result of their behaviour. Absent of this accord, in other words without 
congruence, a person’s inner state may be negatively affected even if their 
actions bring about more advantageous external circumstances.215 Thus, in 
short, we need to consider both the external and the internal outcomes of a 
person’s behaviour in order to judge the extent of their emotional intelligence, 
and to do that, we need to have some awareness of the individual’s personal 
guiding principles.  
The second of the three additional factors to take into account in the 
measurement of emotional intelligence involves the situational context of a 
person’s actions. A particular mode of expression or behaviour may be entirely 
appropriate and beneficial in one situation yet detrimental in another. Thus, the 
fact that both Elinor and Marianne possess high-level skills of emotional 
intelligence does not necessarily mean that they are always emotionally 
intelligent at an advanced level in the ways that they conduct themselves. 
Whether they may be regarded as highly emotionally intelligent depends on the 
suitability and usefulness of their responses and behaviours within a given set 
of circumstances. The third and final factor relates to this situational aspect. A 
substantial part of what it means to be emotionally intelligent is an ability to 
monitor and evaluate continually the effects of one’s thoughts, decisions, 
actions and emotional expressions, and, where one observes these to be 
unconstructive, to be willing to modify one’s choices and behaviour accordingly. 
Thus, it is important to look to Elinor’s and Marianne’s capacity both to be 
                                            
215
 See the section dealing with Rogerian Client-Centred therapy in Chapter One of this thesis for my 
full explanation of the principle of congruence. I explore Austen’s novels in relation to this aspect of 
psychotherapeutic theory in the following chapter of this thesis.  
122 
 
aware of the effects of their behaviour and to allow their awareness to inform 
their current, ongoing and future choices.  
As I state above, for me, Austen brings all of these elements of EI into her 
presentation of Elinor and Marianne as the narratives of the two characters 
unfold within the novel. In the sections to follow, I look first at the outcomes of 
each of the characters’ behaviour in terms of their external circumstances and 
their own internal psychological and emotional experience, taking into account 
the bases for the choices that each of them makes. I then address the effects of 
their behaviour on other people. This brings an important aspect of the EI 
model into the discussion: empathy. The quality of empathy is included within 
the lowest branch of the four-branch model and is therefore a foundational 
element of emotional intelligence. My perception is that Austen’s handling of 
this aspect of the rational-emotional process for both Elinor and Marianne 
resonates with the EI model in an especially subtle way. I also make some 
observations regarding the characters’ responses within their different 
situational contexts and, finally, I will look at their developmental processes as 
they address and respond to the consequences of their choices.  
Elinor’s choices and consequences 
I write in the previous section about the different responses of Elinor and 
Marianne to the take-over of their home by Fanny and John Dashwood, and 
conclude from that discussion that both Elinor and Marianne possess skills in 
emotional intelligence at the fourth-branch level of EI. I return to the same 
scenario now to determine to what extent the characters’ contrasting reactions 
deliver what they need for their own well-being. The answer to this question is 
clear with regard to their external circumstances. As we discover in Chapter 2 
of the novel, neither Marianne’s outward distress nor Elinor’s self-controlled 
civility have any impact at all upon Fanny’s determination to discomfort Mrs 
Dashwood and her daughters, nor on her wish to dissuade her husband from 
assisting them with appropriate financial support.216 Therefore neither of the 
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approaches taken by the two sisters brings about any amelioration of the 
situation for themselves, or, indeed, for their poor mother. Hence we could say 
that, from this point of view, Elinor and Marianne are equally ineffectual in EI 
terms. However, as I indicate above, when one wishes to observe the effect of 
Elinor and Marianne’s behaviours on the internal states of the two characters 
themselves, the story becomes a little more complicated. I will look at Elinor 
first in this regard.  
We know that, in the situation under discussion, Elinor is as ‘deeply 
afflicted’ as Marianne, and therefore that the character’s outward behaviour is 
not congruent with her inner emotions. From a psychotherapeutic perspective, 
one would suspect that Elinor’s lack of congruence could bring her little benefit 
at an internal emotional or psychological level.217 Since Elinor’s behaviour has 
not changed anything for the better for her family, or, apparently, within 
herself, one could conclude that she would have been as well to express and 
relieve her own grief as freely and openly as her sister. However, there is still 
the issue of the basis, or rationale, for Elinor’s form of response to consider. A 
full assessment of the way that Elinor’s outward manner affects her own 
internal state requires an understanding of what it is that motivates her to 
behave as she does. Her polite greeting of her brother and sister-in-law on their 
arrival at Norland is certainly not congruent with her emotional distress, 
however her actions may be congruent with something else, that is, with her 
personal values or code of conduct. As Salovey and Mayer put it, ‘Emotional 
intelligence involves self-regulation appreciative of the fact that temporarily 
hurt feelings or emotional restraint is often necessary in the service of a greater 
objective.’ They continue: ‘Thus, emotionally intelligent individuals accurately 
perceive their emotions and use integrated, sophisticated approaches to 
regulate them as they proceed towards important goals.’218 If Elinor’s 
government of her emotions serves a greater purpose for her than to effect a 
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change in Fanny and John’s conduct, then she is being congruent in a different 
but important sense, and this in itself will ensure her some peace of mind and 
heart.  
One might reasonably surmise that Elinor’s primary purpose in the 
situation with John and Fanny is to behave according to what she perceives to 
be her duty since these are explicitly the terms on which she bases her own 
actions, as well as her judgements of Marianne’s behaviour, throughout the 
novel. Earlier in the current chapter I note the intimate relationship between 
Elinor and Marianne to be an important context within which Austen reveals 
the ways that the characters process their thoughts and emotions. When Elinor 
explains to Marianne how she has been able to keep Lucy’s engagement to 
Edward secret for four months, she does not say it was because she was doing 
her duty, nor does she say it was because she knew that she was doing her duty, 
but, she says, ‘“By feeling that I was doing my duty”’ (III:1, 297. My italics). 
Austen connects Elinor’s emotional awareness of doing what she feels to be 
right with the amelioration of her feelings sufficient to enable her to appear to 
be calm and even cheerful at times. To act according to what she perceives to be 
her duty is patently a significant driving force for Elinor, therefore for her to do 
so is emotionally intelligent as this works to maintain her well-being and ability 
to function under duress. Austen also demonstrates Elinor’s dedication to an 
ideal of propriety within social situations, to the extent that, for example, when 
Marianne demonstrates her outrage at Mrs Ferrars’ appallingly rude response 
to Elinor’s screen, ‘Elinor was much more hurt by Marianne’s warmth, than she 
had been by what had produced it’. There is a poignancy in Austen’s use of the 
word ‘warmth’ to describe Marianne’s defence of her sister, and in her 
reflection through the character of Colonel Brandon that ‘he noticed only what 
was amiable in it, the affectionate heart which could not bear to see a sister 
slighted in the smallest point’ (II:12, 269). While Austen may be interrogating 
Elinor’s attributions of worth in placing social appearances above genuine 
familial love and loyalty, in non-judgemental EI terms Elinor’s civil behaviour 
towards her brother and sister-in-law is congruent with her deeply ingrained 
need to maintain conventional and formalised social manners. Elinor’s conduct 
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in this scene also aligns with her tendency towards pride that I discuss earlier 
in this chapter. It is important to Elinor that other people do not gain a feeling 
of superiority over her from any impression that they might have that she feels 
hurt or distressed. Thus the controlled manner of her greeting of her brother 
and Fanny is congruent with her need to protect her pride.  
In summary, the way in which Elinor greets Fanny and John is not 
congruent with her emotional distress, yet her conduct is congruent with her 
strong motivations towards duty, social propriety and personal pride. One 
might presume this to offset the discomfort that would arise from her 
overarching incongruence. Indeed, given these motivations within Elinor, the 
congruent expression of her emotional state would have elicited anxiety on any 
or all of these scores, and thereby heightened her anguish. To this extent, Elinor 
behaves in an emotionally intelligent way. Having said that, there is an element 
of deceit in Elinor’s behaviour in her interactions with others which one 
imagines would not sit very comfortably with the character’s appreciation of 
honesty. At the point at which Lucy reveals her engagement to Edward and 
disingenuously requests advice from Elinor, Austen writes that ‘Elinor blushed 
for the insincerity of Edward’s future wife’ (II:2, 171). However, on a number of 
occasions we watch Elinor herself express inauthentic opinions in the interest 
of politeness or pride. For example, during the visit to Barton Park at which 
Elinor first meets the Steele sisters, Lucy Steele exclaims at one point: ‘“What a 
sweet woman Lady Middleton is!”’. Austen writes that, in response:  
Marianne was silent; it was impossible for her to say what she did not feel, 
however trivial the occasion; and upon Elinor therefore the whole task of 
telling lies when politeness required it, always fell. She did her best when 
thus called on, by speaking of Lady Middleton with more warmth than she 
felt, though with far less than Miss Lucy. (I:21, 141) 
Here, while Marianne’s silence is entirely true to her own nature, Elinor’s 
dissembling is not wholly congruent with hers. Therefore one might reasonably 
suspect that Elinor, in spite of fulfilling what she perceives to be her duty to be 
polite, experiences an unease which Marianne does not. Further, it is surely 
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pride that leads Elinor to declare herself to feel pity ‘with great sincerity’ for 
Lucy’s anxiety in anticipation of meeting Mrs. Ferrars: ‘to the utter amazement 
of Lucy, who, though really uncomfortable herself, hoped at least to be an object 
of irrepressible envy to Elinor’ (II:12, 264). Austen’s tone is clearly heavily 
ironic as she describes Elinor’s apparent support of Lucy, which is actually 
offered purely in the interest of denying Lucy any gratification. In a similar vein, 
when Elinor is asked for her opinion on the comparative heights of Fanny’s son, 
Harry, and Lady Middleton’s, William, she ‘delivered her opinion on William’s 
side, by which she offended Mrs Ferrars and Fanny still more’ (II:12, 267). It is 
impossible to tell which of the boys is the taller since only Harry is present at 
the time, and we may fairly assume that Elinor has never given the subject a 
thought, as Marianne openly states of herself. It seems then that Elinor’s 
conjecture arises only out of an intention to offend Mrs. Ferrars and Fanny. She 
obviously achieves this aim and it is implied that she gains a certain degree of 
satisfaction from this. However, again, one wonders how uncomfortable it 
would be for Elinor to behave in such an insincere and antagonistic way. 
Perhaps more significantly, one might also question the extent to which, on top 
of this, Elinor’s minor victory over Mrs. Ferrars and Fanny could possibly 
ameliorate Elinor’s deeper pain of loss and the bitterness of her resentment and 
hurt pride.  
Thus, from an EI perspective, it is possible to observe the complexity 
involved in the relationship between Elinor’s underlying motivations and her 
emotional well-being consequent to her behaviour. From an EI viewpoint I 
perceive aspects of Elinor’s attitude and responses that could have beneficial 
effects for her psychological and emotional states. It is also clear that the 
character’s reactions to situational, personal and emotional elements of the 
events in which she is involved may have the potential to undermine her well-
being in ways which are perhaps not as immediately apparent. My 
understanding of Austen’s illustration of Elinor raises questions for the critical 
view that I discuss earlier in this chapter, which perceives an intention on 
Austen’s part for Elinor to emerge as a role-model for Marianne, and indeed for 
readers of the novel. Contrary to this position, I read a non-judgemental 
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attitude on the part of the author as she presents the psychologically complex 
nature of the character, thereby demonstrating the difficulty in assessing the 
usefulness of Elinor’s choices and actions both in and of themselves, and in 
comparison with those of Marianne, on whose character I will now focus.  
Marianne’s choices and consequences 
Returning to the scene in which John and Fanny Dashwood arrive to take 
possession of Norland, Marianne’s outward conduct in reaction to her brother 
and Fanny’s intrusion is clearly congruent with her internal emotional 
suffering. Thus, according to the psychotherapeutic principles that I outline 
above with regard to Elinor, we may presume that Marianne gains some 
emotional or psychological benefit as a result of her emotionally expressive 
behaviour. However, as with Elinor, in order to assess Marianne’s response in 
terms of EI, it is necessary to able to ground her behaviour within some form of 
rationale, or set of personal values. I will take a different approach towards this 
purpose in Marianne’s case. Earlier in the current chapter, I note the alignment 
that Marilyn Butler draws between Sense and Sensibility and Edgeworth’s 
‘Letters of Julia and Caroline’.219 Butler’s view is, of course, partly based on her 
perception of a parallel between the character of Marianne and Edgeworth’s 
Julia, a comparison that will serve to illuminate the foundation of Marianne’s 
behaviour. The comparison reveals that, far from the mindless emotionality in 
which Julia engages, Marianne’s approach emerges out of a considered 
rationality that warrants further exploration in EI terms. I begin with a look at 
Julia’s position as it relates to the present discussion. 
The very first line of Letter 1 of ‘Letters of Julia and Caroline’ states, ‘In 
vain, dear Caroline, you urge me to think; I profess only to feel.’220 This opening 
remark expresses the antithesis of emotional intelligence. Edgeworth’s 
italicising of the words ‘think’ and ‘feel’ marks the two qualities as oppositional 
and separable, and it is inconceivable within EI to isolate the operation of 
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thought from the process of feeling as Julia professes to do. As the letter 
continues, it is interesting to note Julia’s belief that any reflection on her 
feelings would inevitably diminish the intensity of those feelings:  
“Reflect upon my feelings! Analyse my notions of happiness! explain to you 
my system!” My system! – But I have no system: that is the very difference 
between us. My notions of happiness cannot be resolved into simple, fixed 
principles. Nor dare I even attempt to analyse them; the subtle essence 
would escape in the process: just punishment to the alchemist in morality! 
[…]. “Reflect upon my feelings!” - Dear Caroline, is it not enough that I do 
feel? – All that I dread is that apathy which philosophers call tranquillity.” 
In fact, Julia does provide a reason for her unwillingness to employ rationality 
when, a little further on in her letter, she expresses her conviction that 
moderation of her emotional sensitivity would render her less charming to 
men. However, even then, her fear of the rational leads her to resist using the 
term ‘system’, preferring to call her reasoning ‘sentiments’.  
While the notion that it is possible to feel without thinking is explicit in 
Edgeworth’s portrayal of Julia, rationality is inextricably linked with 
emotionality in Marianne. Marianne differs from Julia in two crucial aspects 
from an EI perspective. Firstly, as discussed previously in this chapter, 
Marianne knows that it is possible to use her mind either to decrease, or to 
increase, her awareness and experience of her emotional state; she is just 
determined not to learn how to decrease them. Secondly, where Edgeworth 
shows Julia to be fearful of reason, barely able even to acknowledge that her 
own choices arise out of rational thought, Austen reveals that Marianne’s 
decision to privilege her emotions is incontrovertibly founded on a ‘system’, 
and that this system is one that patently brings reasoning to the fore: 
Marianne abhorred all concealment where no real disgrace could attend 
unreserved; and to aim at the restraint of sentiments which were not in 
themselves illaudable, appeared to her not merely an unnecessary effort, 
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but a disgraceful subjection of reason to common-place and mistaken 
notions. (I:11, 63-64. My italics)221  
In this one sentence, the author shows not only the involvement of rationality in 
Marianne’s choice of behaviour, but also the value of rationality itself for 
Marianne and the nuanced, rationalised terms on which she determines the 
extent of her open emotional expression. Marianne’s emotionality stems from ‘a 
considered view, not an abdication of reason.’222 She reasons about the 
appropriateness of emotional expression and she reasons about the 
appropriate use of reason. The words, ‘disgraceful subjection of reason’ convey 
a high regard for rationality on Marianne’s part. For her, it is wasteful and 
inappropriate to apply as significant a capacity as reason to the attainment of 
ends that she regards to be mindless and erroneous: that is, to suppress or 
conceal emotions that are in themselves perfectly natural in order to comply 
with arbitrary, socially-imposed conventions. To recognise that Marianne’s 
action comes from a system clarifies the rationale behind the character’s 
conduct. Marianne prizes openness of emotional expression, however we now 
see that it is not that she refuses to be taught how to govern all her emotions in 
all circumstances. It is rather that she refuses to learn to govern her emotions 
‘where no real disgrace could attend unreserved’ and when her feelings are ‘not 
in themselves illaudable’. In the terms in which I discuss the character of Elinor 
in the section above, the congruence between Marianne’s values and her 
behaviour appears to be more straightforward and sustained than it is in 
Elinor’s case. Marianne’s refusal to subdue or disguise her emotions, or to 
engage in the ‘common-place’ lies and emotional manipulations which are such 
a ubiquitous feature of the social interactions that take place around her, is 
perfectly allied to her internal abhorrence of deceit and the concealment of her 
emotions. From a psychotherapeutic EI point of view, the accord between her 
behaviour and her inner personal principles enables Marianne to maintain a 
                                            
221
 Marianne’s consideration of natural and intuitive responses as more rational than blind obedience 
to ‘common-place’ conventional codes of conduct suggests the influence of Rousseau. See, for 
example, Lionel Trilling, Sincerity and Authenticity, (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard 
University Press, 1971-72). I will return to the potential influence of Rousseau on Austen’s work in 
Chapter Three. 
222
 As noted by Waldron, see Jane Austen and The Fiction of Her Time, p. 67. 
130 
 
degree of inner psychological equilibrium even when she experiences intense 
emotional discomfort consequent upon external events.  
In the light of this, it is interesting to consider what, for Marianne, would 
constitute a situation in which honesty and openness of feelings might bring 
about ‘disgrace’, and which emotions she would identify as ‘illaudable’. If one 
perceives the words ‘disgrace’ and ‘illaudable’ to relate, for Marianne, to 
opinions of herself held by other people, then it is difficult to imagine any 
situation or instance in which she would feel ashamed of telling the truth or of 
revealing her genuine emotional reactions. Notwithstanding this, Marianne is 
clearly affected by her awareness of the effect that her behaviour may have on 
the people who matter to her and for whom she cares most profoundly: her 
mother and her sisters. When Elinor reminds her of how concerned her mother 
will be for her dreadful distress over Willoughby’s rejection of her, Marianne 
experiences this realisation as ‘“torture”’ (II:7, 211). Then, as Elinor continues 
to plead with Marianne to contain her wretchedness, Marianne tells Elinor that 
she would do more for her sister and her mother’s sake than she would for her 
own. However, she continues, ‘“But to appear happy when I am so miserable̶—
Oh! Who can require it?”’ (II:7, 216). Much as she loves her mother and sister, 
Marianne is aware that to attempt to suppress or conceal her emotions would 
be more difficult and painful for her than it is to fully experience and express 
how she feels. She perceives that her state will become unbearable if she were 
to add the deep unease of incongruence between inner experience and outward 
appearance to the agony of her grief. Marianne rationalises the fact that the 
increase in her suffering must be disproportionate to any ease the concealment 
of her misery could provide to anyone else, and so she is unable to conceive 
how anyone could ask it of her.  
In this respect I reflect upon A. C. Bradley’s remark on Austen that ‘We 
remember Johnson in those passages where she refuses to express a deeper 
concern than she feels for misfortune or grief, and with both there is an 
occasional touch of brutality in the manner of the refusal’.223 One might apply 
Bradley’s view to, for example, Austen’s apparently contemptuous description 
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of Mrs. Musgrove’s overly-affected ‘large, fat sighings over the destiny of a son, 
whom alive nobody had cared for.’224 However, here it seems to me that, 
through Marianne, Austen shows an equal refusal to express a lesser concern 
than she feels. In this respect it is crucial to highlight the distinction between 
emotional affectation, such as that displayed by Mrs. Musgrove, and authentic 
expression of real emotion. If one assumes that Austen follows Johnson in his 
intolerance for inappropriately affected displays of emotion and ‘tenderness’ 
for expressions of genuine and natural emotions, as I suggest earlier in this 
chapter, then my interpretation of Austen’s position in her portrayal of 
Marianne is tenable only if one considers that Marianne is expressing the 
anguish of heart-break that she feels fully in reaction to a genuinely heart-
breaking circumstance. In this regard I concur with, for example, Emily 
Auerbach, for whom Marianne’s suffering is ‘raw and real’, and George Moore 
who, writing about the party scene in which Willoughby avoids Marianne’s 
desperate approaches towards him, perceives that ‘Miss Austen gives us all the 
agony of passion the human heart can feel’, and that ‘it is here that we find the 
burning human heart in English prose’.225 Marianne is genuinely devastated, 
and it is Elinor’s attempts to prevail upon her sister to subdue her distress, and, 
in doing so, possibly exacerbate her suffering with the discomfort of 
incongruence, that may be seen to be somewhat brutal. 
Austen’s placing of her enquiry into the relationship between thought 
and emotion within the intimate relationship between Elinor and Marianne is 
exemplified in the scene to which I refer above. Here the author sets up an 
exploratory dialectic between the contrasting approaches of the two characters. 
Elinor is accustomed to concealment and the associated incongruence, and she 
conceives of the possibility of this for Marianne when she asks her sister to 
consider the effect of her emotionality on other people and to repress it for 
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their sake. On the other hand, Marianne fears the potential anguish brought 
about by incongruence between internal experience and external expression, 
and she expects that her sister will have some understanding of this too as she 
wonders aloud how her sister, or anyone else, could ask her to conceal her 
misery. From an EI perspective, Austen has set up an irresolvable dilemma 
here. It is irresolvable because both Elinor’s and Marianne’s positions are 
authentic and both have validity. Crucially, Austen leaves Marianne’s question, 
‘“Oh! Who can require it?”’, unanswered. Thus it becomes a rhetorical question 
which, it seems to me, the author invites her readers to ponder for themselves.  
The focus of my discussion above has been on the consequences of 
Elinor’s and Marianne’s contrasting modes of behaviour and expression on 
their own psychological and emotional states and well-being. In that discussion, 
and previous sections of this chapter, I demonstrate Austen’s insight into 
individuals’ internal psychical dynamics from an EI perspective. In the 
following section, I highlight the author’s keen awareness of the intricacies of 
people’s interpersonal psychological interactions as I look at her portrayal of 
the effects of the emotions and behaviour of each of the characters on other 
people, most importantly on each other and on their mother. My analysis of this 
revolves around Austen’s conception of the quality which we now term 
‘empathy’. It is clear from the etymology of the word ‘empathy’ that the term 
did not exist at the time of Austen’s writing (as I discuss in Chapter One). 
However, I perceive that Austen’s understanding of the way in which people 
experience the emotional states of others, and the ways in which they process 
and act upon that experience, is in close keeping with modern 
psychotherapeutic conceptions of the emotional phenomenon that we now 
term ‘empathy’. On this basis, I will refer to ‘empathy’ in the following 
discussion. Austen’s incorporation of empathy into her portrayal of the 
characters of Elinor and Marianne not only introduces even greater complexity 
into the natures of both characters, it also reveals the quality to be an important 
133 
 
element in the self-developmental process of each of them, especially in the 
case of Marianne.226 
Elinor’s and Marianne’s empathy 
As I explain above, the quality of empathy is regarded as a foundational element 
of emotional intelligence, and both Elinor and Marianne possess this quality. 
Elinor, for example, feels empathetically for Colonel Brandon when he enquires 
of her as to the state of affairs between Marianne and Willoughby. Austen 
writes that his words, ‘which conveyed to Elinor a direct avowal of his love for 
her sister, affected her very much. She was not immediately able to say 
anything, and even when her spirits were recovered, she debated for a short 
time, on the answer it would be most proper to give’ (II:5, 197).Elinor is not 
only deeply affected by Colonol Brandon’s speech to the point of 
speechlessness, but thinks carefully about her response. Further, when he 
departs, Elinor is left ‘with a melancholy impression of Colonel Brandon’s 
unhappiness, and was prevented even from wishing it removed, by her anxiety 
for the very event that must confirm it’ (II:5, 198). Elinor’s melancholy is an 
empathetic reflection of Brandon’s feelings, and not an experience of her own, 
since her personal reaction to the attachment between Marianne and 
Willoughby is one of anxiety and not unhappiness. Likewise, Austen shows 
Marianne’s capacity for empathy during Edward’s visit to Barton Cottage. In 
one scene, she notices and draws attention to the ring that he is wearing which, 
unbeknownst to her, contains a lock of Lucy Steele’s hair. Austen writes: 
‘Marianne spoke inconsiderately what she really felt—but when she saw how 
much she pained Edward, her own vexation at her want of thought could not be 
surpassed by his’ (S&S, 1:18, 113). Here Marianne’s own feelings of curiosity 
are quickly replaced with her empathetic awareness, not of Edward’s pained 
discomfort as such, but with his annoyance at the thoughtlessness on her part 
that gives rise to his embarrassment.  
Scenes such as these, drawn with such specificity by the author, indicate 
the capacity that both Elinor and Marianne have for refined empathy, and this 
                                            
226
 On empathy and sympathy in the fiction of the Nineteenth Century, see Rae Greiner, Sympathetic 
Realism in Nineteenth-Century British Fiction (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2012).  
134 
 
aspect of emotional intelligence in the two sisters is thrown into sharp relief 
when one notes, in comparison, the lack of empathy in characters who seem to 
have no emotional awareness of other people’s suffering. John and Fanny 
Dashwood and Mrs. Ferrars fall into this category, and even warm and 
hospitable Mrs. Jennings, who has awareness of emotionality in others but 
misinterprets it. While Mrs. Jennings pities Marianne, at one point the reproach 
of Marianne’s tears is ‘entirely lost’ on her. (II:9, 230) Apart from Mrs. 
Dashwood, to whom I will return shortly, the only other explicitly empathetic 
character is Colonel Brandon. Austen writes explicitly of Colonel Brandon that 
he ‘was on every occasion mindful of the feelings of others’ (I:12, 72). The 
contrast between Colonel Brandon and John Dashwood in this respect is 
highlighted when John struggles to understand Colonel Brandon’s motive for 
assisting Edward with a living at Delaford, since he regards the Colonel as a 
man of ‘sense’. He puts Brandon’s behaviour down to the ‘“vast deal of 
inconsistency in almost every character”’ (III:5, 334). However, Colonel 
Brandon is behaving entirely consistently with empathetic awareness, and thus 
within the ambiguous definition of the term ‘sense’ that Austen employs 
throughout the novel.   
It is in the context of the intimate sibling relationship between Elinor 
and Marianne that Austen’s understanding of the subtle aspects of empathy 
comes most powerfully to the fore, as I show in previous sections with regard to 
the underlying psychological dynamics within the characters. Notably, Austen 
demonstrates the empathy that each of the characters feels for the other to be 
self-transformative, as it leads to the adoption by each of the characteristic 
behaviour of the other. Thus, when Elinor finds Marianne grief-stricken on 
receipt of Willoughby’s letter, she joins her sister with a matching outpouring of 
tears: 
Elinor drew near, but without saying a word; and seating herself on the 
bed, took her hand, kissed her affectionately several times, and then gave 




Importantly, Elinor has no knowledge of what has happened to provoke 
Marianne’s distress at this point, and therefore there is nothing that prompts 
her to weep other than Marianne’s weeping. Of course Elinor knows that 
Marianne knows something that she herself does not. However, she does not 
yet know what it is that Marianne knows that is causing her to be so upset. At 
this moment Elinor’s constraint in emotional expression is superseded simply 
by an instantaneous and spontaneous experience of shared feeling, which is the 
essence of empathy. It is interesting to note too that, in these initial moments, 
Elinor has no inclination to prevent Marianne from the unrestrained expression 
of her anguish. Austen writes, ‘Elinor, who knew that such grief, shocking as it 
was to witness it, must have its course, watched by her till this excess of 
suffering had somewhat spent itself’ (II:7, 208). It is only when Elinor becomes 
aware of the specifics of Marianne’s circumstances that her awareness of how 
Marianne feels, and therefore what she needs, is obscured by her recognition of 
how she herself would feel, and what she herself would need, under the same 
circumstances. Elinor then begins to encourage Marianne to restrain herself as 
her own tendency towards emotional control, propriety and pride begin to 
override her purely emotional response to Marianne’s distress. Crucially, 
however, to have empathy requires a person to be able to open themselves to 
emotional experience and here we witness, for the first time, Elinor’s natural, 
unmediated, unconstrained emotional self.  
Likewise, we see Marianne empathising deeply with Elinor and, in her 
empathy, taking on Elinor’s mode of behaviour. This occurs while Elinor writes to 
their mother to inform her of Marianne’s plight. As Elinor herself might do in 
Marianne’s place, Marianne watches in controlled, quiet stillness: ‘Marianne […] 
remained fixed at the table where Elinor wrote, watching the advancement of her 
pen, grieving over her for the hardship of such a task’ (II:9, 231). Marianne’s 
empathy here is revealed in the way in which she mirrors every aspect of Elinor’s 
emotional state and behaviour. For close to fifteen minutes, Marianne is ‘fixed at 
the table’ as Elinor is. Her watching of the movement of the pen mirrors Elinor’s 
moving of it, and she grieves, not for her own circumstances, but out of her 
awareness of the ‘heavy heart’ with which Elinor undertakes the chore (II:9, 230). 
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It is a knock at the door that brings Marianne back into her own emotional reality 
and leads her to act in accord with her own needs and manner again.  
In the Introduction I note critical recognition of the influence on Austen 
of Adam Smith, and Smith’s ideas are evident in her treatment of empathy here. 
Like Austen, Smith did not use the word ‘empathy’ itself. However, in his 
influential essay, ‘The Theory of Modern Sentiments’, Smith’s description of the 
quality that he terms ‘sympathy’ matches that which we would now apply to the 
concept of empathy. With reference to sympathy, Smith writes, ‘The passions, 
upon some occasions, may seem to be transfused from one man to another, 
instantaneously, and antecedent to any knowledge of what excited them in the 
person principally concerned’. Further, he states, ‘Sympathy, […] enlivens joy 
and alleviates grief. It enlivens joy by presenting another source of satisfaction; 
and alleviates grief by insinuating into the heart almost the only agreeable 
sensation which it is at that time capable of receiving’.227 In the moments of 
pure empathy that the sisters share before they return to their habitual modes 
of conduct, they offer each other the exact, and the only, reaction that could be 
of help. This principle underlies the centrality of the empathetic stance in 
Rogerian therapy, as I outline in Chapter One of the thesis, and it is fascinating 
to notice the essence and purpose of this quality so finely observed within 
Austen’s portrayal of the relationship between Elinor and Marianne.  
To explore the nuances of Austen’s characterisations in relation to empathy 
a little further, one might contrast the empathetic source of Marianne’s behaviour 
in the scene above with that which causes her to adopt Elinor’s restrained manner 
again later in the novel when Marianne learns the degree of Elinor’s unhappiness 
caused by her concealed knowledge of Edward’s engagement to Lucy Steele. At 
this point, Marianne’s primary emotions are of guilt and self-reproach for having 
initially minimised her sister’s attachment to Edward. When she conceals her 
emotions relating to Elinor’s situation from other people, this is not an empathetic 
matching of Elinor’s control over emotionality, rather it is in keeping with a 
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promise that she has made to Elinor because of her guilty feelings. In this case, 
precisely because Austen is not presenting another example of empathy on 
Marianne’s part here, we learn more about the nature of Elinor’s character and 
observe further subtle aspects of Austen’s understanding of empathy. To clarify, I 
note that in the moment of Elinor’s revelation of her circumstances to Marianne, 
Austen states that Marianne ‘listened with horror, and cried excessively’, while 
Elinor’s report was ‘clear and simple’, and ‘not accompanied by violent agitation, 
nor impetuous grief.’ Austen further describes Elinor as ‘the comforter of others in 
her own distresses, no less than in theirs; and all the comfort that could be given 
by assurances of her own composure of mind […] was readily offered’ (III:1, 296). 
From these reflections it appears that Austen wishes her readers to admire 
Elinor’s conduct. Yet, the author then undermines readers’ appreciation of Elinor 
when she shows that Elinor is capable of coolly, and possibly even cruelly, 
manipulating her sister: ‘In such a frame of mind as she [Marianne] was now in, 
Elinor had no difficulty in obtaining from her whatever promise she required; and 
at her request, Marianne engaged never to speak of the affair to any one with the 
least appearance of bitterness’ (III:1, 300).228 From my perspective, Austen’s 
perception is in close accord with the principles of EI when she raises the notion 
that the ability to recognise another’s feelings does not necessarily lead to a 
constructive use of that skill. To assess the degree to which awareness of other 
people’s emotions is emotionally intelligent, it is necessary to consider the 
purpose to which that awareness is employed. To the extent that Elinor takes 
advantage of the guilt that Marianne feels to corner her into an agreement to 
constrain the expression of her emotions, Elinor’s awareness of Marianne’s 
feelings of guilt could not be regarded as entirely empathetic, nor indeed at all 
emotionally intelligent.229 
Austen’s representation of empathy resonates yet further with modern-day 
EI conceptions of the quality in her illustration of the way in which, even when a 
person’s intent is for the care of others, firstly the effect may be the opposite to 
                                            
228
 I observe Elinor’s less than straightforward interactions with Lucy Steele and other characters too 
earlier in the current chapter.  
229
 See Simon Baron-Cohen, Zero Degrees of Empathy. A New Theory of Human Cruelty (London: 
Allen Lane, 2011) for a conceptualisation of empathy which requires that a person acts in the interests 
of the other person of whose emotions one is aware, and not to use that awareness to further one’s 
own ends.  
138 
 
that intended, and secondly, this outcome may not be immediately apparent. To 
illustrate this point, I return to the scenes in the novel that concern Willoughby’s 
and Edward’s departures from Barton Cottage, to which I refer earlier in this 
chapter. In the immediate aftermath of Willoughby’s unexpected departure, 
Austen writes that Marianne’s overt distress gives ‘pain every moment to her 
mother and sisters’ (I:16, 96). However, when Edward leaves, because of Elinor’s 
conduct ‘her mother and sisters were spared much solicitude on her account’ 
(I:19, 121). In the light of this, one might reasonably conclude that Austen favours 
Elinor’s behaviour in this instance since, unlike Marianne, Elinor apparently 
demonstrates empathetic care for her mother and sisters. However, the picture is 
not quite so clear when one looks ahead to the later consequences of Elinor’s 
reactions to events.  
During the scene in which the family mistakenly believe that Edward has 
become married to Lucy Steele, Mrs Dashwood realises that Elinor has been 
suffering as much as her sister, but that she, their mother, had been led to 
underestimate the depth of Elinor’s feelings for Edward. Austen writes that Mrs 
Dashwood ‘feared that under this persuasion she had been unjust, inattentive, nay, 
almost unkind to her Elinor’, and that her preoccupation with Marianne’s more 
overt turmoil had ‘led her away to forget that in Elinor she might have a daughter 
suffering almost as much, certainly with less self-provocation, and greater 
fortitude’ (III:11, 403). Again, by virtue of the fact that this statement ends the 
final paragraph of the chapter, it strikes me that Austen leaves a question to be 
considered here as to what effect this realisation has on Mrs. Dashwood. Austen’s 
poignant phrase, ‘her Elinor’, touchingly emphasises the maternal attachment and 
concern that Mrs. Dashwood feels for Elinor. As this is followed by strongly self-
critical words such as ‘unjust’, ‘inattentive’ and even ‘unkind’, it seems clear that 
Austen intended to convey a moving impression of Mrs. Dashwood’s painful 
feelings of guilt and regret. Thus, in the short-term, while Elinor protects her 
mother from unhappiness, she also deprives her of the opportunity to offer her 
daughter the support and consolation which Mrs. Dashwood wished she had 
provided. In the longer term, Mrs. Dashwood suffers in a different way but 
arguably more deeply than she might have if Elinor had expressed her anguish 
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more openly at the time. At this point it is too late for Mrs. Dashwood to attempt to 
ease Elinor’s past grief and, by my reading, this leaves her with the discomforting 
feeling of helplessness in the knowledge of her child having been hurt.  
Of course, this is not the outcome that Elinor intends for her mother, just 
as it is not Marianne’s intention to bring herself nearly to the point of death, and 
in doing so frighten and distress her mother and sister. As I state earlier in this 
chapter, from a psychotherapeutic point of view, Elinor’s and Marianne’s modes 
of behaviour emerge from the different ways in which they seek to meet their 
own emotional and psychological needs. Both characters manage to achieve 
this for the most part, using their capacity for emotional intelligence as it is 
defined within the four levels of the four-branch model of EI. As I indicate 
during my discussion in the sections above, the degree of congruence that each 
achieves between their internal states and the ways in which they express 
themselves outwardly is a key element in the analysis of their emotional 
intelligence. While it appears that Marianne’s character emerges as generally 
the more effective in this element of EI, neither of the characters achieves total 
congruence, since even Marianne is at odds with herself to some extent when 
she is torn between her need fully to express her emotionality and her 
awareness that in doing so she brings concern to the people for whom she 
cares. For me, however, the quality that they both possess in equal measure, as 
well as the self-awareness that I discuss earlier in this chapter, is empathy. This 
quality connects the two characters intimately with each other and with their 
mother, albeit not always entirely successfully as both characters take their 
approaches to extremes when they find themselves in very challenging 
circumstances. 
We see that the extreme of Elinor’s behaviour leads her to isolate herself 
in her suffering, which exacerbates her own anguish and leads both her mother 
and Marianne ultimately to experience the painful helplessness of exclusion. 
The extreme manifestation of Marianne’s approach puts her own life at risk, 
and involves all who care about her in the dreadful anticipation of 
bereavement. Crucially however, and in line with the third and final factor in 
the assessment of EI that I indicate earlier in this chapter, Austen allows both 
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characters to become aware of the limitations and dangers of their customary 
modes of behaviour, and both to change and develop as a result of this self-
awareness.  
Transformation in Marianne 
As I state earlier in this chapter, for me the key influencing factor in Marianne’s 
developmental process is her capacity for empathy. Marianne’s empathetic 
awareness of the consequences of her conduct are explicit when the character 
openly and passionately articulates the extent to which she understands the 
immensity of the emotional upheaval that her illness has caused those dear to 
her, and how devastating the consequences would have been for them had she 
not recovered: ‘“Had I died,—in what peculiar misery should I have left you, my 
nurse, my friend, my sister! […] —How should I have lived in your 
remembrance!—My mother too! How could you have consoled her!”’ (III:10, 
391-392). The emotional tone of Marianne’s declaration here suggests to me 
that, through her keen empathetic quality, in this moment she feels within 
herself even the hypothetical distress that her mother and sister would have 
suffered had they lost her. It is this high degree of empathetic awareness in 
Marianne that Austen shows to be the impetus behind Marianne’s 
determination to bear in mind the emotional well-being of others, as well as her 
own physical health, more carefully in the future. Where Tanner, for example, 
sees that ‘something valuable has been lost’, and that Marianne has become an 
‘automaton’ that ‘submits to the plans of its relations and joins the social game’, 
I perceive that the change in Marianne comes about, not in submission to the 
‘social game’, but through the developmental process of self-reflection with 
which she engages. She thereby does not lose, but gains something valuable.230 
From an EI perspective, Marianne gains an enhanced awareness both of herself 
and of other people that brings with it a much wider range of possible 
emotional, psychological and behavioural responses to the inevitably 
multifarious experiences that life brings.  
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My argument here also contrasts with Helena Kelly’s observation that 
Marianne ‘plays an alarmingly passive, even sacrificial role’ in her marriage to 
Colonel Brandon.231 Kelly concentrates on Austen’s depiction of the gratitude 
that Marianne’s family feels towards Brandon, and finds that Marianne 
subjugates herself to the pressure that they place upon her to marry him as his 
‘reward’ (III:14, 429). My view differs from this as I focus on Austen’s own 
reference to the notion of sacrifice with regard to Marianne when she writes 
that, in marrying Colonel Brandon,  
Instead of falling a sacrifice to an irresistible passion, as once she had 
fondly flattered herself with expecting,—instead of remaining even for 
ever with her mother, and finding pleasures in retirement and study, as 
afterwards in her more calm and sober judgement she had determined 
on,—she found herself at nineteen, submitting to new attachments, 
entering on new duties, placed in a new home, a wife, the mistress of a 
family, and the patroness of a village. (III:14, 429-430)  
For me, it is clear from this that Austen views Marianne’s marriage not as a 
sacrifice, but as an escape from a sacrifice. The sacrifice that Marianne escapes 
is that of the possible scope of her future life to a youthful conviction that there 
is only one form of love that can be given to only one man in only one way. This 
conviction, if she remained committed to it, would narrow the horizons of her 
existence, not only practically, but also, from my psychotherapeutic EI 
perspective, emotionally and psychologically. There is a note of irony in 
Austen’s portrayal of Marianne’s declaration of her intent to adopt behaviour 
which is the direct opposite of that which she has displayed up to this point, 
that is her determination to ‘“mix in society […] only to shew that my spirit is 
humbled, my heart amended, and that I can practise the civilities, the lesser 
duties of life, with gentleness and forbearance”’, and to check her thoughts of 
Willoughby ‘“by religion, by reason, by constant employment”’ (III:10, 393). 
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However, while Marianne might not be able to go quite as far as she imagines, 
surely even to attempt to do so would simply lead to the adoption of another set 
of inflexible, self-limiting rules. From this viewpoint, for Marianne to be able to 
‘discover the falsehood of her own opinions, and to counteract, by her conduct, 
her most favourite maxims’, far from representing a loss or a sacrifice, enables 
her to expand and gain mastery over her repertoire of emotional and 
psychological experiences, as well as of her life choices. In therapeutic terms, 
this is a perfectly apt reflection of a positive and ‘extraordinary’ developmental 
process towards greater emotional intelligence, one which, as I indicate earlier 
in this chapter, I suggest Austen may have hoped her readers would recognise 
and emulate. (III:14, 429)232  
Transformation in Elinor 
The transformation in Elinor’s character is less dramatic than that witnessed in 
Marianne, and the process by which it occurs less explicitly presented by 
Austen. Nevertheless, Elinor’s character does change through the course of the 
novel and an exploration of the development of the character from a 
therapeutic EI perspective may contribute to a greater understanding of the 
nature of the character’s developmental process, as well as further illustrating 
the subtlety of Austen’s perceptiveness with regard to issues relating to 
psychology and emotionality.  
It is clear from the examples that I highlight above and earlier in this 
chapter that Elinor has a capacity for empathy with other people. I note again, 
particularly, both the empathetic weeping that she shares with Marianne on 
receipt of Willoughby’s letter, and the moments in which she and her mother 
are joined in strained silence on hearing the report of Mr. Ferrars’ marriage to 
Lucy Steele. In the former instance, Austen shows Elinor to be as capable as 
Marianne of pure emotional connection with others and of the open expression 
of corresponding emotionality. Therefore, in the latter, as we watch mother and 
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daughter with their appetites ‘equally lost’, and sitting ‘long together in a 
similarity of thoughtfulness and silence’, it seems reasonable to suppose that 
Austen intended the inference that Elinor is as aware of her mother’s 
discomfort as Mrs. Dashwood is of her daughter’s. (III:11, 402) In this context I 
am struck by a proposition made by Frank McLynn in his examination of the 
Stoic tradition which proscribes self-pity.233 McLynn writes: ‘Stoics were caught 
in the coils of their own doctrine: if sorrow is not allowed for one’s own 
misfortunes, logically it cannot be felt for those of others.’234 While one may 
speculate as to the degree to which Austen’s writing was influenced by the 
principles of Stoic philosophy, McLynn’s proposition that in order to feel 
compassion for others one must be able to feel the same for oneself is an 
interesting one in relation to Elinor from my perspective since the model of EI 
would support his observation. While it is easy to locate the source of 
Marianne’s empathy within her own fully lived experience of pain, throughout 
the novel it is only with the painful emotional states of other characters that 
Elinor allows herself to engage fully. To do this, Elinor must have a feeling-
based conception of suffering, and this, as McLynn’s logic proposes, and which 
the EI model would maintain, can only emerge from her awareness of her own 
painful emotionality. Yet Austen provides Elinor with numerous 
rationalisations for the suppression of her own discomfort or distress, and the 
character uses these rationalisations in her attempts to protect her mother and 
Marianne from their experience of anxiety or unhappiness too. The 
rationalisations to which I refer here are duty, care for others, discretion, 
prudence and, following my discussion earlier in this chapter, I would add 
personal pride to the list. 
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These are certainly factors that influence Elinor’s behaviour in relation 
to her emotions. However, I observe further that Elinor maintains her 
emotional reserve during the period of Marianne’s illness, when Marianne 
herself is unconscious and there is no character who it seems would benefit 
from her concealment. Yet, it is only when Marianne starts to show signs of 
recovery that Elinor begins to dare to allow herself to experience and to express 
her feelings: ‘at last, with an agitation more difficult to bury under external 
calmness, than all her foregoing distress’ she ‘ventured to communicate her 
hopes.’ Even in this release, Elinor warns herself against the full experience of 
her own emotionality and, as she does so, it becomes evident that, duty, care for 
others and so on aside, Elinor is simply afraid to engage fully with her own 
internal feelings. She is afraid of her fear, and even more afraid of her hope. 
There is a poignancy in Austen’s description of Elinor’s inability to maintain 
completely controlled restraint over her emotions in this situation when she 
writes, ‘But it was too late. Hope had already entered; and feeling all its anxious 
flutter, she bent over her sister to watch.’ Finally, only when she is confident 
that Marianne is on the mend and therefore sure that it is safe to do so, she 
allows the ‘tears of joy’ to flow. (III:7, 355) Later, we observe the one other 
moment in which Elinor expresses fully her own emotional state, that is in the 
moment she realises that it is Robert and not Edward who has been married to 
Lucy Steele. Here again, her tears are ‘tears of joy’ (III:12, 408). In both of these 
scenes of high drama, Elinor is able to let go of her tight rein on her emotions 
and grant herself emotional release on her own behalf only once she perceives 
that all will be well. This is a distinctive example of the impeccable consistency 
in Austen’s portrayal of her characters, consistency which emerges out of her 
extraordinary perceptivity of the subtle idiosyncrasies of human nature, which 
she manifests in her characterisations. I note earlier in this chapter the 
psychotherapeutic principle that people’s behaviour is directed towards the 
fulfilment of their needs. It is clear that Austen sees this, as Elinor’s behaviour is 
patently and consistently self-protective. However, the self-protective 
approaches that people adopt can, at times, be in some ways self-defeating and 
even threatening to themselves and their relationships, and Austen shows this 
too, equally consistently, to be an outcome in Elinor’s case. 
145 
 
From a four-branch EI perspective, the emotions inform the effective 
functioning of the individual. Therefore, to open oneself to unpleasant feelings 
as well as to pleasant ones, to engage with those emotional states, and even 
deliberately to magnify them, as Marianne and her mother are wont to do, 
enhances all aspects of the individual’s experience of themselves, of other 
people, and of their lives in general. On this basis alone, the level and 
development of Elinor’s emotional intelligence is limited. From a broader EI 
perspective, and, indeed, a wider therapeutic perspective, one is keenly aware 
of the extent to which Elinor’s approach leads her to become isolated, not only 
from herself, but from those closest to her, who could, to paraphrase Adam 
Smith, enhance her happiness or ease her grief if she allowed them to share 
those emotional experiences with her. Rachel Brownstein notes that Elinor’s 
view of the self is ‘social, not isolated’.235 I would agree that this is Elinor’s view 
of the self. My view, however, is that, paradoxically,  Elinor’s self is intensely 
and painfully isolated, and that, as a result, those most intimately caring of her 
are hurt too by their inability to reach her and share in either her sorrow or her 
joy. Even in the latter scene to which I refer above, it is only when Elinor has left 
the room and closed the door on Edward and her family that she is able to let 
herself weep in relief and happiness at Edward’s news. The others left behind 
are confused, and Edward in particular, who wishes to ask Elinor to marry him 
is: ‘so uncomfortable’ and ‘in need of encouragement and fresh air’ (III:13, 409). 
The EI model is a paradigm of high functionality both within the individual and 
of the individual in relationship with others. Therefore, Elinor’s need to protect 
herself emotionally is at odds with the goals to which the model of EI would 
aspire to enable individuals to achieve.236 
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Nevertheless, as I state at the beginning of this section, Elinor does 
change and develop over the course of the novel. Throughout, we watch Elinor 
become empathetically drawn into the emotional experiences of other 
characters, which, almost despite herself, inevitably connects her with her own 
emotional self. In the two instances to which I refer above, we see the actions of 
those for whom she feels the greatest affection bring her to the awareness, 
experience and expression of yet deeper inner emotional processes. I perceive 
that all of these experiences gradually lead Elinor to begin to open herself up 
internally to her own feelings, and to feel a greater need to express them 
outwardly, even if still only when she perceives that it is safe to do so.  
As with critiques of Marianne’s transformation that I discuss in the 
previous section, certain commentators perceive the transition in Elinor’s 
character towards greater emotionality to be detrimental to the strength of the 
character, and therefore to undermine Austen’s success in achieving her 
purpose for the novel. I refer earlier in this chapter to De Rose and Jenkyns for 
whom Elinor’s growing emotionality represents a ‘weakening’ of her ‘type’, just 
as Marianne’s capacity for moderated rationality weakens her ‘type’. However, 
from the perspective of the therapeutic model of EI, it is not the contrast 
between Elinor and Marianne but the complexity and development of the 
psychological and emotional functionality of each of the characters that is the 
central point of the novel. From this viewpoint, rather than engaging in a debate 
around the relative moral values of emotionality and rationality, Austen is far 
more concerned to explore in her novel the ways in which the qualities of 
thought and emotion relate to each other within the psychology of human 
beings, and how the nature of the relationship between the two qualities 
relates, in turn, to the nature of the self, and of self-awareness and self-
development. I perceive that Austen illustrates both the contrasts and the 
similarities between the characters of Elinor and Marianne equally to this end. 
Finally, the EI model highlights Austen’s key concern with, and deep 
understanding of, the negotiation by individuals between the rational and 
feeling elements of their own psyche and those aspects of the psyches of other 
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people, in other words, of the complex psychological dynamics that underlie 





AUTONOMY IN JANE AUSTEN 
while this state lasts, the person may call himself happy; not possessing an 
imperfect happiness, poor and dependent, but a complete felicity, perfect 
and full, which leaves no wish or void in the soul. (Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau)237  
In the preceding chapters of this thesis I explain Carl Rogers’ definition of 
autonomy, the conditions that are necessary both intra-personally and 
interpersonally for the development of an individual’s autonomy, and the 
effects of the possession of autonomy, or lack of autonomy (heteronomy), on an 
individual’s psychological and emotional state. Lack of autonomy creates a 
dissonance between one’s external behaviour or expressions of thought and/or 
emotion and one’s instinctive drive towards maturity and independence. This 
dissonance causes the individual to experience stress which may be damaging 
to the individual’s well-being. In contrast, the individual who possesses a high 
level of self-aware and congruent autonomy experiences an inner ease, the 
essence of which is captured in Rousseau’s reflection quoted above. 
Like Trilling, I observe an ‘affinity’ between Rousseau and Austen in the 
value that they both place on self-awareness, self-definition, self-directedness 
and self-sufficiency.238 In Reveries of The Solitary Walker, Rousseau further 
articulates the outcome of self-aware autonomy as the ‘sentiment of existence’ 
which ‘stripped of any other emotion, is in itself a precious sentiment of 
contentment, and of peace which alone would suffice to make this existence 
sweet and dear’.239 Here Rousseau describes a state in which there is no 
emotion felt other than the experience simply of being, and which therefore 
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bestows a profound sense of inner peace. In the Introduction to his translation 
of Reveries, Russell Goulbourne observes that ‘Whereas in the Confessions 
Rousseau seeks to explain himself to others, in the Reveries, by contrast, he 
makes a point of addressing only himself, since all he seeks, […], is to 
understand himself’.240 Rousseau’s Reveries therefore reflects his individual 
quest for the self-awareness, absent of the perceptions or judgements of other 
people, which is at the heart of Rogers’ conception of autonomy, and that 
Austen’s writing clearly shows to be her own.241  
In the previous chapter I look at the issue of autonomy inasmuch as the 
concept is encompassed within the context of EI. In the current chapter, I 
explore Austen’s conceptualisation of, and appreciation of, autonomy in and of 
itself. The scenes and characters that I explore in the following sections also 
reveal close resonances between Austen’s psychological understanding and 
other specific features of the different models of psychotherapy that I present in 
Chapter One of this thesis. Below, I look at Catherine Morland, Charlotte Lucas 
and Lady Catherine de Bourgh (in juxtaposition with Elizabeth Bennet) from a 
Rogerian Client-Centred perspective, and Mary Crawford from a TA point of 
view. For my fifth and final analysis, I present my interpretation of the 
character of Mrs. Smith in the light of the model of CBT. I begin with Catherine 
Morland, and the scene in which Catherine refuses to abandon a social 
arrangement with Eleanor Tilney in order to accompany Isabella and John 
Thorpe, and her brother James, on a carriage ride to Clifton.  
3.1. Catherine Morland refuses a carriage ride 
There is one scene in particular in which I perceive that Austen draws attention 
to the autonomous nature of the character of Catherine Morland. This is the 
scene that involves Catherine’s refusal to abandon the arrangement she has 
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made to go for a walk with Eleanor Tilney in order to accompany Isabella and 
John Thorpe, and her own brother, James, on a trip to Clifton instead.242 During 
this episode, Catherine’s self-aware autonomy is manifested by her 
determinedly empathetic assertive responses to the patently aggressive 
approaches adopted by the other three characters involved, in particular 
Isabella and James, in their attempts to persuade her to comply with their plan. 
It is notable that Austen unfolds this scene over the course of five pages when 
the exchange depicted within it could have been covered within a paragraph or 
two by means of a brief, if argumentative, conversation between the characters 
involved. This indicates the importance to Austen of her portrayal of 
Catherine’s self-aware autonomy, and of that character’s preparedness to 
maintain and express her autonomy even under duress.  
Austen outlines in remarkable detail the different types of approach that 
Catherine’s three companions use, and the degree of pressure that these 
strategies place on Catherine. The way in which Austen gradually increases the 
tension over the course of the scene reveals not only the strength of Catherine’s 
determination to remain true to her autonomous self. It also highlights the 
ways in which the author’s conception of the subtleties of interpersonal 
relationship dynamics closely matches the way in which these interactions 
might be understood and explained by modern-day psychotherapists as 
variously passive, aggressive, passive-aggressive and empathetic assertive. The 
passive form of communication is evinced by people who seek the approval of 
others and behave in submissive and compliant ways to maintain that approval. 
The aggressive form is adopted by individuals who need to be in control of 
other people and behave in a domineering and hostile manner in order to 
achieve that control. The passive-aggressive form is used by those who wish to 
control others but are simultaneously fearful of disapproval and thus they 
adopt subtle manipulations to achieve their own ends. Finally, the empathetic 
assertive form which is manifested by people who act independently of the 
need either to control others or to win other people’s approval. The 
empathetically assertive individual is able to behave according to their own 
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wishes and values, while taking account of the wishes and values of others.243 I 
analyse Catherine’s refusal of the carriage ride with Isabella, John and James in 
some detail below to illustrate this observation.  
The scene in question emerges out of coincidentally simultaneous yet 
conflicting conversations. Catherine talks with Eleanor Tilney and arranges to 
go for a walk with her on the following day. In the same few minutes, Isabella, 
John and James decide amongst themselves that they, along with Catherine, will 
go on an excursion to Clifton, also on the next day. As far as those three 
characters are concerned, ‘Catherine only remained to be apprized of it.’ 
Clearly, the use of the word ‘apprized’ is significant here. It does not occur to 
any one of the three characters that it might be necessary to enquire about 
Catherine’s availability, or indeed desire to join the party. As far as they are 
concerned, they need only to inform her of the plan and all will be settled. Their 
mode of communication is an aggressive style: ‘her agreement was demanded’, 
with the expectation of an acceptance on Catherine’s side. However, ‘instead of 
the gay acquiescence expected by Isabella, Catherine looked grave, was very 
sorry, but could not go’. Catherine had allowed herself to be deceived out of her 
agreement to walk with Eleanor on the previous week, had been distraught as a 
result, and this time, ‘it was quite determined, and she would not, upon any 
account, retract’ (I:13, 97).244 Catherine’s response to her brother’s and friends’ 
demand of her embodies the principles of self-aware empathetic assertiveness. 
Her statement, and the tone and manner by which she communicates her reply, 
reflect both the clarity of purpose and the awareness of the feelings of other 
people which together constitute empathetic assertiveness. Her ‘grave’ 
expression and apology express her anticipation of their disappointment as 
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well as her own regret. Furthermore, Catherine makes no demands on the 
others. She simply states her own position with no attempt to influence their 
plans or actions.  
In an interaction between two equally assertive, autonomous 
individuals, the recipient of such a clear and empathetic response would be 
open to the possibility of a rejection of their own plan and would respond with 
equal honesty and empathy. For example, they might declare their unhappiness 
that their design will not come to fruition as they had hoped while at the same 
time acknowledging the awkwardness of the refuser’s position. However, 
Austen has already indicated that the initial approach from Isabella and the 
others is not assertive but aggressive, and they maintain their aggressive stance 
in their reply: 
But that she must and should retract was instantly the eager cry of both 
the Thorpes; they must go to Clifton tomorrow, they would not go without 
her, it would be nothing to put off a mere walk for one day longer, and 
they would not hear of a refusal. (I:13, 97-98. Austen’s italics) 
Unlike Catherine who simply declares her own intentions without either 
commenting on the others’ plans or making any attempt to encourage them to 
change those plans, Isabella and John unempathetically minimise Catherine’s 
scheduled walk with Eleanor as ‘mere’, and the potential postponement of it as 
‘nothing’ in an attempt to manoeuvre Catherine into compliance with their own 
wishes. The words ‘must’ and ‘should’ in the Thorpes’ reaction to Catherine’s 
refusal deny the potential for an outcome other than the one that they desire, 
and Austen’s use of italics indicates the author’s wish to emphasise the pressure 
under which the Thorpes are placing Catherine, and thereby to indicate the 
significance of Catherine’s continued resistance. It is additionally noteworthy 
that Austen uses the words ‘must’ and ‘should’ so emphatically here, since 
modern psychotherapeutic interventions frequently involve examinations of 
the nature and effects of people’s past and present experiences of ‘must’ and 
‘should’ messages in their interactions with others. In the interests of enhancing 
an individual’s degree of autonomy, therapeutic processes often seek to enable 
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individuals who have a tendency to respond in a passive way to such forms of 
aggressive communication to work towards the adoption of more autonomous 
assertive responses, such as those demonstrated by Catherine Morland.245  
One might give the Thorpes the benefit of the doubt at this point and 
consider that perhaps they are not aware of the disturbing effect that their 
aggressive approach will have on Catherine. However, when Isabella sees that 
‘Catherine was distressed, but not subdued’, her lack of empathy becomes 
evident. Despite Catherine’s plea for Isabella not to urge her further, ‘The same 
arguments assailed her again; she must go, she should go, and they would not 
hear of a refusal.’ The word ‘assailed’, the repetition of Isabella’s ‘must’ and 
‘should’, and ‘they would not hear of a refusal’, all effectively conjure a sense of 
a relentless onslaught that Catherine continues to withstand. Then, suddenly, 
Austen instigates a shift in the focus of the argument as Isabella continues: ‘“It 
would be so easy to tell Miss Tilney that you had just been reminded of a prior 
engagement, and must only beg to put off the walk till Tuesday”’ (I:13, 98). It is 
now clear that, to this point, Isabella has understood the central question 
underlying the dispute to be whether Catherine is willing to sacrifice Eleanor’s 
good opinion. Isabella perceives that Catherine is not prepared to do this and so 
she changes tack. She presents Catherine with a solution whereby she could 
postpone the walk, and at the same time keep on good terms with Eleanor by 
offering a perfectly reasonable, albeit untrue, explanation. Again, Catherine 
displays the clear and direct style that is characteristic of assertive 
communication. In three short, succinct statements, she states that she would 
not: ‘No, it would not be easy. I could not do it. There has been no prior 
engagement’ (I:13, 98). Catherine’s response makes it clear that Isabella has 
been mistaken. For Catherine, the altercation has not been primarily about her 
commitment to the arrangement she has made with Eleanor and her fear of 
losing Eleanor’s approval of her should she renege on that commitment. Rather, 
the dispute has addressed Catherine’s deeper commitment to herself and to her 
own core values, one of which is honesty. 
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Up to this point, we have observed Catherine withstand Isabella’s 
straightforward aggression and her misguided suggestion that Catherine make 
a dishonest excuse to Eleanor. Now Isabella confronts Catherine with passive-
aggression as she disingenuously flatters Catherine, declares her love for her, 
and calls upon Catherine’s loyalty to those whom Catherine herself loves. 
Isabella does so: 
in the most affectionate manner; addressing her by the most endearing 
names. She was sure her sweetest, dearest Catherine would not seriously 
refuse such a trifling request to a friend who loved her so dearly. She 
knew her beloved Catherine to have so feeling a heart, so sweet a temper, 
to be so easily persuaded by those she loved.  
Isabella’s exaggerated flattery shows that she is fully aware of the potential 
seductiveness of this appeal. As I discuss earlier in the current chapter and 
elsewhere in this thesis, people’s need for the approval of others is a powerful 
factor in their decision-making processes and their behaviour. In the passage 
cited above, Isabella explicitly raises the friendship between herself and 
Catherine to the level of a loving relationship with the intention to provoke 
greater anxiety and fear of loss within Catherine if she were to continue to deny 
Isabella. Further, Isabella declares her perception of Catherine’s ‘feeling’ nature 
and sweetness on the assumption that Catherine would submit to Isabella’s will 
and prioritise her good opinion. Still Catherine does not give in: ‘Catherine felt 
herself to be in the right, and though pained by such tender, such flattering 
supplication, could not allow it to influence her’ (I:13, 98). Here again, Austen 
emphasises the autonomy of Catherine’s position. Catherine feels that she is 
right, and it is her own view of herself and her need to sustain her own 
approval of herself that motivates her, over and above the need for the good 
opinion and approval of others, even of those who declare themselves to be 
‘beloved’ of her.  
Austen’s note that Catherine was ‘pained’ by Isabella’s approach is 
important here. Throughout the interactions that I discuss above, and over the 
course of the further challenges that Catherine comes to face from both Isabella 
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and John Thorpe, and even her brother, Austen is careful to remind the reader 
that it is difficult for Catherine to resist those challenges. She states of 
Catherine, ‘At one moment she was softened, at another irritated; always 
distressed, but always steady’ (I:13, 100). In the previous chapter of the novel, 
Austen’s parodic portrayal of the situation in which Catherine finds herself and 
her tearful state on her ‘pillow strewed with thorns and wet with tears’ at the 
end of the day is entertaining and amusing (I:11, 89). Here, however, while one 
may detect an element of the Gothic romance within the scene, Austen 
straightforwardly attributes a clearly identifiable psychological strength to 
Catherine that marks her as genuinely heroic in an everyday human sense.246 
Catherine’s determined resistance would be unremarkable if it was easy to be 
‘steady’ in these circumstances. It is heroic because it is so difficult to achieve. 
As the conflict continues to unfold, Austen shows her heroine battling to protect 
and maintain her autonomy in the face of mounting pressure, even to the point 
of escape from physical restraint. From a psychotherapeutic perspective, I 
observe how the psychological insight that informs Austen’s portrayal of the 
increasing difficulty of Catherine’s predicament matches, with near-exact 
precision, the interactional elements that a modern-day psychotherapist might 
anticipate. In the discussion to follow, I continue to identify and discuss these 
elements.  
When Isabella’s appeal to Catherine’s need for her love and approval 
proves to be unsuccessful, Austen writes that Isabella then tries ‘another 
method’ (I:13, 98). With these two words, Austen subtly and succinctly 
demonstrates that Isabella is motivated by neither a loving care for Catherine, 
nor a genuine desire for Catherine’s company.  If there had been any doubt up 
to this point, Austen now makes it entirely apparent that what Isabella needs is 
simply to gain control over Catherine, and thus to win the battle. The next 
‘method’ that Isabella employs to this end is to accuse Catherine of neglect, of 
having ‘“grown cold and indifferent”’, and of causing her to feel ‘“cut […] to the 
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quick”’ (I:13, 98). This passive-aggressive ploy is intended to drive Catherine 
into compliance through guilt, and fear of disapproval. When this fails too, 
Isabella attempts yet another strategy. As Austen expresses it, she ‘applied her 
handkerchief to her eyes’ (I:13, 99). The author clearly intends her readers to 
realise, by her description of Isabella’s action without reference to feeling, that 
Isabella is not genuinely upset or weeping, she is simply employing yet another 
passive-aggressive technique. In contrast, Catherine’s pain and distress are 
authentic, yet she remains firm. Just as the character of Catherine embodies 
empathetic assertiveness, Isabella’s character constitutes the essence of 
aggression in both the pure and passive forms of that behaviour. 
However, the most challenging test, and therefore the most revealing of 
the degree of Catherine’s self-aware autonomy, comes about when Catherine’s 
brother, James, intervenes. At this point, although Catherine has begun to 
suspect Isabella’s motives, James is in thrall to Isabella and does not see 
through her artifice. Unable to bear Isabella’s apparent tearfulness, James 
challenges Catherine firstly with: “‘I shall think you quite unkind, if you still 
refuse.”’ Difficult as it has been for Catherine to remain firm in her refusal in the 
face of Isabella’s criticism and manipulation, from a psychotherapeutic view 
this intervention from her truly beloved brother must be even more difficult to 
bear.  
Austen’s own perception of this is evident too as it is only in relation to 
James’ comments that the author reveals explicitly the fear of loss of approval 
in Catherine when she states that Catherine is ‘anxious to avoid his displeasure’ 
(I:13, 99). James’ statement also triggers for the first time a response from 
Catherine other than the straightforward demurral with which she has 
countered Isabella’s efforts. However, this is not to surrender and agree to 
change her arrangement with Eleanor, but again in the spirit of empathetic 
assertiveness, to suggest a compromise plan that would satisfy all concerned. 
The other characters shout down this proposal and submit Catherine to further 
passive-aggressive ‘supplications’ and aggressive ‘reproaches’, which Catherine 
continues to resist. James then declares: ‘“I did not think you had been so 
obstinate, Catherine [...] you were not used to be so hard to persuade; you were 
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once the kindest, best-tempered of my sisters.”’ (I:13, 99 and 100) With this, 
James reinforces his threat to withdraw his approval from his sister, and still 
Catherine maintains her position:  
“I hope I am not less so now,” she replied, very feelingly; “but indeed I 
cannot go. If I am wrong, I am doing what I believe to be right.” (I:13, 100) 
Within this brief response, Austen shows Catherine’s autonomy to be 
exceptionally well-developed as she clarifies all the distinct aspects of the 
character’s sense of self, and of her self-efficacy and self-esteem. Catherine’s 
reply reveals that her autonomy does not rest on a conviction that what she is 
doing is right. She is determined to do what she believes to be right and is 
prepared to take responsibility if she is wrong. Catherine demonstrates also 
that her actions do not, and will not, depend upon another person’s view of her. 
She will do what she believes to be right even if that leads her brother to think 
her unkind. Finally, and most notably, Catherine recognises that, if she is a kind 
person, her determination to hold fast to her values does not negate that 
kindness, nor does it transform her from a person who is ‘kind’, into a person 
who is ‘obstinate’, even if the values called into play require that she declines to 
act in accordance with the wishes of other people. From a psychotherapeutic 
point of view, Catherine’s ability to persist in her refusals while simultaneously 
maintaining her self-perception as a kind and good-hearted person is a 
remarkable and sophisticated achievement.247 
It is unusual to apply the term ‘sophisticated’ to Catherine Morland. In 
1882, Margaret Oliphant enumerated all of the qualities of Catherine that would 
be noted, with varying points of focus, by later critics of the character. Oliphant 
describes Catherine as, ‘a picture of delightful youth’ with her ‘simplicity, 
absurdity, and natural sweetness’, however, she notes also ‘the fine instinct 
which runs through (Catherine’s) simplicity’. Oliphant observes further that, 
while Austen ‘makes that innocent creature ridiculous’, still Catherine is ‘never 
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wrong in instinct and feeling, notwithstanding all her amusing foolishness.’248 
While critics acknowledge a certain degree of honesty and sense of self in 
Catherine, they seem commonly to express this perception either with a tone of 
gentle amusement in view of the character’s overarching naiveté or 
‘foolishness’, or, as Mary Lascelles suggests, with an intimation of tension 
between Catherine’s naiveté and her courage and sense of self. Of course, 
Catherine is naïve in terms of the way that she engages with the intricacies of 
urbane social intercourse. Nevertheless, I perceive self-aware autonomy to be 
Catherine’s singular characteristic, and it is in this sense that I view the 
character of Catherine to be far more sophisticated than her worldly co-
characters, and in a way that is far more important.249  
It is significant that Austen took such pains to articulate and illustrate 
Catherine’s autonomous nature in such specific and careful detail. The 
strategies that James, and Isabella and John Thorpe employ are those that any 
of Austen’s readers may experience or have experienced and, given people’s 
strong need for approval in general, most often with less ability to resist and 
stand their ground than they will perceive Catherine to possess. As they read 
they may compare the way that Catherine handles the situation in which she 
finds herself with the way in which they themselves would feel and respond in 
similar circumstances, and perhaps begin to think about how they would wish 
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to resolve such conflict in the future. They may develop an intention to 
repudiate the kinds of manipulative behaviour displayed by the Thorpes and 
James, and proceed instead to allow other people to make their own choices 
according to their own desires and values. This is a learning process for the 
reader and, whether or not Austen intended it to be, possibly even a therapeutic 
one.  
In the Introduction to this thesis, I reflect on my perception that Austen’s 
writing may engender a therapeutic transformation in the reader by ‘intangling’ 
them in characters’ situations and dilemmas rather than by delivering lessons 
through more didactic means.250 The fact that Austen unfolds the scene in 
question almost in real time suggests that she intended readers to feel 
emotionally involved while Catherine experiences the event. Catherine’s 
tension and distress increase so gradually and intensely that by the time she 
finally breaks free from her companions the reader can hardly help but 
experience great relief with and for her. It is through the deep engagement with 
this scenario that Austen’s technique induces that readers’ self-awareness may 
be enhanced, and their behaviour affected accordingly. One may observe the 
same method of ‘intangling’ in Mansfield Park as Fanny Price maintains her 
refusal to marry Henry Crawford in the face of multiple appeals, aggressive 
threats and passive-aggressive ploys over the course of six chapters.251 This 
lengthy exposition extends from the moment of Henry’s proposal to her after 
having informed her of his efforts in the interests of her brother’s promotion, 
thus passive-aggressively ‘conferring an obligation, which no want of delicacy 
on his part could make a trifle to her’, to Sir Thomas Bertram’s final aggressive 
‘medicinal project upon his niece’s understanding’, that of sending her back to 
her parents’ home in Portsmouth where ‘a little abstinence from the elegancies 
and luxuries of Mansfield Park, would bring her mind to a sober state’.252 
Therapeutic intent or otherwise on Austen’s part notwithstanding, the 
possession or otherwise of self-aware autonomy and concomitant issues of 
communication and relationships with other people are clearly important 
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aspects of human psychology and behaviour for Austen, and one that she 
seemingly wished readers to explore and consider in great depth and detail.  
In my analysis above of Catherine Morland’s behaviour, I illustrate ways 
in which Austen reveals Catherine’s high level of personal autonomy through 
both the words and the actions of the character, and I draw attention especially 
to Catherine’s verbal self-reflection in this respect. This element of Austen’s 
portrayal is significant from a psychotherapeutic perspective since a person’s 
autonomy is not necessarily discerned most effectively by the scrutiny of a 
person’s behaviour, but rather through insight gained into the intent or internal 
psychological process that underlies that behaviour.  
My primary focus in the next two sections of this chapter is on Pride and 
Prejudice, with particular attention to Charlotte Lucas and Lady Catherine de 
Bourgh. I propose that my reading of Charlotte and Lady Catherine contributes 
to existing critiques with a more nuanced, and in some respects quite different 
interpretation of these two characters. From an empathetic and non-
judgmental psychotherapeutic viewpoint, Charlotte emerges as a character 
whose ultimate contentment rests on her high level of self-aware autonomy in 
spite of her apparent submission to external pressures, while Lady Catherine, 
who imposes social conventions on others and demands the submission of 
others to her own will, manifests all of the painful inner discomfort and anxiety 
that a Rogerian therapeutic approach would predict from one who lacks 
autonomy. Thus, I perceive each of these characters to be both more complex in 
themselves and more important to the psychological impact of the novel as a 
whole than commentators have so far recorded. I begin with my analysis of 
Charlotte in the following section.  
3.2. Charlotte Lucas marries Mr. Collins 
If an individual’s actions were to be judged to be autonomous only when the 
individual behaves contrary to external expectations and demands, then it is 
easy to identify Elizabeth Bennet’s refusal to marry Mr. Collins, against all 
social, economic and maternal pressure to accept him, as an autonomous act. In 
the same light, Charlotte Lucas’ acceptance of Mr. Collins would be evidence of 
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Charlotte’s heteronomy since her decision is apparently motivated purely by 
social and economic considerations, regardless of her own personal lack of 
attraction to or affection for him. Such an evaluation of the heteronomous 
nature of Charlotte’s actions is supported to some extent by Austen’s use of free 
indirect speech to produce a near-authorial comment on marriage as ‘the only 
honourable provision for well-educated young women of small fortune’ (I:22, 
138). It is not only economically pragmatic for Charlotte to accept Mr. Collins, it 
is also the only socially morally correct course of action for Charlotte to take. 
The pragmatism of Charlotte’s engagement to Mr. Collins is the focus of Ruth 
Perry’s discussion of the implications of the marriage with regard to the 
necessity for Charlotte to engage in sexual relations with a husband whom she 
neither desires nor even particularly likes. Perry concludes that, while one 
might abhor Charlotte’s decision on the grounds of the presumably unwelcome 
sexual element of the marriage, since Elizabeth Bennet finds her friend to be 
surprisingly content at Hunsford,  ‘we are not allowed to imagine that Charlotte 
Lucas has allowed her “excellent understanding” to lapse.’253 There is no 
implication here that, over and above Charlotte’s pragmatism, her decision to 
marry Mr. Collins is an autonomous one. However, from Perry’s viewpoint, the 
comfortable outcome for Charlotte of the marriage justifies the means and 
vindicates the character’s intelligence.  
Other critics have cast a less forgiving light on Charlotte’s seeming lack 
of autonomy. For example, Mudrick categorises Charlotte as one of Austen’s 
‘simple people’ who lack self-awareness and are incapable of choice. As a result, 
Mudrick judges the character’s decision to accept Mr. Collins to be degrading.254 
In a similar vein, Wendy Craik writes that ‘Charlotte’s marriage to Mr. Collins 
shows that her moral sense is deficient’, and describes the character as an 
‘acute and rational person warped into moral irresponsibility […] by 
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materialism’.255 Katie Trumpener goes as far as to see Charlotte as a tragic 
figure, identifying the character as an exemplar of ‘the understated, 
unsentimental thread of tragedy in Austen’s work: […] married to a fool to be 
married at all’.256 A yet more condemnatory critique of Charlotte is presented 
by Tiffany Potter who draws on Seth Grahame-Smith’s portrayal of Charlotte as 
a stricken zombie in his novel Pride and Prejudice and Zombies to illustrate her 
perception of the character.257 She writes: 
Austen’s most heartbreaking depiction of marriage […] has always been 
that endured by Charlotte Lucas, who accepts a marriage to the 
obsequious social striver Mr. Collins because she knows that she has a 
social script to follow, and she dares to imagine for herself ‘only a 
comfortable home’. […]. Charlotte’s sacrifice to unmentionable social and 
economic demands is reconsidered in Grahame-Smith’s adaptation where 
Charlotte marries Collins because she knows that she has been ‘stricken’ 
and will soon become ill herself. With nothing to lose, Charlotte chooses to 
combine the metaphorical death-in-life of an obviously bad marriage with 
the literal living death of a zombie.258 
Grahame-Smith’s depiction of Charlotte’s loss of her dignity and even of her 
humanity in her marriage to Mr. Collins is gross and disgusting, and Potter 
considers his description of the character’s gradual decay to be a metaphor that 
aptly reflects her view of Charlotte as a woman who is ‘bound by conventions of 
conduct: what can be done and said and what cannot’, and who subjects herself 
to a loveless marriage for purely economic and socio-political reasons.259  
More recently, Woodruff Smith presents a similar, albeit less 
disturbingly illustrated view of Charlotte’s apparent heteronomy in the light of 
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a nineteenth-century ‘map of respectability’ which ‘regularly favours the route 
of moral autonomy over economic rationality when the two are clear 
alternatives’.260 From this point of view, Smith perceives that Austen portrays a 
lack of respectability in Charlotte as the character prioritises the attainment of 
financial security over adherence to autonomous choice, while Elizabeth Bennet 
remains respectable by virtue of her refusal to do likewise. Smith further 
reflects on the incorporation in the nineteenth century of the ideal of self-
respect within the concept of respectability, and concludes that Charlotte 
sacrifices her self-respect as well as her morality and respectability in her 
acceptance of Mr. Collins. In this regard I note Smith’s comment on Charlotte’s 
fear that she will lose the good opinion of Elizabeth, ‘whose rejection of 
Charlotte would injure her self-regard’, all of which serves to magnify the 
character’s loss of morality and sense of self-worth.261 
As I state above, Austen’s reference to marriage as ‘the only honourable 
provision for well-educated young women of small fortune’ lends some weight 
to critiques which perceive Charlotte as heteronomous, and a reading from a 
psychotherapeutic perspective would concur with critics’ assumption that a 
marriage choice based on heteronomous motivations would be likely to result 
in unhappiness for the character (although, as I clarify below, not with their 
consequently negative judgements on the character’s morality or worth). Yet, 
economic practicality and social morality are not the only reasons that Austen 
gives for Charlotte’s actions. Austen identifies another motivating factor behind 
the character’s acceptance of Mr. Collins: Charlotte states, ‘“I am not romantic 
you know. I never was.’ With these two brief statements the author shows that 
the character is acting entirely with self-awareness and in accord with her own 
nature and values. Charlotte continues with, ‘“I ask only a comfortable home”’ 
(I:22, 140). There is no suggestion in her concise explanation that she would 
take the same step to attain her desired home even if her nature had been 
romantic. Therefore, for me, Charlotte’s brief statement reveals the character’s 
decision to be an autonomous one. I should re-emphasise at this point the 
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central principle of the non-judgmental approach within modern-day 
psychotherapy, which holds that there is no measure of moral worth attached 
either to autonomy or to the lack of autonomy. Rather, the value of autonomy 
lies in the psychological wellbeing that the autonomous state confers on an 
individual, and in the potential for personal development that the self-
awareness inherent within the autonomous state enables for the individual. As I 
proceed to clarify my views on the self-aware autonomy that I identify in the 
character of Charlotte, and the importance that I perceive Austen to attach to it, 
my intention is not to defend the character’s moral standing on account of her 
autonomy, but to illuminate further the aspects of modern psychotherapeutic 
conceptions with which Austen’s character portrayals resonate. 
There are two key points that I would highlight with respect to the issue 
of Charlotte Lucas’ autonomy. The first relates to Woodruff Smith’s reflection 
cited above on Charlotte’s fear of losing Elizabeth’s approval of her, since this 
would ‘injure her self-regard’. Certainly, Austen states that for Charlotte, ‘The 
least agreeable circumstance in the business, was the surprise it must occasion 
to Elizabeth Bennet, whose friendship she valued beyond that of any other 
person’, and furthermore that Charlotte realises that Elizabeth would be likely 
to judge her harshly (I:22, 138). However, I perceive a distinct parallel between 
the way in which Austen illustrates Charlotte’s autonomous response to this 
dilemma and the author’s demonstration of Catherine Morland’s autonomy 
during the carriage-ride refusal scenario that I explore, above. Austen registers 
Charlotte’s discomfort at the potential loss of Elizabeth’s affection just as she 
notes Catherine’s distress in response to the disapproval of her friends and 
brother. However, like Catherine, Charlotte’s resolve remains firm. In the face of 
Elizabeth’s outrage, even though Charlotte experiences ‘a momentary 
confusion’, she quickly composes herself, and carefully and concisely attempts 
to reassure Elizabeth. Again, like Catherine, Charlotte knows her own nature, 
she knows what her own values are, and she will sacrifice neither to gain the 
approval of another person, not even that of her dearest friend. By this reading, 
Charlotte’s fear is not that Elizabeth’s disapproval will undermine her self-
regard, but that it will damage the close relationship between them. Far from 
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indicating Charlotte’s heteronomy, the fact that the character experiences such 
an anxiety and still maintains her position attests to the strength of her 
autonomy.262  
The second point that I observe with regard to Charlotte’s autonomy is 
the voice in which Austen relates the self-awareness that underpins that 
autonomy. I note above that Austen presents the socio-economic justifications 
for Charlotte’s acceptance of Mr. Collins in the near-authorial voice of free 
indirect speech. However, when Charlotte discloses to Elizabeth the news of her 
engagement, both Charlotte and Elizabeth are focused on the central concern of 
Charlotte’s individual personal happiness. In this context it is in direct speech 
that Austen expresses Charlotte’s assertion that she is not and never was 
romantic. This produces a more alive and intimate conveyance of Charlotte’s 
personal self-knowledge, and the self-aware and self-evaluative autonomy that 
drives her behaviour, and the reader may gauge the congruence of her 
reflections by attending to both verbal and non-verbal cues at first hand. The 
composed, articulate and self-assured way in which Charlotte tells Elizabeth of 
her wishes and intent substantiates a key point of this scene which is that the 
outward appearance of conformity of Charlotte’s decision does not negate the 
fact that Charlotte’s acceptance of Mr. Collins’ proposal to her is a self-aware, 
autonomous choice on her part.  
Despite the clues to Charlotte’s self-aware autonomy that I discuss 
above, for the most part critics interpret Charlotte’s choice as heteronomous 
and conclude that therefore the character deserves pity, censure, or both. The 
role of Elizabeth as a mediator of response to Charlotte’s marriage suggests that 
Austen not only expected this reaction, but also intended to elicit responses of 
this kind from her readers so that she might lead them to explore the subtler 
aspects of autonomy. My view here is that Austen employs the character of 
Elizabeth to illustrate, and thus to model, a gradual shift in response to 
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Charlotte’s course of action from appalled disgust to a more open-minded and 
non-judgmental acceptance. To begin with, Elizabeth persists in her conviction 
that Charlotte has ‘sacrificed every better feeling’ despite Charlotte’s 
reassurance that her decision is comfortably in line with her own personality 
and desires (I:22, 141). Elizabeth is able to comprehend Charlotte’s acceptance 
of Mr. Collins only from the perspective of her own personal value system at 
this point. Elizabeth herself would have to sacrifice her feelings in order to 
marry Mr. Collins, thus, regardless of Charlotte’s measured and dignified 
explanations, Elizabeth cannot help but see her friend as having disgraced 
herself.  I observe that Elizabeth’s initial reactions are reflected in Tiffany 
Potter’s patent resistance to Charlotte’s clear statement of her natural wish for 
a home. Where Charlotte states, ‘“I ask only a comfortable home”’, Potter reads 
that a comfortable home is all that Charlotte ‘dares to imagine for herself’, as I 
quote above. Interestingly too, in the 2005 cinematic adaptation of Pride and 
Prejudice, the character of Charlotte states “We can’t all afford to be romantic” 
in place of Austen’s “I am not romantic you know”.263 In each of these examples 
the distortion of Austen’s words and meaning negates the author’s actual 
depiction of Charlotte as autonomous in ways that bring to mind Freudian 
defence mechanisms such as denial and projection.264  
Austen then employs two strategies to direct Elizabeth towards a view of 
Charlotte that recognises the autonomy of that character’s actions, and to 
encourage Elizabeth to take a less self-centeredly judgmental view of her friend. 
First, Jane Bennet counters Elizabeth’s complaints about Charlotte’s behaviour 
with: ‘“My dear Lizzie, do not give way to such feelings as these. You do not 
make allowance enough for difference of situation and temper.”’ As Jane 
continues to refer to Charlotte’s ‘prudence’ and ‘steady character’ she indicates 
clearly that, from a different perspective, Charlotte has abandoned nothing of 
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her own character in her acceptance of Mr. Collins (II:1, 153).265 Like Catherine 
Morland who remains sweet-tempered even though she refuses to capitulate to 
her brother and friends, Charlotte remains ‘sensible and intelligent’ 
notwithstanding her apparently misguided determination to marry Mr. Collins 
(I:5, 19).266 Then, Elizabeth visits Charlotte at Hunsford and finds that her 
friend is surprisingly ‘cheerful’. She is struck by ‘Charlotte’s evident enjoyment’ 
of the comfort of her home, and finally is brought to ‘meditate upon Charlotte’s 
degree of contentment, to understand her address in guiding, and composure in 
bearing with her husband, and to acknowledge that it was all done very well’ 
(II:5, 177-179). Elizabeth is persuaded at last that she was mistaken to evaluate 
Charlotte’s decision in the light of her own wishes and values. The change in 
Elizabeth’s attitude is firmly established for the reader when she encounters 
Mr. Darcy’s slightly mocking tone in relation Mr. Collins’ good fortune in his 
marriage to Charlotte. Now Elizabeth practically echoes her sister Jane’s earlier 
reflections on Charlotte’s marriage as she credits Charlotte with “excellent 
understanding”, and acknowledges without reservation: “She seems perfectly 
happy […], and seen in a prudential light, it is certainly a very good match for 
her" (II:9, 200). Thus, Austen brings Elizabeth’s views around a full circle. In so 
doing she not only restores Elizabeth’s faith in her friend for story-telling 
purposes, she also communicates to her readers a process whereby they might 
re-calibrate their own understanding of the meaning of autonomy with the 
recognition that the expression of autonomy may take different yet equally 
valid forms.  
I turn now to Lady Catherine. From a Rogerian perspective, in complete 
contrast to Charlotte, Lady Catherine is deeply heteronomous despite her 
ability to impose her will on others and, as a result, experiences a needful 
anxiety which is quite the opposite of Rousseau’s ‘sentiment of contentment, 
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and of peace which alone would suffice to make this existence sweet and 
dear’.267 
3.3. Lady Catherine de Bourgh: authority without autonomy 
Lady Catherine has most commonly been viewed as a character whose 
unpleasant nature is exaggerated to the point of caricature for comic effect. It is 
also noteworthy that critiques of Lady Catherine invariably link the character 
with Mr. Collins, as though the two were to be seen as a comic duo with neither 
having any individual significance. For example, Reginald Farrer writes, ‘As for 
Mr. Collins and Lady Catherine, whom some are ungrateful enough to call 
caricatures, it must definitely be said that they are figures of fun, indeed’, 
rescued from becoming farcical by ‘a youthful sheer delight in their absurdity 
which gives to them an objective ebullience not to be found in more richly 
comic studies such as Lady Bertram and Mr. Woodhouse’.268 For Reuben 
Brower, Lady Catherine and Mr. Collins are ‘the ‘fools’ which […] are 
indispensable for any piece of fiction.’269 Somerset Maugham also views the two 
characters closely together in his observation: ‘There is perhaps some 
exaggeration in the drawing of Lady Catherine and Mr. Collins, but to my mind 
little more than comedy allows’, as does D. W. Harding whose observation: 
‘Lady Catherine in the shrubbery, forbidding Elizabeth to become engaged to 
Darcy, touches the heights of caricature for us’ follows immediately from his 
note about readers’ view of Mr. Collins as a caricature.270 Thus, critiques have 
commonly regarded Lady Catherine and Mr. Collins to be practically 
inseparable as comedic characters.  
Where Lady Catherine has attracted significant attention in her own 
right, the character’s ‘caricatured’ imperiousness and arrogance has been 
interpreted as a manifestation of Austen’s dislike and contempt for her. Harding 
is one critic who takes this view as he writes: ‘one of Jane Austen’s most 
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successful methods is to offer her readers every excuse for regarding as rather 
exaggerated figures of fun people whom she herself detests and fears.’271 This is 
the stance taken by Gilbert and Gilbar in their highly influential work.272 For 
these critics, women writers in the nineteenth century presented ‘Images of 
enclosure and escape, fantasies in which maddened doubles functioned as 
asocial surrogates for docile selves’.273 In other words, according to Gilbert and 
Gubar, women writers of that time wished to rebel against the patriarchy 
within which they were confined and to express their rebelliousness both in the 
act of writing and in its content; however they could not escape their deeply 
ingrained willingness to conform to the expectations of the patriarchal 
paradigm and their desire to be accepted within it.  
Gilbert and Gubar observe that, to resolve this dissonance, these writers 
invoked female characters who could behave in ways, or take positions, that 
were contrary to those permitted by society, and at the same time rendered 
those characters either hateful or ‘maddened’ by their aberrance from the social 
norms. Further, they placed these aberrant characters in immediate 
juxtaposition with other female characters whose position and demeanour 
would educate and encourage women readers to accept their allotted place and 
duties. Gilbert and Gubar place Austen firmly in this category of women writers, 
along with Maria Edgeworth, as they state: 
We can see Austen struggling after Northanger Abbey to combine her 
implicitly rebellious vision with an explicitly decorous form as she follows 
Miss Edgeworth’s example and writes in order to make herself useful, 
justifying her presumptuous attempts at the pen by inspiring other 
women with respect for the moral and social responsibilities of their 
social duties.274 
With regard to the character of Lady Catherine in particular, they write:  
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Opposed to the very basis of patriarchy, the exclusive rights of male 
inheritance, Lady Catherine quite predictably earns the vilification always 
allotted by the author to matriarchal power. She is shown to be arrogant, 
officious, egotistical and rude as she patronises all the other characters in 
the novel.275 
Thus, Gilbert and Gubar perceive the unpleasantness of Lady Catherine’s 
personality to be an inevitable and foreseeable outcome of Austen’s wish to 
express her own subversive opinions and her simultaneous compulsion to be 
seen to reject and deride those views and thus engender similar detestation and 
scorn for the character in her readers.276   
It would be difficult to disagree with Gilbert and Gubar’s portrayal of the 
way in which Lady Catherine behaves towards others throughout Pride and 
Prejudice. However, I would argue that the nature of Lady Catherine’s character 
is not intended to reflect any deep distaste on Austen’s part for Lady 
Catherine’s matriarchal power, nor is it a warning against it on a social gender-
political level. I perceive that the way that Austen conducted her own life, and 
the reactions that she ascribes to her key female characters to the constraints of 
their dependence on men, make her frustration with the enforced submission of 
women to patriarchal dominance quite evident. Thus I concur with 
commentators such as Margaret Kirkham, who consider that Austen was in 
sympathy with the ‘rational feminism of the Enlightenment’ and that she shared 
many of the political views expressed by Mary Wollstonecraft.277 However, I 
observe an even greater affinity between Austen and Wollstonecraft in the 
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context of Wollstonecraft’s rebuff to Rousseau’s caution that to increase 
women’s knowledge and intellectual rigour would diminish their power over 
men.278 Of her intention for the empowerment of women by means of 
education, Wollstonecraft states, ‘I do not wish them to have power over men, 
but over themselves’.279 In this brief and simple assertion, Wollstonecraft 
presaged a (if not the) core principle underlying modern models of personal 
development: self-empowerment.  
For Wollstonecraft, the primary requirement for all effective human 
functioning and interaction, for men as well as for women, in both intimate and 
wider social relationships, was mastery over the self. I consider that this is the 
position that Austen takes, as Auerbach reflects:  
Without ever writing a line of political treatise as Wollstonecraft had 
done, Austen offers an equally revolutionary argument for educating both 
men and women to be whole human beings. Only then can they live in 
harmony and fulfilment.280  
From this perspective, the nature of Lady Catherine does not manifest a 
complex internal psychological conflict within Austen, but rather serves to 
illustrate Austen’s perceptions of what it means to be a ‘whole human being’, 
and what it means not to be so.281 To understand Austen’s characterisation of 
Lady Catherine, we need therefore to look in a more subtle and nuanced way at 
how Austen portrays the character herself on an individual level. From this 
viewpoint, in Lady Catherine, Austen shows that it is possible to possess a great 
capacity to wield authority and at the same time entirely to lack individual 
personal autonomy. The pain that Lady Catherine experiences at the end of the 
novel, and, I would suggest, throughout, attests to Austen’s perception that, 
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over and above any social, economic or political constraints, it is lack of 
personal autonomy, to not be ‘whole’ as a human being, that has the potential to 
lead to the greatest emotional suffering. In this I observe again a close affinity 
between Austen’s recognition of the centrality of autonomy to a person’s well-
being and the conceptualisation of autonomy that underpins Rogers’ Client-
Centered model of psychotherapy.  
I begin my discussion of Lady Catherine in this respect with an overview 
of the way in which Austen introduces the character. I then look more closely at 
Lady Catherine in comparison with Elizabeth Bennet, since Austen’s 
juxtaposition of the two characters serves to illuminate Lady Catherine’s lack of 
autonomy and the implications of that state on her psychological and emotional 
well-being. It is interesting also to examine Lady Catherine’s behaviour in the 
light of that of Mr. Darcy. Although the two characters occupy comparable social 
and economic positions, they conduct themselves very differently. This serves 
to demonstrate that Lady Catherine’s behaviour is a function of her character 
rather than of her status.  
Austen makes the nature of Lady Catherine’s character clear to the 
reader long before she appears in person. Austen introduces both Lady 
Catherine and Mr. Collins in Chapter 13 of Volume I in the letter from Mr. 
Collins to Mr. Bennet in which he proposes his first visit to the Bennet family at 
Longbourn. Mr. Collins describes himself in this letter as ‘distinguished by the 
patronage of the Right Honourable Lady Catherine de Bourgh’ (I:13, 70). Mr. 
Collins’ use of Lady Catherine’s full title makes very clear to readers as well as 
to the Bennets that Mr. Collins considers that deference is due to Lady 
Catherine on account of her elevated social status. Mr. Collins strongly implies 
that this deference should be paid to Lady Catherine not only by himself but by 
others too when, without an enquiry as to the suitability of the dates of his visit 
to those upon whose hospitality he will impose, he assures Mr. Bennet that he 
will be able to visit Longbourn without any inconvenience as Lady Catherine 
would not object to his absence. Thus, along with the residents of Longbourn, 
readers are left in no doubt that Lady Catherine is a woman who is accustomed 
to having her wishes considered as the highest priority.  
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This impression is reinforced when Mr. Collins arrives on the scene and 
refers repeatedly to the grandeur of Lady Catherine’s estate, to the demands 
that she places on his conduct, and to his unquestioning obedience to her every 
whim. He interprets Lady Catherine’s dominance over him as ‘affability and 
condescension’, and uses the words ‘condescended to’ to describe his 
impression of Lady Catherine’s interference in personal aspects of his life. It is 
interesting to highlight the ambiguity in the eighteenth-century meaning of the 
words ‘condescension’ and ‘condescend’ with which Austen patently engages 
here. Johnson defines ‘condescension’ as ‘voluntary humiliation, descent from 
superiority’, and ‘to condescend’ as ‘to depart from the privileges of superiority 
by voluntary submissions, to sink willingly to equal terms with inferiors, to 
soothe with familiarity’.282 Clearly, these are the admirable characteristics that 
Mr. Collins wishes to convey of Lady Catherine. However, in Rambler, the word 
‘condescensions’ is used to denote a belittling and disdainful attitude, and thus 
to convey the more pejorative connotation of the word that we now nearly 
exclusively apply to the term.283 Thus, with the use of just this one concept, 
Austen simultaneously substantiates the unpleasantness of Lady Catherine, and 
shows Mr. Collins to unwittingly establish her officiousness while he himself is 
oblivious to it. This multi-layered presentation of the two characters informs 
my closer analysis of the relationship between them later in this section. For 
now, I note that it is not until Chapter 6 of Volume II that we eventually meet 
Lady Catherine during Elizabeth Bennet’s first visit to Charlotte and Mr Collins 
in the company of Charlotte’s young sister Maria and father, Sir William Lucas. 
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The length of time that Austen takes to develop our sense of Lady 
Catherine is significant. The author deliberately and carefully establishes the 
character’s reputation over sixteen chapters through further accounts delivered 
by Mr Collins, and by Mr Wickham who describes the character to Elizabeth as 
‘dictatorial and insolent’ (I:16, 94). Thus, at the point at which the party 
approaches Rosings, we are not surprised to read that, ‘Such formidable 
accounts of her Ladyship, and her manner of living, quite frightened Maria 
Lucas’, and that, ‘When they ascended the steps to the hall, Maria’s alarm was 
every moment increasing, and even Sir William did not look perfectly calm’.284 
However, as the group arrive at the entrance to the house, Austen turns our 
attention to Elizabeth and, through that character’s reactions, suggests that a 
response other than apprehension might be more appropriate:  
Elizabeth’s courage did not fail her. She had heard nothing of Lady 
Catherine that spoke her awful from any extraordinary talents or 
miraculous virtue, and the mere stateliness of money and rank, she 
thought she could witness without trepidation. (II:6, 182) 
Here the purpose of Austen’s prolonged build-up of readers’ impression of Lady 
Catherine becomes clear. The wry humour that Austen conjures with the 
juxtaposition of the words ‘mere’ and ‘stateliness’, and of both with the word, 
‘trepidation’, provides a succinct and effective counterpoint to the anxiety that 
the author has developed over the several chapters that lead up to this visit. 
The amusement with which Austen explains Elizabeth’s position makes any 
unquestioning fearfulness of Lady Catherine due solely to her wealth and 
hierarchical position appear, after all, to be a little ridiculous. It is natural to be 
drawn into a sense of awe when confronted with a vision of such immense 
wealth and so apparently powerful a character. Yet Austen plainly questions the 
validity of that almost instinctive response when, within the same sentence, she 
compares the respect-worthiness of external signifiers of status such as ‘money 
and rank’, with that of internal qualities which she clearly deems to be more 
worthy of appreciation and esteem.  
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That said, I perceive that the few lines in question above have yet greater 
significance in that they represent more generally that which we know and do 
not know about Lady Catherine. We know what Lady Catherine is. She is an 
aristocrat, the owner of a great estate, and she is domineering and imperious in 
her relationships with others. All that we know of the character is in the 
externality of the trappings associated with her status and the arrogance of her 
behaviour which is sanctioned by that status. However, we do not know who 
Lady Catherine is. We have no insight into that character’s internal 
psychological or emotional life. We have no idea of what Lady Catherine thinks, 
or of what moves her, or what her personal values are. We have very clear 
revelations of what others think of her and how they respond to her ‘stateliness 
of money and rank’, however we do not know how she herself feels about that 
social and financial position or about the way she interacts with others. We 
have no sense of the degree to which her style of living and manner accord with 
the person she wishes herself to be and how she would like to live her life, as 
distinct from the impression and impact that her lifestyle and behaviour make 
on other people. For example, we are given no indication as to whether Lady 
Catherine derives any inner joy from the luxurious comforts of her home, or 
even just pleasure from her beautiful surroundings that is independent of other 
people’s admiration or appreciation of them. 
There is no question that it is to the inner psychological workings and 
emotionality of her major characters that Austen gives her readers greatest 
access.285 However, in this thesis I illustrate ways in which Austen explores and 
reveals the deeper natures of more minor characters, for example, up to this 
point, Mrs. Dashwood and Charlotte Lucas, and in a later section of this chapter, 
Persuasion’s Mrs. Smith. So the fact that we have no knowledge at all of the 
internality of a character whose presence is palpable throughout the novel is 
meaningful, and, for me, is the crux of Austen’s presentation of, and purpose for, 
the character of Lady Catherine. The lack of any mention of Lady Catherine’s 
inner self suggests an absence, or at least a paucity of self-generated inner life.  
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Of course, absence of evidence is not evidence of absence, and the fact 
that we are not shown any aspect of Lady Catherine’s experience of her own 
inner self cannot necessarily be taken as evidence that she has no such 
experience. However, as I demonstrate below, as we watch Lady Catherine in 
action and observe the character’s relationship with herself and her 
interactions with other people at first hand, it becomes clear that the reason we 
know only what, and not who Lady Catherine is, is because Lady Catherine 
herself knows only what but not who she is. She understands herself only in 
relation to her social status and other people’s responses to her insofar as these 
relate to her position of authority and her ability to impose her will upon them. 
This characterisation is the essence of Mudrick’s and Woloch’s assessments of 
Lady Catherine. However, from a psychotherapeutic perspective, Lady 
Catherine’s dependency for her sense of self on other people’s validation of her 
social and economic position renders her neither simple as Mudrick suggests, 
nor comic, as Woloch observes.286 The psychotherapeutic view would agree on 
principle with Mudrick that we cannot submit Lady Catherine to moral 
judgement because she is unaware and has ‘only the illusion of choice’.287 
However, this does not mean that she does not warrant more in-depth analysis 
of any kind.288 Secondly, from a Rogerian Client-Centered standpoint, Lady 
Catherine’s lack of self-aware autonomy is hardly cause for amusement as this 
heteronomous state will be a constant source of anxiety and unhappiness for 
her. I demonstrate below the ways in which Austen shows this to be the case for 
Lady Catherine and explain how this leads to my reading of the character as one 
who should engender an element of compassion, much as her superficial 
behaviour is amusingly distasteful. First, I explore some aspects of Austen’s 
presentation of Elizabeth as an autonomous individual since Elizabeth’s rich 
internal life serves to highlight Lady Catherine’s lack of the same.  
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Austen provides the reader with many examples of situations in which 
Elizabeth’s emotions and behaviour emerge as expressions of her own self-
generated, deeply held values, in other words, as manifestations of her 
autonomy. These are revealed most powerfully in her refusals.289 However, it is 
equally possible to perceive the vitality and influence of Elizabeth’s inner self by 
noting other occasions on which Austen shows her, in different ways, to act 
determinedly according to her personal values rather than yield to the 
expectations of others or seek to win their approval.  
We see it, for example, when Elizabeth receives news that Jane Bennet 
has become ill during Jane’s first visit to Netherfield Park. This scene highlights 
the authenticity of Elizabeth’s love and care for Jane and her desire to act on 
those feelings, regardless of the impression such action may make on others. 
The author describes Elizabeth as ‘feeling really anxious’, and it is this emotion 
that arises purely from Elizabeth’s internal and individual valuing of her sister, 
and nothing else, that drives her resolution to walk to Netherfield to see Jane. 
The exchange that results between Elizabeth and her mother serves to establish 
Elizabeth’s primary motivation, not only in this instance but in all others that 
follow in the novel:  
“How can you be so silly”, cried her mother, “as to think of such a thing, in 
all this dirt! You will not be fit to be seen when you get there.” 
“I shall be very fit to see Jane—which is all I want.”  
This succinct interaction delineates perfectly the distinction between 
heteronomous and autonomous responses to a situation. Mrs Bennet’s 
attention is entirely upon how other people might judge the condition of 
Elizabeth’s dress when she arrives at Netherfield dishevelled from her walk. 
The drive to conform to socially imposed standards is deeply ingrained in Mrs 
Bennet. The word ‘cried’ indicates the immediacy and forcefulness of her 
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reaction so that her response seems to be almost a reflex as opposed to a 
conclusion arrived at after due consideration. Further, she does not accuse 
Elizabeth of silliness for her proposal to walk to Netherfield, but for the mere 
thought of it. Mrs Bennet is unable even to conceive of the possibility that a 
strong inner desire to attend to a beloved sister who is suffering might 
appropriately overwhelm any possible concerns of social impropriety and 
therefore give rise to a plan that apparently fails to take those societal 
considerations into account.  
In contrast, Elizabeth’s focus is simply on her awareness of what matters 
to her, and on what she needs to do to satisfy the demands of her own values, 
regardless of what others might think and in complete contravention of the 
demands of social decorum. Her intent and reason could not be more clearly 
expressed. Yet even her father who, we are given to understand, has a close 
affinity with and admiration for Elizabeth, seems to struggle to be convinced 
that she can be wholly genuine in her apparent disregard for the good opinion 
of the residents of Netherfield Park: 
“Is this a hint to me, Lizzy,” said her father, “to send for the horses?” 
“No, indeed. I do not wish to avoid the walk. The distance is nothing when 
one has motive; only three miles. I shall be back by dinner.” (I:7, 35) 
Two suppositions underlie Mr Bennet’s question. The first is that Elizabeth 
must, in truth, harbour some concern for the state of her appearance upon her 
arrival at Netherfield. The second is that she would find it difficult or awkward 
to ask directly for the use of the horses, and so might use an outrageous 
proposal to walk there in the hope that her father would guess her actual wish 
to ride. However, by virtue of her autonomous nature, Elizabeth is able, even 
compelled, to state her values and intentions in a straightforwardly honest and 
open manner. It is in this way that Elizabeth determines her own actions, and 
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assertively communicates her thoughts, emotions and decisions throughout the 
novel.290  
One is able equally to perceive the vitality of Elizabeth’s inner self when 
one notices the many things that she relishes and enjoys in her life, and her 
tendency towards ironic amusement for which her self-awareness is a pre-
condition. Austen begins to reveal this aspect of Elizabeth’s character very early 
on in the novel where we see her able to find a comical element in Mr. Darcy’s 
rejection of her as a dance partner. Elizabeth responds to Mr. Darcy’s 
ungracious remark, ‘“She is tolerable; but not handsome enough to tempt me”’, 
by recounting the event ‘with great spirit among her friends; for she had a 
lively, playful disposition, which delighted in any thing ridiculous’ (I:3, 12. 
Austen’s italics). Austen ascribes the liveliness, playfulness and delight in the 
ridiculous to Elizabeth’s ‘disposition’. They are not characteristics displayed to 
achieve a particular response from other people, nor are they dependent upon 
the reactions of others. They are simply demonstrations of what she is like; that 
is, of who she is. Elizabeth is offended by the rudeness of Mr. Darcy’s comment 
and consequently determines never to dance with him again. However, she has 
a strong selfhood and a clear awareness of that selfhood, neither of which is 
shaken by Mr. Darcy’s opinion of her. This leaves her free to reflect on his 
behaviour as ridiculous, and thus to be amused by it.  
We see Elizabeth’s inner nature revealed again towards the end of her 
prolonged stay at Netherfield during her sister Jane’s illness. While Elizabeth, 
Mr. Darcy, Miss Bingley and Mrs Hurst are out walking, it becomes apparent 
that there will not be room for all four on the path. An alternative route is 
suggested by Mr. Darcy and the four could have continued together along this 
way, however at this point Austen removes Elizabeth from the party. Thus the 
author creates an opportunity for readers to watch Elizabeth while she is 
completely alone, and thereby to note the independence of the character’s inner 
emotional life from the observance or opinion of others. Austen writes of 
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Elizabeth, ‘She then ran gaily off, rejoicing as she rambled about, in the hope of 
being at home in a day or two’ (I:10, 58). With no-one there to witness her, 
Elizabeth feels and expresses to herself a joyfulness that springs purely from 
within as she anticipates the coming together of all that she personally holds to 
be of greatest value: the well-being of her family, and her home. The examples 
that I provide are just two of many instances in which, as John Wiltshire states 
of Elizabeth, ‘her smiles invite the reader into a private self-hood’. As I note 
above, it is Elizabeth’s ‘private self-hood’ that allows her to smile, even when 
the immediate circumstances surrounding her are not as she would wish, and 
in the absence of any validation of her worth from other people.291  
In direct contrast to this, we have no idea what might lead Lady 
Catherine to feel happiness, comfort or contentment with something simply 
because it is in harmony with her internally derived needs, desires or values. 
Indeed, Wiltshire identifies just one example of Lady Catherine smiling, that is, 
‘Lady Catherine’s “gracious” or obviously condescending smile when her guests 
dutifully praise her hospitality’.292 This is Wiltshire’s reflection on an episode 
during the first visit by Elizabeth and her companions to Rosings Park. In this 
scene, the group are seated for dinner in the company of Lady Catherine who 
‘seemed gratified by their excessive admiration, and gave most gracious smiles, 
especially when any dish on the table proved a novelty to them’ (II:6, 184). In 
less than one sentence, Austen illustrates and clarifies the sources of Lady 
Catherine’s motivation and gratification: the praise and admiration that she 
receives from the others, and the discomfiture of others that reinforces her 
sense of superiority over them. There is no suggestion that Lady Catherine’s 
guests enjoy the unfamiliar dishes that they are served, only that the dishes are 
unfamiliar to them, and it is from this that Lady Catherine takes her pleasure.293 
Graciousness is a manifestation of the desire, or at least the willingness, to be 
aware of the needs and feelings of other people, and to act according to that 
awareness to ensure their ease and comfort, and to enable them to maintain 
their own self-esteem. Gracious behaviour is thus the outward demonstration 
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of the inner qualities of humility and of empathy.294 Wiltshire’s use of inverted 
commas around the word ‘gracious’ clearly acknowledges Austen’s ironic 
implication that any appearance of grace in Lady Catherine is just that, an 
appearance, a superficial performance that reveals nothing of a congruent inner 
quality. Lady Catherine’s self-esteem is upheld by the diminishment of that of 
others, and her apparent graciousness is, in fact, a patronising form of 
condescension designed to achieve that effect.  
A useful comparison might be drawn here with the genuine grace with 
which Mr. Darcy invites Mr. Gardiner ‘with the greatest civility’ to fish on his 
Pemberley estate, ‘as often as he chose, […], offering at the same time to supply 
him with fishing tackle, and pointing out those parts of the stream where there 
was usually the most sport’ (III:1, 282). The words ‘gracious’ and 
‘condescending’ are noticeably missing from Austen’s presentation of Darcy’s 
interaction with Mr. Gardiner, and thus Mr. Darcy’s behaviour is portrayed with 
none of the ambiguity and consequent irony with which the author she 
describes Lady Catherine. Mr. Darcy opens his estate to Mr. Gardiner, not to 
impress or overawe the visitor with the immensity of the property and thus 
boost his own self-esteem, but to give pleasure to, and enhance the self-esteem 
of, his guest. Thus, Mr. Darcy’s graciousness is genuine, and no less so for being 
a product of the gradual development of his authentic, self-aware 
respectfulness towards others. 
Once we have met Lady Catherine in person, it is possible to monitor the 
numerous ways in which the character reveals the depth of her personal 
insecurity and dependence on others for her sense of self. Within the first few 
moments we learn that ‘She was not rendered formidable by silence; but 
whatever she said, was spoken in so authoritative a tone, as marked her self-
importance’ (II:6, 183). There are two aspects of this statement about Lady 
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Catherine that are notable. Firstly, there is an emphasis on the alternative to the 
authoritative tone with which Lady Catherine speaks. That is, silence. In a 
review of research into the roles of speech and silence in the development of 
inter-relational power dynamics, John Biguenet finds that power may be 
exercised by either. However, he concludes that ‘At the highest levels of 
authority, the latter may be preferred.295 If that is the case, there is a sense in 
which Lady Catherine’s ‘authoritative’ tone might actually undermine the 
command that she wishes her presence to establish. The difficulty with silence, 
however, is that it is open to different interpretations, and it seems that Lady 
Catherine is not sufficiently secure in her own selfhood to risk any such 
ambiguity.  
Again, comparison with the character of Mr. Darcy in this respect will 
illustrate the point. By and large, Mr. Darcy’s silence is taken to be a sign of 
arrogance and conceit, and there is undoubtedly some element of this involved. 
Darcy himself admits as much to Elizabeth when they are reconciled at the end 
of the novel. Yet, earlier he offers a different explanation for his manner to 
Elizabeth: ‘“I certainly have not the talent which some people possess,” said Mr. 
Darcy, “of conversing easily with those I have never seen before. I cannot catch 
their tone of conversation, or appear interested in their concerns, as I often see 
done”’ (II:8, 197). Thus it emerges that Darcy’s silence is, to some extent, the 
result of a form of social incompetence of which he himself is fully aware, and 
which leads him to appear to hold himself aloof. No-one else could know this 
without his explicit clarification, yet Mr. Darcy is secure enough in his 
knowledge of himself, and his position, to tolerate other people’s possible 
misapprehension of his conduct. Lady Catherine’s vocal insistence on her 
authority reveals her lack of the same strength of sense of self. 
Secondly, I note that Austen uses the phrase, ‘as marked her self-
importance’ rather than, ‘as marked her importance’. The term ‘self-
importance’ suggests feeling important as opposed to ‘importance’ which is 
indicative of being important. To feel important is dependent on the validation 
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of others. To be important is not. There is no question that Lady Catherine is 
important. She moves in social circles of great consequence and, within the 
novel’s social structure, she does have a position of responsibility towards, and 
influence over other people’s lives and livelihoods on her estate. While her role 
is greatly facilitated if those who are dependent on her are compliant with her 
decisions and instructions, the position that she holds is, in itself, not reliant on 
other people’s fearful and obsequious obedience. Yet this is what Lady 
Catherine needs for the nourishment of her sense of importance as a person; 
that is, to feel important. As the first visit to Rosings progresses, we watch Lady 
Catherine ceaselessly dominate the conversation and impose her will upon the 
others, giving her instructions and opinions ‘on every subject in so decisive a 
manner as proved that she was not used to have her judgement controverted’, 
even in matters concerning Charlotte’s management of her private household 
(II:6, 185). 
Lady Catherine’s overbearing imperiousness is patently clear and well-
documented. However, from my perspective, a careful analysis of the precise 
and subtle indicators of her characterisation is warranted since I perceive her 
to be as significant as the major characters whom critics have read more 
closely. This exploration is necessary also to illustrate my reading of Lady 
Catherine as a character who elicits, and I think is intended to elicit, some 
degree of compassion. From a Rogerian perspective, the character’s behaviour 
shows her to be so lacking in autonomy that she has developed barely any 
sense of self or inner resource that would enable her to attain any level of 
contentment, or even to maintain a degree of emotional equilibrium, in the 
absence of external validation. The foundation upon which she builds her 
emotional and psychological stability could be shaken at any moment because 
that foundation depends upon something over which she can never be 
completely in control: the thoughts, opinions and conduct of other people. From 
this viewpoint, Lady Catherine’s arrogant demeanour and constant demand for 
other people’s admiration and compliance is driven by persistent, deeply 
rooted fear: the fear that she would fall apart without these forms of 
substantiation from others. From a psychotherapeutic perspective, this state of 
184 
 
being is profoundly uncomfortable and the persistent quest for the ease of that 
discomfort from outside sources is exhausting. Thus, it is more disturbing than 
amusing to witness the manifestation of both the anxiety and the search for its 
remedy in Lady Catherine’s unremitting pursuit of attention and validation. 
This therapeutic standpoint highlights Austen’s portrayal of the 
relentlessness of Lady Catherine’s claims upon people’s recognition. For 
example, one observes the way that she is compelled to interrupt a 
conversation between Elizabeth and Colonel Fitzwilliam: ‘“What is that you are 
saying, Fitzwilliam? What is it you are talking of? What are you telling Miss 
Bennet? Let me hear what it is”’ (II:8, 194). Again, by contrast, Mr. Darcy is able 
to contain his own curiosity and remain silent. Shortly afterwards, Mr. Darcy 
himself and Elizabeth are interrupted by Lady Catherine ‘who called out to 
know what they were talking of’ (II:8, 197).296 She openly aggrandises her own 
appreciation of, and talents for, music: ‘“There are few people in England, I 
suppose, who have more true enjoyment of music than myself, or a better 
natural taste. If I had ever learnt, I should have been a great proficient”’, as well 
as the unrealised potential of her daughter, Anne. (II:8, 194). When she fails to 
have Elizabeth postpone her departure from Rosings with the Lucases, she 
cannot restrain herself from attempting to interfere with their perfectly 
adequately prepared travel arrangements, and thus to reassure herself that her 
knowledge and influence would be indispensable to the safety and comfort of 
their journey; ‘“Where shall you change horses?—Oh! Bromley, of course.—If  
you mention my name at the Bell, you will be attended to”’ (II:14, 235). The 
redundancy of Lady Catherine’s overbearing intrusion in this instance is subtly 
and amusingly implied when Elizabeth and the Lucases eventually find the two 
most scatter-brained and frivolous of the Bennet sisters already comfortably 
settled at the inn, and with a meal set out, without the need for recourse to any 
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reference to a connection with Lady Catherine. These are just a few of the many 
demonstrations of the efforts to which Lady Catherine is driven to maintain her 
sense of self. However, it is in the direct juxtaposition of Lady Catherine with 
Elizabeth Bennet that Austen most explicitly indicates Lady Catherine’s 
vulnerability.  
During the first substantial exchange between Elizabeth and Lady 
Catherine, we observe Lady Catherine’s shock as Elizabeth firmly expresses her 
own opinions, and she is so ‘astonished’ when Elizabeth, at least initially, 
declines to comply with her demands to know her age that ‘Elizabeth suspected 
herself to be the first creature who had ever dared to trifle with so much 
dignified impertinence’ (II:6, 187). Of course, it is for amusement that Austen 
extends the reach of Lady Catherine’s imperious authority beyond human 
beings to encompass all ‘creatures’, and then, shortly afterwards, even to the 
weather: ‘The party then gathered round the fire to hear Lady Catherine 
determine what weather they were to have on the morrow’ (II:6, 188). 
However, it is Lady Catherine’s insistence on having her own curiosity 
regarding Elizabeth’s age satisfied that is described as ‘impertinent’ rather than 
Elizabeth’s quite blunt refusal to provide the answer. Austen is clearly critical of 
Lady Catherine’s ungracious and judgmental interrogation of her new guest. 
Yet, in the disquiet that accompanies Lady Catherine’s reaction to Elizabeth’s 
direct and self-assured responses to her enquiries, the author also exposes Lady 
Catherine’s vulnerability: no-one has ever before refused, countered or 
questioned her, and it was always just a matter of time before the bedrock of 
her emotional security was shaken by someone such as Elizabeth. Lady 
Catherine’s reluctance to let Elizabeth go when she wishes to leave Hunsford 
suggests she has begun to develop a tolerance for another individual’s 
autonomy, to enjoy something other than unqualified admiration, and to 
experience that as something of a relief. However, the exchanges between Lady 
Catherine and Elizabeth at Rosings are only minor skirmishes. Lady Catherine’s 
intolerant aggression, driven by her vulnerability, comes powerfully and 
explicitly to the fore during the much more significant battle between the two 
characters in the garden at Longbourn.  
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Claire Tomalin says of the encounter between Lady Catherine and 
Elizabeth at Longbourn: ‘Not only is the scene intensely dramatic in itself, as 
every adaptor for stage and film knows; it also serves to keep the flag of 
excitement flying right to the end.’297 There are certainly substantial elements 
of both drama and excitement in the passage, and the confrontation between 
two individuals who have very different backgrounds, personalities and 
agendas is effective at the surface level of entertainment. However, at a deeper 
level within an engrossing dialogue between two fictional characters, I perceive 
Elizabeth and Lady Catherine to be symbolic representations of autonomy and 
heteronomy respectively. The form of the exchange that takes place between 
the characters, the ways in which each of them expresses herself, and the 
nature of the denouement of the argument, all perfectly model a Rogerian view 
of autonomy and heteronomy, and the ways in which each would be outwardly 
manifested.298 To paraphrase Elizabeth’s own reflections towards the end of the 
encounter, Lady Catherine insults and threatens Elizabeth personally, and her 
family, in every way possible to gain Elizabeth’s acquiescence to her demands. 
Yet Elizabeth does not respond in kind. She strongly challenges Lady 
Catherine’s manner and contentions, and questions the legitimacy of her 
interference, however she makes no attack on Lady Catherine at a personal 
level.  
One may compare, for example, Lady Catherine’s insults to Elizabeth: 
‘“Obstinate, headstrong girl! I am ashamed of you!”’ (III:14, 394), ‘“I expected to 
find a more reasonable young woman”’, (III:14, 395), and, ‘“Unfeeling, selfish 
girl!”’ (III: 14, 396), with Elizabeth’s criticism, not of Lady Catherine personally, 
but of her comments and behaviour: ‘“Allow me to say, Lady Catherine, that the 
arguments with which you have supported this extraordinary application, have 
been as frivolous as the application was ill-judged”’ (III:14, 395-396). Lady 
Catherine uses threats and emotional blackmail: ‘“You will be censured, 
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slighted, and despised, by everyone connected with him”’ (III:14, 394); ‘“You 
are determined to ruin him in the opinion of all his friends, and make him the 
contempt of the world”’ (III:14, 397); and, in desperation, ‘“Are the shades of 
Pemberley to be thus polluted?”’ (III:14, 396). In contrast, Elizabeth offers 
measured responses to the specific elements of Lady Catherine’s charges: 
‘“Whatever my connections may be,” […] “if your nephew does not object to 
them, they can be nothing to you”’, and, ‘“Supposing him to be attached to me, 
would my refusing his hand make him wish to bestow it on his cousin?”’ (III:14, 
395. Austen’s italics). Elizabeth also demonstrates a firm declaration of 
autonomous intent, in which she poses no threat to Lady Catherine, but simply 
states her commitment to her own happiness, ‘“without reference to you, or to 
any person so wholly unconnected with me”’ (III:14, 396). Elizabeth at no point 
attempts to compel or even persuade Lady Catherine to do other than that 
character chooses. Even at the height of Elizabeth’s distress as the 
confrontation concludes, she does not remonstrate with Lady Catherine to 
return into the house with her. When her mother questions her as to why the 
visitor did not come in, Elizabeth replies simply that, ‘“She did not choose it,” 
[…] “she would go.”’ (III:14, 397).  
At a superficial level it appears that Lady Catherine is the more 
commanding participant in the conversation by virtue of her wealth, position, 
and forcefulness. However, by the current reading, Elizabeth is the more 
powerful of the two from the very start. Crucially, it is during this encounter 
between Lady Catherine and Elizabeth that Austen brings Lady Catherine’s 
vulnerability explicitly to the reader’s attention, and she does so with 
meticulous precision. I refer to the moment at which Lady Catherine states: 
You are to understand, Miss Bennet, that I came here with the determined 
resolution of carrying my purpose; nor will I be dissuaded from it. I have 
not been used to submit to any person’s whims. I have not been in the 
habit of brooking disappointment.  
Elizabeth replies: ‘“That will make your ladyship’s situation at present more 
pitiable; but it will have no effect on me”’ (III:14, 394. Austen’s italics). It is the 
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word ‘pitiable’ that is important here. Notably, Elizabeth does not describe Lady 
Catherine as ‘pitiful’, which is a quality intrinsic to a person and an attribute 
certainly not applicable to Lady Catherine, but as ‘pitiable’, which indicates the 
potential response of another towards her. Lady Catherine intends her 
statement – that she is unused to facing contradiction and disobedience – to 
indicate her right to knowledge of, and authority over, Elizabeth’s personal 
affairs. In fact, it reveals her fundamental weakness. As I observe above, Lady 
Catherine’s equilibrium is founded on the compliance of other people and she 
has developed no resource to maintain it in the absence of that external 
validation. During the course of the confrontation in the garden, Lady Catherine 
gradually loses her equilibrium in the face of Elizabeth’s assertive refusal to 
comply, and, when Elizabeth and Mr. Darcy finally marry, her agony spills out 
into a letter so abusive that ‘for some time all intercourse was at an end’ (III:19, 
430). In the terms that I use earlier in this discussion, she falls apart. This has 
been an inevitable outcome for Lady Catherine since the moment we were first 
introduced to her in awestruck tones by Mr. Collins. James Wood writes: ‘It is by 
noticing people seriously that you begin to understand them; by looking harder, 
more sensitively, at people’s motives, you can look around and behind them, so 
to speak.’299 From a psychotherapeutic perspective, when one looks ‘around 
and behind’ Lady Catherine, one sees that Lady Catherine’s discomfort is not 
caused by Elizabeth’s contrary responses and actions. In fact, neither Elizabeth 
herself nor anything she does is the cause of Lady Catherine’s anguish. 
Elizabeth is simply the catalyst for the revelation of Lady Catherine’s fragility, 
and it is this fragility that leads, ineluctably, to the character’s emotional 
suffering. An analytic and empathic approach to Lady Catherine allows one to 
get a sense of the painful neediness that underlies and drives her overbearing 
behavior, and, in consequence, to feel compassion for her. 
As I explain in Chapter One of this thesis, self-aware personal autonomy 
is the central focus within all of the models of psychotherapy that inform this 
thesis. However, the different models take varying views on the way in which 
autonomy is developed and on the external expressions of autonomy and 
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heteronomy. In the section to follow I present my interpretation of Mary 
Crawford in relation to autonomy from the perspective of Eric Berne’s 
Transactional Analysis (TA) model of psychotherapy. 300  
3.4. The character of Mary Crawford from a TA perspective 
Mary Crawford is one of Austen’s most complex, multi-layered characters and 
this is reflected in certain critics’ observations. For example, Trilling finds on 
his first reading of Mansfield Park that:   
Mary Crawford is conceived—is calculated—to win the charmed 
admiration of almost any reader. She is all pungency and wit. […]. She is 
downright, open, intelligent, impatient. Irony is her natural mode, and we 
are drawn to think of her voice as being as nearly the author’s own as 
Elizabeth Bennet’s is.301 
However, Trilling’s perception of Mary changes upon the second reading of the 
novel, as he explains:  
on a first reading of Mansfield Park, Mary Crawford’s speeches are all 
delightful, they diminish in charm as we read the novel a second time. We 
begin to hear something disagreeable in their intonation: it is the 
peculiarly modern bad quality which Jane Austen was the first to 
represent—insincerity.302 
Comments by D. A. Miller likewise reflect the ambiguity of the nature of the 
character, and readers’ mixed responses to her. Miller writes of Mary that she is 
‘a self whose whereabouts (in every but the geographical sense) are in 
question’, and that ‘Our fascination with Mary Crawford springs from the 
absence of full terms to grasp her’.303 In the following discussion I illustrate 
how one may observe the character of Mary Crawford in the light of the 
structured explanatory framework of Eric Berne’s model of Transactional 
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Analysis (TA), and I demonstrate the way in which Berne’s concept of the ‘ego 
states’ enhances our reading of the character’s complex nature.  
To recap briefly, Berne’s TA model defines three separate ego states 
which constitute the elements of an adult’s personality: the Adult, the Child and 
the Parent. The Adult ego state relates to an individual’s present adult 
experience, while the Child and Parent ego states preserve vestiges of the 
individual’s past experiences. Thus, even in adulthood, a person retains aspects 
of their personality that were formed during their childhood. In communication 
with other people, the Adult ego state of an individual expresses autonomous 
thoughts and feelings which are congruent with their present-moment 
adulthood. An adult who is being influenced by their Child ego state may 
express neediness or dependency that is incongruent with their adulthood in 
order to gain parent-like attention in the form of comfort and guidance from 
others. Equally, an adult who is acting from their Child ego may behave 
mischievously, or they might take risks with their own safety, to attract 
attentive criticism or reprimand. An individual who is directed by their Parent 
ego state may scold, instruct, or comfort other adults as if those adults were 
children. It is important to re-emphasise the point that I make in Chapter One 
that no one of the ego states is wholly beneficial or entirely detrimental. The 
Adult ego state is necessary to enable an individual to analyse and evaluate 
objectively the situations that they encounter, and to function effectively 
according to their current needs. As I state in Chapter One, the Parent ego state 
holds capacities for nurturing others that may inform and enhance the adult’s 
ability to care for others, not least for their own children. Finally, the Child ego 
state brings spontaneity, playfulness and creativity and ‘charm’ to the 
individual’s personality.  
TA dissects communicative transactions between people to reveal the 
dominant ego state within each individual at any one time. In Chapter One, I 
provide an illustrative example of an analysis of transactions which involves an 
exchange between three women: Camellia who is provoked to tears by her 
Child ego, Holly who responds in her Parent ego state to comfort Camellia’s 
Child, and Rosita whose Adult ego remains dominant throughout the sequence. 
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In this section I explore a passage that highlights the operation of the Child ego 
state within Mary Crawford. From a TA perspective, the dominance of this ego 
state within Mary is the source of the character’s captivating appeal. However, 
it is also indicative of her vulnerability and lack of self-aware autonomy which, 
in turn, drive her tendency to be deceitful and manipulative.   
The transactions that I analyse here take place in exchanges between 
Mary, Fanny Price, Mrs. Grant and Edmund Bertram in the garden of the 
Parsonage, home of Mr. and Mrs. Grant.304 It is Autumn, and Mary and Fanny 
are seated together outside when Mrs. Grant and Edmund appear in the garden 
and approach them. As Edmund and Mrs. Grant draw near, Mary proposes to 
Fanny, ‘“Well, shall we join and disappoint them of half their lecture upon 
sitting down out of doors at this time of year, by being up before they begin?”’ 
(II:4, 246). This is a curious proposition. It assumes that two adults, Edmund 
and Mrs. Grant, would deem it appropriate to reproach another two adults, 
Mary and Fanny, for sitting outdoors in the cold weather. In fact, if it were to 
occur to Edmund and Mrs. Grant to contemplate Mary and Fanny’s actions at all 
in this regard, they would presumably suppose that the two grown women are 
as able as they would be themselves to determine whether it is wise to sit 
outside. One could imagine that Edmund and Mrs. Grant might give a telling-off 
to two children who have been warned not to sit out in the cold and who do so 
anyway because they do not have the maturity to take care of themselves, or 
because they wish to attract attention in the form of a reprimand. From this 
point of view, Mary’s proposal to Fanny places herself and Fanny figuratively in 
the position of such children, and Edmund and Mrs. Grant in the role of their 
parents.  
If the four characters had then met each other with conventional 
greetings, one could interpret Mary’s initial suggestion to Fanny as simply a 
playful comment which an adult might make in a light-hearted moment. 
However, when Edmund and Mrs. Grant arrive, rather than with any customary 
reception, Mary challenges them straight away with: ‘“Well,” […], “and do not 
you scold us for our imprudence? What do you think we have been sitting down 
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for but to be talked to about it, and entreated and supplicated never to do so 
again?”’ (II:4, 247). With these words Mary continues to adopt for herself and 
Fanny the position of children who need parent-like direction and protection, 
who deserve to be told off when they defy instructions and who must be 
implored not to put themselves in danger. It is the incongruity that Austen 
frames between Mary’s adulthood and the way in which the character appears 
to be determined to be treated as a child that invites an interpretation of Mary’s 
remarks to her friends from a TA perspective. Further, it is possible to observe 
a remarkable similarity between the ways in which Edmund and Mrs. Grant 
react to Mary’s exclamation and those that might be predicted and/or explained 
in TA terms.  
To begin with, a TA point of view would see Mary’s opening remark to 
Edmund and Mrs. Grant as a transactional stimulus which is an explicit demand 
for attention driven by Mary’s Child ego state. I note above that one would not 
expect Edmund and Mrs. Grant to scold or plead with two perfectly capable 
adults. Interestingly, it is clear that Mary herself does not expect this because 
she does not wait for it to happen. In TA terms, Mary’s Adult ego anticipates 
Edmund’s and Mrs. Grant’s likely approach appropriately. So, with her Child in 
control, Mary confronts Edmund and Mrs. Grant with their failure to castigate 
herself and Fanny before they have had a chance to say anything at all. One may 
compare Mary with Camellia who, in Berne’s case study, begins to cry in 
response to Rosita’s approach to her. Berne’s interpretation of Camellia’s 
behaviour is that Camellia’s Child needs to bring about the kind of reassurance 
that she might expect to receive from a consoling parent. Clearly, Mary is not 
looking for such comfort from Edmund and Mrs. Grant. On the contrary, she 
implicitly accuses them of neglect when they do not immediately ‘scold’ her and 
attend to her further with pleas and entreaties. If one keeps in mind children’s 
tendency to require attention even if that attention involves criticism or 
reprimand, then one can see that while Camellia’s and Mary’s methods differ, 
the impetus behind the behaviour is the same; that is the Child within each of 
them that craves attention.  
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There is an important difference between Mary and Camellia however. 
While Camellia’s crying is a spontaneous reaction to Rosita’s question, Mary 
tells Fanny what she is going to do. Thus, in effect, Mary reveals that her 
attempt to instigate a reaction from her companions is a consciously aware act 
in both senses of the word: action and performance. It is an act in the sense that 
it is an intentional piece of behaviour. It is also an act in the sense that it is a 
pretence. When Mary and Fanny entered the garden, they had no notion of 
sitting outside in order to provoke a rebuke from Edmund and Mrs. Grant, 
whose arrival they could not in any event have predicted. The appearance of 
Edmund and Mrs. Grant pushes Mary into her Child ego, and it is from her Child 
state that Mary disingenuously purports that concern and rebuke from Edmund 
and Mrs. Grant had been the two women’s intention. In the light of this analysis, 
TA would describe Mary as the ‘agent’ in initiating a ‘game’. Berne outlines 
many forms of the games that people play in their interactions with other 
people to satisfy their own psychological needs.305 The inter-relational 
dynamics invoked by Mary compare closely with the processes that are 
involved in the game that Berne calls ‘The Alcoholic’. The agent of this game is 
an alcoholic who brings about and then complains of the pain of a severe 
hangover in order to gain attention. The needs that drive this kind of behaviour 
arise from an individual’s vulnerable and dependent Child ego. As Berne 
explains, ‘The transactional object of the drinking, aside from the personal 
pleasures it brings, is to set up a situation where the Child can be severely 
scolded […] by any parental figures in the environment who are interested 
enough to oblige.’306 Berne’s word ‘oblige’ here emphasises the intentionality of 
the alcoholic’s conduct, and Berne’s term, ‘parental figures’, refers to adults 
whose Parent ego state will be triggered by the alcoholic’s self-damaging 
actions. Any adult whose Parent ego is open to be moved by the alcoholic’s 
vulnerable Child will either take the alcoholic to task, or soothe and nurse them. 
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If this happens, the agent of the game has achieved the ‘pay off’, which is the 
nurturing attention that they need.307 
The description of the ‘The Alcoholic’ game may be generalised to 
describe and explain the behaviour of people who engage in any form of 
conduct that brings about unpleasant or damaging consequences for 
themselves and then make their suffering apparent to other people. This was 
not Mary’s and Fanny’s intention when they decided to sit outside, however 
when Mary claims that it was, she exploits the dynamics that are codified with 
the ‘The Alcoholic’ game to achieve the same results. That is to elicit angry 
rebukes, or at least equally attentive defensive excuses and rationalisations, 
from the Parent egos of Mrs. Grant and Edmund in response to what is 
effectively an accusation of the neglect of their children. Sometimes an agent of 
the game is aware that their primary need is for attention, and they know that 
the way that they operate is geared to enable them to fulfil that need. It is the 
aim of TA in therapy to bring people to this point since the individual is then 
well placed to bring their Adult understanding to bear on their psychological 
needs, and to move towards the development of more mature psychological as 
well as physical independence, in other words, towards greater autonomy. 
Often however, and most usually at the start of therapy, the behaviour of the 
agent of such a game is compulsive. In other words, the individual cannot help 
but adopt these forms of behaviour because they are not aware of the 
underlying impetus for their actions. Mary Crawford falls into the latter 
category. Mary is not conscious that her approach to Edmund and Mrs. Grant 
emerges compulsively out of her need for attention even though her 
provocation of them is conscious and deliberate.     
If either Edmund or Mrs. Grant are, to use Berne’s phraseology, ‘parental 
figures […] who are interested enough to oblige’, and thus respond to Mary’s 
transactional stimulus as she intends, then Mary would have achieved the ‘pay 
off’ in TA terms. Edmund obliges fully, and I examine his responses shortly. I 
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look first at Mrs. Grant however, and note that one may detect the influence of 
the Parent ego in that character’s initial reply: ‘“They cannot have been sitting 
long,” [...] “for when I went up for my shawl I saw them from the staircase 
window, and then they were walking”’ (II:4, 247). While the Adult is certainly 
present in Mrs. Grant’s rational assessment of the facts of the situation, there is 
a suggestion that she would have reproached Mary and Fanny if she had 
noticed that the two women had been sitting for longer. Mary then expresses 
further dismay at her companions’ apparent lack of concern in an attempt to 
exacerbate their feelings of guilt as she exclaims: ‘“Upon my word,” […] “you are 
two of the most disappointing and unfeeling kind friends I ever met with! […]. 
You do not know how much we have been suffering, nor what chills we have 
felt!”’, and she directs her indictment of neglect more directly towards Mrs. 
Grant: ‘“you, Mrs. Grant, my sister, my own sister, I think I had a right to alarm 
you a little.”’ However, Mary’s exaggeration of her own and Fanny’s suffering, 
and the hint of emotional blackmail in her inappropriate attribution of 
responsibility for the women’s welfare to Mrs. Grant, has the opposite effect 
from that which Mary intended. Rather than drawing Mrs. Grant’s Parent out 
further, Mary’s pointed denouncement triggers Mrs. Grant’s Adult, which is in 
firm command as Mrs. Grant states: “Do not flatter yourself, my dearest Mary. 
You have not the smallest chance of moving me. I have my alarms, but they are 
quite in a different quarter”’. In her Adult state Mrs. Grant is aware of her real 
personal concerns – the survival of her plants in the frost and the likelihood 
that a turkey she wishes to serve to her husband might not keep until she is 
ready to dress it – and like Rosita with Camellia in Berne’s example, she 
declines to continue to play the game with Mary. Mrs. Grant’s refusal to play the 
Parent to Mary’s Child pulls Mary eventually into her own Adult ego state, and 
the Child ego’s foot-stamping resentment with which Mary makes that enforced 
transition is evident in the sarcastic and dismissive tone in which she counters 
Mrs. Grant: ‘“The sweets of housekeeping in a country village!” said Miss 
Crawford archly. ‘“Commend me to the nurseryman and the poulterer”’ (II:4, 
247-248).308  
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While Mary fails to win the ‘pay off’ in her game with Mrs. Grant, she is 
more successful with Edmund. To begin with, there is an undeniably parental 
tone in Edmund’s defensive rationalisation: ‘“Perhaps I might have scolded,” 
said Edmund, “if either of you had been sitting down alone; but while you do 
wrong together I can overlook a great deal”’ (II:4, 247). Here Edmund conveys 
the impression that he feels himself to be in a paternal position in relation to 
Mary and Fanny, that he therefore has the authority to judge the women’s 
behaviour, in this instance as ‘wrong’, and that he has the right to choose to 
overlook their misbehaviour. All of this indicates that Edmund’s response 
comes from his Parent ego. The spuriousness of the excuse that Edmund gives 
here for his apparent lack of care, that the two women were together, reveals 
that he had given the matter no rational consideration at all in his Adult state. 
When pushed into his Parent state, he had simply been compelled to invent any 
explanation with which to vindicate his alleged dereliction of duty. One is 
reminded of Holly who rushes to comfort Camellia in Berne’s case study. As 
with my comparison between Mary and Camellia, the form of Edmund’s 
reaction to Mary is not the same as that of Holly’s to Camellia because the 
stimulus is different. However, the source of both Edmund’s and Holly’s 
responses is the same: the nurturing Parent within each of them. Shortly 
afterwards Edmund appears to feel compelled to present a more convincing 
excuse for having allegedly neglected his child: ‘“And really,” added Edmund, 
“the day is so mild, that your sitting down for a few minutes can be hardly 
thought imprudent. Our weather must not always be judged by the Calendar. 
We may sometimes take greater liberties in November than in May”’ (II:4, 247). 
Edmund’s continued attempts to exonerate himself from guilt even though he 
has done nothing wrong show that he is more open to Mary’s provocations than 
Mrs. Grant, and there is even a hint of desperation in Edmund’s latter extended 
rationalisation. This is not surprising as Edmund is in thrall to Mary and thus 
more sensitive to her needs and keen to gratify her.   
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A reading from a TA perspective enables a deeper and more subtle 
understanding of the character of Mary Crawford. Mary is self-absorbed and 
attention-seeking throughout the novel. Her communications are frequently 
ambiguous and therefore confusing and unsettling to the other characters. She 
is also, by turns, charming, engaging, deceitful and manipulative. She is 
complicated. However, in response to Miller’s observations cited above, one 
may locate precisely the character’s ‘whereabouts’ and provide the exact terms 
by which to describe and define her through Transactional Analysis. Many of 
the qualities and propensities that characterise Mary originate from the Child 
ego within her personality. As such, these features are all symptomatic of an 
individual who has not fully realised the transition from dependent childhood 
to independent and autonomous adulthood.309 From a therapist’s viewpoint, 
Mary’s behaviour emerges compulsively, and thus not at all from an 
unwillingness but rather an inability to act according to her needs and values in 
a mature, straightforward and assertive way. She is so occupied in the 
protection of her Child ego and in her efforts to meet its needs that she loses 
sight of, or perhaps more accurately, does not develop fully formed values as an 
adult.310 For myself, as a therapist, the ability to locate the ‘whereabouts’ of 
Mary’s character in this way makes her all the more intriguing. Primarily 
however, my interest in presenting an analysis of Mary from a TA point of view 
is to illuminate another aspect of Austen’s penetrating observation of the 
complexities of human psychology, and of the subtle ways in which the 
personality of an individual may be discerned through careful observation of 
their interactions with other people.  
For the concluding section of this chapter, I turn to Persuasion and the 
character of Mrs. Smith. It is fitting that I focus a final brief discussion in the 
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thesis on this character. It was in my reading of Persuasion, and particularly the 
first encounters with Mrs. Smith, that I became aware of a close resemblance 
between modern psychotherapeutic approaches and Austen’s perceptions of 
psychological processes and the means by which psychological well-being 
might be maintained.  
I refer to Anne Elliot’s initial two visits to Mrs. Smith.311 Prior to the first 
meeting, Anne is informed of the many hardships that Mrs. Smith has endured 
over the previous two years, and therefore Anne understandably expects that 
her former school friend will be ‘suffering’ (II:5, 165). However, during the first 
of the two visits under discussion, Anne is surprised to find her friend ‘cheerful 
beyond her expectation’ in spite of her past difficulties, her present significantly 
reduced living circumstances and her compromised physical health (II:5, 166-
167). On the second visit, Anne discovers how Mrs. Smith achieves her 
contentment. At this point, the explanation that Austen gives for Mrs. Smith’s 
mental well-being is one that all but exactly matches that which a modern-day 
psychotherapist would be likely to express in terms of the concept of 
‘resilience’. Further, Austen ascribes to Mrs. Smith the use of a number of 
methods that bear a remarkable resemblance to techniques and strategies that 
are encompassed within the repertoire of CBT for the avoidance of stress and 
depression and the maintenance of resilience.312  
Although the term ‘resilience’ was in use in the context of human 
psychology toward the end of the eighteenth century, Austen does not use the 
word itself and, of course, the CBT terms that would now be applied to the 
practices that aim to develop an individual’s resilience would not have been in 
the author’s vocabulary.313 Therefore, as has been the case throughout this 
thesis, it is with Hayles’ notion of constrained constructivism and Richardson’s 
qualified identification of resonances in mind that I illustrate striking 
similarities between current psychotherapeutic views on resilience and 
                                            
311
 Persuasion, II:5, 165-170. 
312
 See Chapter One of this thesis for full explanations of CBT and the therapeutic techniques 
followed by CBT practitioners. 
313
 See Persuasion, p. 378, note 4 for references to the use of the word in relation to mental states by 
Thomas Holcroft (1792) and William Godwin (1799). 
199 
 
Austen’s description of Mrs. Smith’s psychological flexibility and the measures 
by which she achieves that.  
3.5. The resilience of Mrs. Smith 
The OED defines resilience as ‘the quality or fact of being able to recover quickly 
or easily from, or resist being affected by, a misfortune, shock, illness, etc.; 
robustness; adaptability’. This is the meaning which is generally applied to the 
term, albeit with slight variations, in the field of psychotherapy. In my own 
publication, Coaching for Resilience, I draw a distinction between ‘strength’ and 
resilience:  
[Resilience] is not the same as strength, which enables you to remain 
calm, unaffected, or ‘stony’ in the face of life’s difficulties and challenges. 
Rather it is that you are moved emotionally by those difficulties — you 
feel pain, anxiety, fear, sadness, even despair — then can recover to your 
original state. 
I observe further that, ‘At its best resilience enables a person to recover to an 
even more resourceful state’.314 My own delineation of resilience as both 
distinct from, and more conducive to mental well-being than mere strength, is 
mirrored by the specificity of Austen’s revelation that Mrs. Smith’s unexpected 
contentment  
was not a case of fortitude or of resignation only.—A submissive spirit 
might be patient, a strong understanding would supply resolution, but 
here was something more; here was that elasticity of mind. (II:5 167. My 
italics).  
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I note Austen’s careful differentiation between ‘fortitude’ and ‘elasticity of 
mind’ in this quotation. Further, where I propose that resilience involves the 
willingness to experience emotional discomfort in response to difficulty, Austen 
writes, ‘There had been a time, (Mrs. Smith told her), when her spirits had 
nearly failed.’ Here, Austen explicitly shows that Mrs. Smith has not been 
unaffected by events, and thereby reinforces her view that it is flexibility rather 
than strength of mind that enables an individual to withstand the negative 
psychological effects of traumatic experiences, and not only to find some 
contentment within challenging circumstances, but to develop greater personal 
resource. In Mrs. Smith’s case, this is revealed by her ability, to do ‘a little good 
to one or two of the very poor families in this neighbourhood’ despite her own 
unfortunate circumstances. (II:5, 168)315  
Having identified a state of mind analogous to modern perceptions of 
resilience, Austen proceeds to enumerate the elements that enable Mrs. Smith 
to achieve that state: a ‘disposition to be comforted’, along with the ‘power of 
turning readily from evil to good, and of finding employment which carried her 
out of herself’, all of which are recognisable as abilities, or strategies, that are 
now encompassed within CBT. (II:5 167) Austen illustrates the ‘disposition to 
be comforted’ in Mrs. Smith’s reflections on her present state of health in 
comparison with her condition when she first arrived in Bath: ‘Then, she had 
indeed been a pitiable object—[…]. She had weathered it however, and could 
truly say that it had done her good. It had increased her comforts by making her 
feel herself to be in good hands’ (II:5, 167-168). Within my explanation of CBT 
in Chapter One of this thesis I define the ‘permanent thinking style’ which is 
manifested in people who believe that any suffering they experience will be 
unremitting, and they struggle to perceive change or improvement in their 
circumstances. People who have this thinking style also tend to predict a 
                                            
315
 The psychotherapeutic reading that I present here offers a very different interpretation of Mrs. 
Smith’s ‘elasticity of mind’ from those of, for example, Laura Mooneyham White, Romance, 
Language, and Education in Jane Austen’s Novels (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998), and John 
Wiltshire, Jane Austen and the Body, ‘The picture of health’ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1992). Mooneyham White views Mrs. Smith as a ‘Christian Stoic’; Mooneyham White, p. 156. 
Wiltshire relates Mrs. Smith’s ‘elasticity’ to ‘Emma’s spirit’, that is, to an interest and eagerness to be 
involved in the lives of other people which he views as a ‘moral anomaly, that offends almost as much 
as it charms, but that ensures her survival, even in the most defeating conditions of personal 
deprivation; Wiltshire, p. 18.  
201 
 
negative future on the basis of negative experiences in the past. In contrast, 
people with a ‘flexible thinking style’ understand that everything changes and 
that one cannot ground one’s expectations for the future on things that have 
happened in the past. Mrs. Smith models the flexible thinking style. She 
acknowledges the misery of her pain and isolation on arriving at Bath, and then 
is fully aware of the change, limited though it is, and welcomes the relief when it 
comes.  
In Chapter One I identify two further forms of dysfunctional thinking 
styles that Aaron Beck defined within his concept of the ‘cognitive triad’: the 
personal style, in which people attribute negative events to their own actions or 
to some defect within themselves, and the pervasive style, through which 
people view everything and everyone in their lives in a pessimistic light. There 
is no indication of either of these styles in Mrs. Smith’s account of her situation. 
Although we learn later in the novel that she was at least partially complicit in 
the destructive financial extravagance of her husband in company with Mr. 
Elliot, she is able to make appropriate attributions for her present situation to 
external factors, such as Mr. Elliot’s betrayal of her husband’s trust with regard 
to the executorship of his will. In addition, while ‘She had seen too much of the 
world, to expect sudden or disinterested attachment any where’, she 
nevertheless is receptive to the empirical evidence that at least one specific 
person, her landlady, ‘would not use her ill’. From a CBT perspective, the 
‘flexible’, ‘external’ and ‘specific’ thinking styles that Mrs. Smith adopts 
contribute to her resilience and are protective against more intractable 
unhappiness or even depression.316  
To illuminate this perspective, one might compare Mrs. Smith’s cognitive 
styles to those of Anne’s sister, Mary. Of this character, we learn that:  
While well, and happy, and properly attended to, she had great good 
humour and excellent spirits; but any indisposition sunk her completely; 
she had no resources for solitude; and […] was very prone to add to every 
other distress that of fancying herself neglected and ill-used. (I:5, 39) 
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In this excerpt one is able to observe the pervasive thinking style. CBT 
practitioners are very attentive to the appearance of words such as ‘any’ or 
‘every’ which do not allow for exceptions. Here we see that, for Mary, if any one 
thing is amiss then everything, whether real or imagined, is wrong, and she 
therefore easily descends into gloom. Later, when Mary is called upon to miss 
an evening at Kellynch Hall to take care of her sick child with Anne, she 
declares: ‘“So! You and I are left to shift by ourselves, with this poor sick child—
and not a creature coming near us all evening! I knew how it would be. This is 
always my luck!”’ (I:7, 60) Here Mary demonstrates a perfect example of the 
pervasive style (“always”) combined with personal attribution (“I knew how it 
would be” because it is always “my luck!”). Mary has so many of the advantages 
that Mrs. Smith lacks, yet she is unable to perceive and appreciate any of them 
when she is disappointed in a single respect, and she is frequently frustrated 
and miserable as a result. The contrast that Austen draws between Mary and 
Mrs. Smith is entirely consistent with a CBT view that, by virtue of her 
dysfunctional cognitive processing, Mary is far more vulnerable to unhappiness 
and mental ill-health than Mrs. Smith.317 
In the remainder of Austen’s reflection on Mrs. Smith’s resilience, I note 
two techniques that I identify as behavioural even though they involve a 
transformation of thought processes. The first is the ‘power of turning readily 
from evil to good’. This strategy certainly is a feature of the flexible and specific 
cognitive styles that Mrs. Smith adopts. However, the words that Austen uses, 
‘turning readily’, bring another psychotherapeutic model to mind; the 
behavioural therapeutic model of ‘Neuro-Linguistic Programming’ (NLP), again 
explained in Chapter One of this thesis. Although the model of NLP engages 
with people’s thoughts, it is not concerned with the content of those thoughts. 
NLP practitioners are interested only in the way in which people experience, or 
in NLP terms, ‘represent’ their thoughts — that is, for example, whether people 
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see images in their minds, or hear their thoughts as a sound, or a voice speaking 
to them. In NLP, once the representational form of an individual’s thought 
becomes clear, therapeutic intervention involves the manipulation of the 
features of the representation of the thought or of the person’s orientation in 
relation to the representation. So, for example, if a person sees a disturbing 
image in their mind as large, close and bright, they can mentally dim the light 
and move it away so that it is small and shadowy in the distance. This shift in 
perception very often eases any tension or anxiety brought about by the 
thought quickly, without the need to adjust any of the content or meaning of the 
thought. The notion of Mrs. Smith ‘turning readily from evil to good’ is 
reminiscent of another visual NLP strategy, that is to simply look away from a 
picture that depicts a disturbing image and towards another that presents a 
more pleasant one. Where cognitive therapy aims to re-draw the original 
picture, NLP suggests that one simply looks at something else.318  
The second of the latter two techniques that Mrs. Smith uses is ‘finding 
employment which carried her out of herself’. Here I detect a resonance with 
another behavioural psychotherapeutic concept, which is the experience of 
‘flow’.319 As I explain in Chapter One, Csikszentmihalyi applies the term ‘flow’ to 
the state that a person might achieve when they are so absorbed in a task or 
activity that they become unaware of the external environment, and often even 
of themselves. The idea that Mrs. Smith could be transported ‘out of herself’ by 
her engagement with a task resonates clearly with Csikszentmihalyi’s 
observation that the condition of flow induces a ‘loss of consciousness of the 
self’. Further, Csikszentmihalyi concludes that ‘being able to forget temporarily 
who we are seems to be very enjoyable.’320 One may imagine how comforting it 
would be for Mrs. Smith to forget who she is for a while. In the recognition of 
the desirability of that temporary oblivion to her circumstances, the method by 
which it could be achieved, and in the actuality that outcome, Austen’s 
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description of the third strategy used by Mrs. Smith is in close accord with 
Csikszentmihalyi’s conception of ‘flow’.  
As well as the strong resonances between Austen’s portrayal of Mrs. 
Smith’s resilience and the aims and methods encompassed within the CBT 
school of psychotherapy that I outline above, I am struck also by the value that 
Austen places on the abilities demonstrated by Mrs. Smith. Barbara Hardy 
judges Austen’s voice to be ‘unexcited’, and to have ‘neutrality’, ‘steadiness’ and 
‘a social tact and ease in understatement’. Hardy observes that this tone 
facilitates the impact of the author’s irony and enables her ‘most unobtrusively 
to present the private and public world’.321 I concur with this view, so I find it 
significant that the author departs from her restrained tone when she reflects 
on Mrs. Smith’s resilience. Through the use of free indirect speech, it is as 
though it is Anne who writes that Mrs. Smith’s elasticity of mind ‘was from 
Nature alone. It was the choicest gift of Heaven’. Yet with the superlative, 
‘choicest’, and the reference to the highest possible sources of such a ‘gift’, 
Austen dispenses with neutrality and understated unobtrusiveness, and this 
gives the impression that this summation reflects her own deep appreciation of 
Mrs. Smith’s cognitive skills and consequent capacity for resilience. (II:5, 167) 
All of the points that I discuss above cover just a few pages of the novel. 
However, for me, the unusual irony-free fervency of Austen’s tone in her 
concluding statement draws considerable attention to this brief segment, and 
leads me to regard the scene and the minor character of Mrs. Smith to be of 
importance to Austen’s purpose.322 While Mrs. Smith functions as a device to 
further the plot later in the novel, here she plays a vital role in the enhancement 
of Anne’s understanding of internal sources of happiness. Austen attributes 
Mrs. Smith’s resilience to Nature and to Heaven, yet the author’s very specific 
elucidation of the skills that underlie Mrs. Smith’s resilience indicates her 
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recognition that these are very human psychological facilities which people 
who are not as psychologically gifted as Mrs. Smith might learn.  
Most significantly for this thesis, the strategies and methods by which 
Mrs. Smith maintains her psychological well-being correspond to a striking 
degree with those that modern-day cognitive-behavioural psychotherapists 
would recommend. Although Austen did not have the benefit of the carefully 
wrought models now familiar to psychotherapists, she nonetheless 
demonstrates in Mrs. Smith, as in all of the characters on whom I focus in this 
thesis, a remarkable depth of psychological perceptiveness that the 
psychotherapeutic formulations with which her insights resonate serve to 





It seems to me that a good formula to test the quality of a novel is, in the 
long run, a merging of the precision of poetry and the intuition of science. 
In order to bask in that magic a wise reader reads the book of genius not 
with his heart, not so much with his brain, but with his spine. (Vladimir 
Nabokov)323  
 
My primary intention for this thesis has been to demonstrate the ways in which 
the theories and principles that underpin different twentieth-century 
psychotherapeutic approaches provide frameworks and concepts that facilitate 
the identification and definition of Austen’s comprehensive insights into human 
nature and psychology. I wished also to show how my understanding of the 
principles and practices of modern-day psychotherapy has lead me to interpret 
aspects of Austen’s characterisations in ways that in some instances differ from 
existing perceptions, and at other times reinforce or enhance previous readings 
with explanatory analysis that is informed by the principles that underpin 
modern psychotherapeutic practice. Throughout the thesis I have drawn 
attention to the strong resonances that I have detected between the complex 
and subtle aspects of Austen’s characters’ emotions, thoughts and motivations, 
and the ways in which those elements of human experience are comprehended 
and explained within the major schools of psychotherapy.  
The similarity between features of Austen’s portrayals and the 
constituents of these psychotherapeutic formulations is frequently quite 
remarkable, and there is a rich seam of these resemblances throughout the 
author’s novels which I have found to enhance my reading of all of her 
characters. My concern in consideration of the scope of the current thesis was 
to determine the way in which I could convey my readings and impressions 
most effectively. It would have been possible to focus briefly on numerous 
characters across the six novels in the light of each of the psychotherapeutic 
models that have informed this thesis. This strategy would have conveyed a 
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sense of the extent to which modern-day psychotherapeutic concepts permeate 
Austen’s work, and it would have brought a wider range of Austen’s characters 
into the purview of this thesis. However, the distinctiveness of Austen’s 
psychological perspicuity lies in the layers of complexity that the author 
incorporates into her portrayal of the nature of her characters, and the 
psychotherapeutic formulations which form the background of my approach 
provide the means by which these layers may be identified and defined. I chose, 
therefore, to limit the breadth of my exploration, and to analyse in depth a small 
selection of characters and scenarios that I determined would fulfil the remit of 
this thesis most effectively. I chose also to focus on characters that I perceived 
to have attracted less penetrating attention than I observed them to warrant, or 
in respect of whom my interpretations differed from, or augmented most 
substantially, those presented within existing critiques. Further, I decided to 
concentrate largely on scenes that appear to be insignificant but which, from 
my perspective, contribute substantially to a greater understanding of the 
characters involved, as well as of Austen’s extraordinary psychological insight 
and perhaps something of the author’s intention.   
The approach that I have taken has resulted in the absence from this 
thesis of many of Austen’s characters and, in particular, the regrettable 
omission of a substantial analysis of any specific character from Emma. Austen’s 
Juvenilia, Lady Susan, and the unfinished works, The Watsons and Sanditon, have 
likewise fallen outside of the scope of the current thesis.324 However, the 
constraints that I placed on the breadth of my analysis have enabled me to 
present a more finely detailed examination of the ways in which aspects of 
modern psychotherapeutic models may be discerned within Austen’s work, and 
thereby to illuminate the many and nuanced psychological elements that are 
integral to Austen’s characterisations as far as possible within the context of 
this thesis. The thorough explanations of the key psychotherapeutic paradigms 
and the intricate illustrations of Austen’s characters that I have been able to 
offer as a result of my chosen structure and content provide the wherewithal 
for further explorations of each of Austen’s works, and a wider range of her 
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characters from this perspective in the future. It may be interesting too to trace 
the development of Austen’s psychological insights from indications of this 
contained within her Juvenilia. Austen produced her earliest pieces for the 
entertainment of her friends and family, and they are extremely amusing. 
Nevertheless, within the humour, one may detect the beginnings of Austen’s 
interest in the reciprocal interaction between a person’s thought processes on 
their emotions. There is an instance in Catharine, or The Bower, for example, in 
which Catharine is prevented by a toothache from attending a much-anticipated 
ball. Catharine is deeply disappointed, yet Austen states that: 
she was not so totally void of philosophy as many Girls of her age, might 
have been in her situation. She considered that there were Misfortunes of 
a much greater magnitude than the loss of a Ball, experienced every day 
by some part of Mortality, and that the time might come when She would 
herself look back with Wonder and perhaps with Envy on her having 
known no greater vexation. By such reflections as these, she soon 
reasoned herself into as much Resignation & Patience as the pain she 
suffered would allow of […].325 
Here the young Austen describes the ameliorating effect of Catharine’s 
rationalisation on the character’s emotional state. The framework of the 
psychotherapeutic model of Emotional Intelligence, and the detailed analyses of 
Elinor and Marianne that I provide in Chapter Two of this thesis, establish a 
basis from which aspects of the Juvenilia such as this brief reflection on 
Catharine’s part may be interpreted from a psychotherapeutic point of view.  
In the previous chapter of this thesis, I note that my initial awareness of 
the resonance between Austen’s psychological observations and modern 
psychotherapeutic understandings arose from my reading of Austen’s portrayal 
of Mrs. Smith’s resilience. Now, as I draw to the end of this thesis several years 
later, I notice a similar psychotherapy-related critical analysis of Mrs. Smith in 
Kay Young’s chapter ‘Resilience in Jane Austen’, in Beth Lau’s recent 
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publication.326 It is particularly interesting to perceive the explicit involvement 
of psychotherapeutic notions in Young’s proposition that Austen’s illustrations 
of resilience lead her readers to become more resilient themselves. Young 
reflects that ‘[…] Jane Austen grows not just our powers of empathy, but our 
power to hope—the basis of resilience—[…]’, and that ‘The choicest gift of 
heaven is Jane Austen’s gift to us’.327 Young’s statement here touches on my 
acknowledgement in Chapter One of this thesis of the potential value of one 
aspect of Freudian theory in a critique of Austen’s work.328 It is possible that 
Austen’s novels might bring about therapeutic change within her readers by 
virtue of the operation of her storytelling on a metaphorical level. This is a 
notion that is derived directly from the Freudian concept of repression that I 
explain in Chapter One.329 Philip Barker expresses this position succinctly when 
he writes: ‘A person may take a metaphor literally on a conscious level, while on 
the unconscious level perceiving its symbolic meaning. It is on this assumption 
that the clinical use of metaphorical communication is based.’330 Simply then, 
the telling of stories enables new ideas to be embedded at a subconscious level 
before they can be rejected at a conscious level.  
It is not possible to know whether or not Austen had a deliberate 
intention to circumvent the unconscious minds of her readers and to 
communicate personally challenging ideas to them through the medium of her 
novels. However, as Lisa Zunshine suggests, it is hardly possible to interpret a 
text without the construal of an author’s intentions, and, as I indicate 
throughout this thesis, the thread of psychotherapeutic principles within 
Austen’s work suggests to me an intentionality on Austen’s part to elicit 
personal change, or at least self-reflection on the part of her readers.331 Having 
said that, my central intention for this thesis has been to illuminate and define 
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Austen’s psychological insights from a psychotherapeutic viewpoint, and it is 
intriguing to distinguish, in Young’s recent critique, the development of a field 
of exploration of Austen’s work in which the perspective that I present in this 
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